God, which yet he formally derives from it and fufpends upon it. And what is this but to put the very fame thing both before and after, and to make it hang and depend upon it felf? Which feems to make a Figure fo like what we call a Circle, that I fhould think it no defirable Undertaking to be bound to diftinguish it from it. But a little Distinction will ferve to fhew that this is not our Cafe at prefent. 'Tis true indeed that as we found Truth upon the Being of God, so we cannot deny but that the Being of God must be also founded upon Truth, and fo far indeed we feem to make as round a Figure as Des Cartes. But that which hinders it from being fo, is, that this is done not in the fame (as in his Cafe) but in different Respects. For when Truth is founded upon the Being of God as the Ground of it, this is to be taken quoad fe, or as to the Reality of the Thing it felf, meaning that if there were no God, 'tis impoffible there fhould be any Truth, as refulting from the Divine Ideality. But now, when the Being of God is founded upon Truth, as when by any Metaphyfical Argument we prove that there is a God, this is to be understood only quoad nos, or as to our Knowledge or Conviction, in as much as we derive our Knowledge and Certainty of his Being from the Confideration of certain Truths or Reafons that convince and affure us of it. Which carries no Abfurdity in it. For tho' Truth, as to the Thing, depends upon the Being of God, and fo cannot in that Respect be prefuppofed to it, yet nothing hinders but that as to us the Being of God fhould be founded upon

Dd 3

Truth,

Truth, fo that we could not be able to come to the Knowledge, or to have any Certainty of it, but from the Confideration of, and in the Light of fome Truths, or if you please, otherwife thus. Tho' we may be certain of fome Truths before we are certain of the Being of God, those fup. pose whereby we prove his Being, yet as to the Reality of the thing it felf, all Truth may fo depend upon God, and have its Foundation in his Ideality, that if there were no God there could not be that Truth which we suppose. But then for Truth in the Nature of the thing to be confequential (Formally I mean) to the Being of God, and yet as to our Knowledge or Certainty of it to go before it, is neither Circle nor Contradiction.

1

But yet however fince upon the Principles of this Theory, Truth is fuppofed to be the fame with God according to a real Identity, and fince God is proved by Truth, will not this be to prove the fame thing by it felf? No, not in the inconvenient Senfe intended in that way of speaking. For tho' here be a real Identity, yet here is alfo a Formal Diftinction, Truth not being Formally the fame with God, as has been noted already. But now there is no more Abfurdity in proving the fame by the fame, if by the fame be meant only Really, not Formally the fame, than in proving one Attribute of God by another, as his Eternity, fuppofe, from the Neceffity or Immutability of his Being, which tho' really the fame, yet being of a distinct Formality, are allow'd in all Rational Difcourfes about them

to

to be confider'd and used as if really distinct, as to any Confequence from one to the other. So that here is no Confufion in the Account given of these things, which by this feeming Intanglement, appear the more clear and confiftent, and will Í hope, the more they are confider'd.

CHAP. VII.

The Notion and Distinction of Effence and Existence briefly Stated and Explain'd upon Ideal Principles.

I.

ΤΗ

HERE is hardly any thing of more nice and delicate Confideration in it self, or upon which Metaphysical and Scholaftick Pens have bestow'd more Exquifite Subtilty, and yet after all have left more Intricate and Confufed, than the Notion of Effence and Existence, and the Distinction that is between them. The main Ground and Occafion of which Intanglement I take to be their Confidering Effence and Exittence with Relation to one and the felf-fame thing, as the two Metaphyfical Degrees of it, and as it were different parts whereof it confifts (for de Effentia & Exiftentia is one of the Metaphyfical Compofitions) whereas fo far as these are any ways diftinct from one another, they will be found to belong to different things. Ifay, fo far as they are Diftinct. For I pretend not to deny but that Dd 4 there

there is also an Effence in the thing that Exifts, as alfo on the other fide there is Exiftence belonging to every thing that has an Effence. But then I fay, that fo confider'd they are not at all diftinct. This is not that Effence which fhould be diftinguish'd from Exiftence. And 'tis the making this otherwife neceffary Diftinction where it fhould not and cannot be, which has bred fo great Confufion and Perplexity in this Matter. Which yet upon the Principles of our Ideal Syftem we defpair not to clear and rectify.

ing, but may fometimes not be, and yet notwithstanding this that it is always Intelligible (for fo a Circle is always an Intelligible Thing whether there be really any Circle in Nature or no) took occafion from hence to diftinguish, that in the Creature which is at all times Intelligible, from that which in fome time actually is, and fo probably upon this Ground raised the Distinction of Effence and Exiftente. By the Effence of a Thing, meaning that in the Thing whereby it is primari ly Intelligible or Conceivable, as in fuch a certain Degree or Order of Being. Or that whereby it is Defined. And this they other wife call the Quiddity, Formal Reafon or Nature of a Thing. By the Existence of a Thing, that whereby it becomes a real and actual Being in the World. And this latter they look upon as a kind of Acceffory Form to the other, or as the Metaphyfical Act and Compliment of it, with refpect to which the other is by them conceiv'd as a fort of Potential Being. And thus, as Intelligibly and as Com pendiously as I can exprefs it, they diftinguish the Effence of a Thing from its Exiftence. Not that they fuppofe this Diftinction to be real (for they pretend not but that in the Thing they are one and the fame) but only Rational, or by way of Abstraction, with a Foundation or Occafion for it in the Thing, which as I faid before I take to be the conftant Intelligibility as confider'd with the Contingent Being of the Crea