have stated, that they are subversive of our political institutions, and fatal, in their tendency, to the liberty and happiness of the country. Fortunately, we are not left to conjecture or inference as to what these principles are. It was openly proclaimed, both here and elsewhere, in the debates of this body and the proclamation and message of the President, in which the act originated, that the very basis on which it rests-the assumption on which only it could be supported-was, that this government had the final and conclusive right, in the last resort, to judge of the extent of its powers; and that, to execute its decision, it had the right to use all the means of the country, civil, military, and fiscal, not only against individuals, but against the states themselves, and all acting under their authority, whether in a legislative, executive, or judicial capacity.

If farther evidence be required as to the nature and character of the act, it will be found in the history of the events in which it took its origin. It originated, as we all know, in a controversy between this government and the State of South Carolina, in reference to a power which involved the question of the constitutionality of a protective tariff. I do not intend to give the history of this controversy; it is sufficient for my purpose to say that the state, in maintenance of what she believed to be her unquestionable power, assumed the highest ground: she placed herself on her sovereign authority as a constituent member of this confederacy, and made her opposition to the encroachment on her rights through a convention of the people, the only organ by which, according to our conception, the sovereign will of a state can be immediately and directly pronounced. This government, on its part, in resistance to the action of the state, assumed the right to trample upon the authority of the convention, and to look beyond the state to the individuals who compose it: not as forming a political community, but as a mere mass of insolated individuals, without political character or authority; and thus asserted in the strongest manner, not only the right of judging of its own powers, but that of overlooking, in a contest for power, the very existence of the state itself, and of recognising, in the assertion of what it might claim to be its power, no other authority whatever in the system but its own.

Such being the principle in which this bill originated, we are brought to the consideration of a question of the deepest import. Is an act, which assumes such powers for this government, consistent with the nature and character of our political institutions?

It is not my intention, in the discussion of this question, to renew the debate of the last session. But, in declining to renew that discussion, I wish to be directly understood that I do so exclusively on the ground that I do not feel myself justified in repeating arguments so recently advanced; and not on the ground that there is the least abatement of confidence in the positions then assumed, or in the decisive bearing which they ought to have against the act. So far otherwise, time and reflection have but served to confirm me in the impression which I then entertained; and, without repeating the arguments, I now avail myself, in this discussion, of the positions then established, and stand prepared to vindicate them against whatever assaults may be made upon them, come from what quarter they may. Without, then, reopening the discussion of the last session on the elementary principles of our government, which were then brought into controversy, I shall now proceed to take the plainest and most common-sense view of our political institutions, regarding them merely in a matter-of-fact way, in order to ascertain the parts of which they are composed, and the relations which they bear to each other.

Thus regarding our institutions, we are struck, on the first view, with the number and complexity of the parts-with the division, classification,

and organization which pervade every part of the system. It is, in fact, a system of governments; and these, in turn, are a system of departmentsa system in which government bears the same relation to government, in reference to the whole, as departments do to departments, in reference to each particular government. As each government is made up of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments organized into one, so the system is made up of this government, and the state governments, in like manner, organized into one system. So, too, as the powers which constitute the respective governments are divided and organized into departments, in like manner in the formation of the governments, their powers are classed into two distinct divisions: the one containing powers local and peculiar in their character, which the interests of the states require to be exercised by each state through a separate government; the other containing those which are more general and comprehensive, and which can be best exercised in some uniform mode through a common government. The former of these divisions constitutes what, in our system, are known as the reserved powers, and are exercised by each state through its own separate government. The latter are known as the delegated powers, and are exercised through this, the common government of the several states. This division of power into two parts, with distinct and independent governments, regularly organized into departments, legisla tive, executive, and judicial, to carry their respective parts into effect, constitutes the great striking and peculiar character of our system, and is without example in ancient or modern times; and may be regarded as the fundamental distribution of power under the system, and as constituting its great conservative principle.

If we extend our eyes beyond, we shall find another striking division between the power of the people and that of the government-between that inherent, primitive, creative power which resides exclusively in the people, and from which all authority is derived, and the delegated power or trust conferred upon the government to effect the object of their creation. If we look still beyond, we shall find another and most important division. The people, instead of being united in one general community, are divided into twenty-four states, each forming a distinct sovereign community, and in which, separately, the whole power of the system ultimately resides.

If we examine how this ultimate power is called into action, we shall find that its only organ is a primary assemblage of the people, known under the name of a convention, through which their sovereign will is announced, and by which governments are formed and organized. If we trace historically the exertion of this power in the formation of the gov ernments constituting our system, we shall find that, originally, on the separation of the thirteen colonies from the crown of Great Britain, each state for itself, through its own convention, formed separate constitutions and governments, and that these governments, in turn, formed a league or confederacy for the purpose of exercising those powers, in the regulation of which the states had a common interest. But this confederacy, proving incompetent for its object, was superseded by the present Constitution, which essentially changed the character of the system. If we compare the mode of the adoption of this Constitution with that of the adoption of original constitutions of the several states, we shall find them precisely the same. In both, each state adopted the Constitution through its own convention, by its separate act, each for itself, and is only bound in consequence of its own adoption, without reference to the adoption of any other state. The only point in which they can be distinguished is the mutual compact, in which each state stipulated with the

other to adopt it as a common Constitution. Thus regarded, this Constitution is, in fact, the Constitution of each state. In Virginia, for in stance, it is the Constitution of Virginia; and so, too, this government, and the laws which it enacts, are, within the limits of the state, the government and the laws of the state. It is, in fact, the Constitution and government, of the whole, because it is the Constitution and government of each part; and not the Constitution and government of the parts because it is of the whole. The system commences with the parts, and ends with the whole. The parts are the units, and the whole the multiple, instead of the whole being a unit and the parts the fractions. Thus viewed, each state has two distinct Constitutions and governments-a separate Constitution and government, instituted, as I have stated, to regulate the object in which each has a peculiar interest; and a general one to regulate the interests common to all, and binding by a common compact the whole into one community, in which the separate and independent existence of each state as a sovereign community is preserved, instead of being fused into

a common mass.

Such is our system: such are its parts, and such their relation to each other. I have stated no fact that can be questioned, nor have I omitted any that is essential which I am capable of perceiving. In reviewing the whole, we must be no less struck with the simplicity of the means by which all are blended into one, than we are by the number and complex. ity of the parts. I know of no system, in either respect, ancient or modern, to be compared with it; and can compare it to nothing but that sublime and beautiful system of which our globe constitutes a part, and to which it bears in many particulars so striking a resemblance. In this system, this government, as we have seen, constitutes a part-a prominent, but a subordinate part, with defined, limited, and restricted powers.

I now repeat the question, Is the act which assumes for this government the right to interpret, in the last resort, the extent of its powers, and to enforce its interpretation against all other authority, consistent with our institutions? To state the question is to answer it. We might with equal propriety ask whether a government of unlimited power is consistent with one of enumerated and restricted powers. I say unlimited, for I would hold his understanding in low estimation who can make, practically, any distinction between a government of unlimited powers, and one which has an unlimited right to construe and enforce its powers as it pleases; who does not see that, to divide power, and to give one of the parties the exclusive right to determine what share belongs to him, is to annihilate the division, and to vest the whole in him who possesses the right? It would be no less absurd, than for one in private life to divide his property with another, and vest in that other the absolute and unconditional right to determine the extent of his share; which would be, in fact, to give him the whole. Nor could I think much more highly of the understanding of him who does not perceive that this exclusive right, on the part of this government, of determining the extent of its powers, necessarily destroys all distinction between reserved and delegated powers; and that it thus strikes a fatal blow at that fundamental distribution of power which lies at the bottom of our system. It also, by inevitable consequence, destroys all distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional laws, making the latter to the full as obligatory as the former; of which we had a remarkable example when the act proposed to be repealed was before the Senate. It is well known that the power in controversy between this government and the State of South Carolina had been pronounced to be unconstitutional by the legislatures of most of the Southern States, and also by many of the members of this body; and yet

there were instances, however extraordinary it may appear, of members of the body voting to enforce an act which they believed to be unconstitutional, and that, too, at the hazard of civil war. As strange as such a course must appear, it was the natural and legitimate consequence of the power which the act assumed for this government, and illustrates, in the strongest manner imaginable, the truth of what I have advanced. But to proceed. This unlimited right of judging as to its powers, not only destroys, as I have stated, all distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional acts, but merges in this government the very existence of the separate governments of the states, by reducing them from that independent and distinct existence, as co-governments, assigned to them in the system, to mere subordinate and dependant bodies, holding their power and existence at the mercy of this government. It stops not here-it annihilates the states themselves. The right which it assumes of trampling upon the authority of a Convention of the people of the states, the only organ through which the sovereignty of the states can exert itself, and to look beyond the states to the individuals who compose them, and to treat them as entirely destitute of all political character or power, is, in fact, to annihilate the states, and to transfer their sovereignty, and all their powers, to this government.

If we now raise our eyes, and direct them towards that once beautiful system, with all its various, separate, and independent parts blended into one harmonious whole, we must be struck with the mighty change! All have disappeared-gone-absorbed-concentrated and consolidated in this government, which is left alone in the midst of the desolation of the system, the sole and unrestricted representative of an absolute and despotic majority.

Will it be tolerated, that I should ask whether an act which has caused so complete a revolution-which has entirely subverted our political system, as it emanated from the hands of its creators, and reared in its place one in every respect so different-must not, in its consequences, prove fatal to the liberty and the happiness of these states? Can it be necessary for me to prove that no other system that human ingenuity can devise, or imagination conceive, but that which this fatal act has subverted, can preserve the liberty or secure the happiness of the country? Need I show that the most difficult problem which ever was presented to the mind of a legislator to solve, was to devise a system of government for a country of such vast extent, that should at once possess sufficient power to hold the whole together, without, at the same time, proving fatal to liberty? There never existed an example before of a free community spreading over such an extent of territory; and the ablest and profoundest thinkers, at the time, believed it to be utterly impracticable that there should be. Yet this difficult problem was solved-successfully solved, by the wise and sagacious men who framed our Constitution. No: it was above unaided human wisdom-above the sagacity of the most enlightened. It was the result of a fortunate combination of circumstances, co-operating and leading the way to its formation; directed by that kind Providence which has so often and so signally disposed events in our favour.

To solve this difficult problem, and to overcome the apparently insuperable obstacle which it presents, required that peculiar division, distribution, and organization of power which, as I have stated, so remarkably distinguish our system, and which serve as so many breakwaters to arrest the angry waves of power, impelled by avarice and ambition, and which, driven furiously over a broad and unbroken expanse, would be resistless. Of this partition and breaking up of power into separate parts, the most remarkable division is that between the reserved and delegated

powers, which forms the basis on which this and the separate governments of the states are organized, as the great and primary departments of the system. It is this important division which mainly gives that expansive character to our institutions, by means of which they have the capacity of being spread over the vast extent of our country without exposing us on the one side to the danger of disunion, or on the other to the loss of liberty. Without this happy device, the people of these states, after having achieved their independence, would have been compelled to resolve themselves into small and hostile communities, in despite of a common origin, a common language, and the common renown and glory acquired by their united wisdom and valour in the war of the Revolution, or have submitted quietly to the yoke of despotic power as the only alternative.

In the place of this admirably-contrived system, the act proposed to be repealed has erected one great consolidated government. Can it be necessary for me to show what must be the inevitable consequences? Need I prove that all consolidated governments-governments in which a single power predominates (for such is their essence) are necessarily despotic, whether that power be wielded by the will of one man, or that of an absolute and unchecked majority? Need I demonstrate that it is, on the contrary, the very essence of liberty that the power should be so divided, distributed, and organized, that one interest may check the other, so as to prevent the excessive action of the separate interests of the community against each other; on the principle that organized power can only be checked by organized power?

The truth of these doctrines was fully understood at the time of the formation of this Constitution. It was then clearly foreseen and foretold what must be the inevitable consequences of concentrating all the powers of the system in this government. Yes, we are in a state predicted, foretold, prophesied from the beginning. All the calamities we have experienced, and those which are yet to come, are the result of the consolidating tendency of the government; and unless that tendency be arrested -unless we reverse our steps, all that has been foretold will certainly befall us even to the pouring out of the last vial of wrath-military despotism. To this fruitful source of woes may be traced that remarkable decay of public virtue; that rapid growth of corruption and subserviency; that decline of patriotism; that increase of faction; that tendency to anarchy; and, finally, that visible approach of the absolute power of one man which so lamentably characterizes the times. Should there be any one seeing and acknowledging all these morbid and dangerous symptoms, but should doubt whether the disease is to be traced to the cause which I have assigned, I would ask him, To what other can it be attributed? There is no event-no, not in the political or moral world, more than in the physical-without an adequate cause. I would ask him, Does he attribute it to the people to their want of sufficient intelligence and virtue for self-government? If the true cause may be traced to them, very melancholy would be our situation; gloomy would be the prospect before us. If such be the fact, that our people are, indeed, incapable of self-government, I know of no people upon earth with whom we might not desire to change condition. When the day comes when this people shall be compelled to surrender self-government, a people so spirited and so long accustomed to liberty, it will be indeed a day of revolution, of convulsion and blood, such as has rarely, if ever, been witnessed in any age or country; and, until compelled by irresistible evidence, so fearful a cause cannot be admitted.

Can it be attributed to the nature of our system of government? Shall we pronounce it radically defective, and incapable of effecting the objects