stock. Nor can it be less obvious that, in point of fact, the former would prove far stronger than the latter. The result is obvious. The surplus, be it ever so great, would be absorbed by appropriations instead of being vested in the stock, and the scheme, of course, would, in practice, prove an abortion; which brings us back to the original inquiry, How is the surplus to be disposed of until the excess shall be reduced to the just and economical wants of the government?

After bestowing on this question, on the successful solution of which so much depends, the most deliberate attention, your committee, as they have already stated, can advise but one means by which it can be effected; and that is an amendment of the Constitution, authorizing the temporary distribution of the surplus revenue among the states till the year 1843, when, as has been shown, the income and expenditure will be equalized.

Your committee are fully aware of the many and fatal objections to the distribution of the surplus revenue among the states, considered as a part of the ordinary and regular system of this government. They admit them to be as great as can be well imagined. The proposition itself, that the government should collect money for the purpose of such distribution, or should distribute a surplus for the purpose of perpetuating taxes, is too absurd to require refutation; and yet what would be, when applied, as supposed, so absurd and pernicious, is, in the opinion of your committee, in the present extraordinary and deeply-disordered state of our affairs, not only useful and salutary, but indispensable to the restoration of the body politic to a sound condition: just as some potent medicine, which it would be dangerous and absurd to prescribe to the healthy, may, to the diseased, be the only means of arresting the hand of death. Distribution, as proposed, is not for the preposterous and dangerous purpose of raising a revenue for distribution, or of distributing the surplus as a means of perpetuating a system of duties or taxes, but a temporary measure to dispose of an unavoidable surplus while the revenue is in the course of reduction, and which cannot be otherwise disposed of without greatly aggravating disease that threatens the most dangerous consequences; and which holds out hope, not only of arresting its farther progress, but also of restoring the body politic to a state of health and vigour. The truth of this assertion a few observations will suffice to illustrate.

It must be obvious, on a little reflection, that the effects of distribution of the surplus would be to place the interests of the states, on all questions of expenditure, in opposition to expenditure, as every reduction of expense would necessarily increase the sum to be distributed among the states. The effect of

this would be to convert them, through their interests, into faithful and vigilant sentinels on the side of economy and accountability in the expenditures of this government; and would thus powerfully tend to restore the government, in its fiscal action, to the honest simplicity of former days.

It may, perhaps, be thought by some that the power which the distribution among the states would bring to bear against the expenditure, and its conse quent tendency to retrench the disbursements of the government, would be so strong as not only to curtail useless or improper expenditure, but also the useful and necessary. Such, undoubtedly, would be the consequence if the process were too long continued; but in the present irregular and excessive action of the system, when its centripetal force threatens to concentrate all its powers in a single department, the fear that the action of this government will be too much reduced by the measure under consideration, in the short period to which it is proposed to limit its operation, is without just foundation. On the contrary, if the proposed measure should be applied in the present diseased state of the government, its effect would be like that of some powerful alterative medicine, operating just long enough to change the present morbid action, but not sufficiently long to superinduce another of an opposite character. A A

But it may be objected, that, though the distribution might reduce all useless expenditure, it would, at the same time, give additional power to the interest in favour of taxation. It is not denied that such would be its tendency; and, if the danger from increased duties or taxes was at this time as great as that from a surplus revenue, the objection would be fatal; but it is confidently believed that such is not the case. On the contrary, in proposing the measure, it is assumed that the act of March 2, 1833, will remain undisturbed. It is on the strength of this assumption that the measure is proposed, and, as it is believed, safely proposed.

It may, however, be said that the distribution may create, on the part of the states, an appetite in its favour which may ultimately lead to its adoption as a permanent measure. It may, indeed, tend to excite such an appetite, short as is the period proposed for its operation; but it is obvious that this danger is far more than countervailed by the fact, that the proposed amendment to the Constitution to authorize the distribution would place the power beyond the reach of legislative construction, and thus effectually prevent the possibility of its adoption as a permanent measure, as it cannot be conceived that three fourths of the states will ever assent to an amendment of the Constitution to authorize a distribution, except as an extraordinary measure, applicable to some extraor dinary condition of the country like the present.

Giving, however, to these, and other objections which may be urged, all the force that can be claimed for them, it must be remembered, the question is not whether the measure proposed is or is not liable to this or that objection, but whether any other less objectionable can be devised; or, rather, whether there is any other which promises the least prospect of relief that can be applied. Let not the delusion prevail that the disease, after running through its natural course, will terminate of itself, without fatal consequences. Experience is opposed to such anticipations. Many and striking are the examples of free states perishing under that excess of patronage which now afflicts ours. It may, in fact, be said with truth, that all, or nearly all, diseases which afflict free governments, may be traced directly or indirectly to excess of revenue and expenditure; the effect of which is to rally around the government a powerful, corrupt, and subservient corps-a corps ever obedient to its will, and ready to sustain it in every measure, whether right or wrong, and which, if the cause of the disease be not eradicated, must ultimately render the government stronger than the people.

What progress this dangerous disease has already made in our country it is not for your committee to say; but when they reflect on the present symptoms, on the almost unbounded extent of executive patronage, wielded by a single will; the surplus revenue, which cannot be reduced within proper limits in less than seven years-a period which covers two presidential elections, on both of which all this mighty power and influence will be brought to bear-and when they consider that, with the vast patronage and influence of this government, that of all the states acting in concert with it will be combined, there are just grounds to fear that the fate which has befallen so many other free governments must also befall ours, unless, indeed, some effectual remedy be forthwith applied. It is under this impression that your committee have suggested the one proposed, not as free from all objections, but as the only one of sufficient power to arrest the disease, and to restore the body politic to a sound condition; and they have, accordingly, reported a resolution so to amend the Constitution that the money remaining in the treasury at the end of each year, till the 1st of January, 1843, deducting therefrom the sum of $2,000,000 to meet current and contingent expenses, shall annually be distributed among the states and territories, including the District of Columbia; and, for that purpose, the sum to be distributed to be divided into as many shares as there are senators and representatives in Congress, adding two for each territory, and two for the Dis

trict of Columbia; and that there shall be allotted to each state a number of shares equal to its representation in both houses, and to the territories, including the District of Columbia, two shares each. Supposing the surplus to be distributed should average $9,000,000 annually, as estimated, it would give to each share $30,405; which, multiplied by the number of senators and representatives of any state, would show the sum to which it would be entitled.

The reason for selecting the ratio of distribution proposed in the amendment is too obvious to require much illustration. It is that which indicates the relative political weight assigned by the Constitution to the members of the confederacy respectively, and, it is believed, approaches as nearly to equality as any other that can be selected. It may be objected that some states, under the distribution, may receive more, and others less than their actual contribution to the treasury, under the existing system of revenue. The truth of the objection may be acknowledged, but it must also be acknowledged that the inequali ty is at least as great under the present system of disbursement, and would be as great under any other disposition of the surplus that can be adopted.

But as effectual as the distribution must be, if adopted, to retrench improper expenditure, and reduce correspondingly the patronage of the government, yet other means must be added to bring it within safe limits, and to prevent the recurrence hereafter of the danger which now threatens the institutions and the liberty of the country; and, with this view, your committee have reported a bill to repeal the first and second sections of the act to limit the term of certain officers therein named, passed 13th May, 1820; to make it the duty of the President to lay before Congress, on the first of January next, and on the first of January every four years thereafter, the names of all defaulting officers and agents charged with the collection and disbursement of the public money, whose commissions shall be vacated from and after the date of such message; and also to make it his duty, in all cases of nomination to fill vacancies occasioned by removal from office, to assign the reason for which said officer may have been removed.

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The provisions of this bill are the same as those contained in bill No. 2, reported to the Senate on the 4th of May, 1826, by a select committee appointed to inquire into the expediency of reducing the patronage of the government of the United States," and which was accompanied by an explanatory report, to which your committee would refer the Senate; and, in order to facilitate the reference, they have instructed their chairman to move to reprint the report for their use.

But the great and alarming strides which patronage has made in the short period that has intervened since the date of the report, has demonstrated the necessity of imposing other limitations on the discretionary powers of the executive, particularly in reference to the General Postoffice and the public funds, on which important subject the executive has an almost unlimited discretion as things now are.

In a government like ours, liable to dangers so imminent from the excess and abuse of patronage, it would seem extraordinary that a department of such vast powers, with an annual income and expenditure so great, and with a host of persons in its service, extending and ramifying itself to the remotest point, and into every neighbourhood of the Union, and having a control over the correspondence and intercourse of the whole community, should be permitted to remain so long, without efficient checks or responsibility, under the almost unlimited control of the executive. Such a power, wielded by a single will, is sufficient of itself, when made an instrument of ambition, to contaminate the community, and to control to a great extent public opinion. To guard against this danger, and to impose effectual restrictions on executive patronage, acting through this important department, your committee are of the opinion that an entire reorganization of the department is required; but their labour, in refer

ence to this subject, has been superseded by the Committee on the Postoffice, which has bestowed so much attention on it, and which is so much more minutely acquainted with the diseased state of the department than your committee can be, that it would be presumption on their part to attempt to add to their recommendation.

But, as extensive and dangerous as is the patronage of the executive through the postoffice department, it is not much less so in reference to the public funds, over which, as has been stated, it now has unlimited control, and, through them, over the entire banking system of the country. With a banking system spread from Maine to Louisiana, from the Atlantic to the utmost West, consisting of not less than five or six hundred banks, struggling among themselves for existence and gain, with an immense public fund under the control of the executive, to be deposited in whatever banks he may favour, or to be withdrawn at his pleasure, it is impossible for ingenuity to devise any scheme better calculated to convert the surplus revenue into a most potent engine of power and influence; and, it may be added, of peculation, speculation, corruption, and fraud. The first and most decisive step against this danger is that already proposed, of distributing the surplus revenue among the states, which will prevent its growing accumulation in the banks, and, with it, the corresponding increase of executive power and influence over the banking system. In addition, your committee have reported a bill to charge the deposite banks at the rate of per cent. per annum for the use of the public funds, to be calculated on the average monthly deposites; to prohibit transfers, except for the purpose of disbursements; and to prevent a removal of the public funds from the banks in which they are now, or may hereafter be deposited, without the consent of Congress, except as is provided in the bill. The object of the bill is to secure to the government an equivalent for the use of the public funds, to prevent the abuses and influence incident to transfer-warrants, and to place the deposite banks, as far as it may be practicable, beyond the control of the executive.

In addition to these measures, there are, doubtless, many others connected with the customs-Indian affairs, public lands, army, navy, and other branches of the administration-into which, it is feared, there have crept many abuses, which have unnecessarily increased the expenditures and the number of persons employed, and, with them, the executive patronage; but to reform which would require a more minute investigation into the general state of the administration than your committee can at present bestow. Should the measures which they have recommended receive the sanction of Congress, they feel a strong conviction that they will greatly facilitate the work of carrying accountability, retrenchment, and economy through every branch of the administration, and thereby reduce the patronage of the executive to those safe and economical limits which are necessary to a complete restoration of the equilibrium of the system, now so dangerously disturbed. Your committee are deeply impressed with the necessity of commencing early, and of carrying through to its full and final completion, this great work of reform.

The disease is daily becoming more aggravated and dangerous, and, if it be permitted to advance for a few years longer with the rapidity with which it has of late, it will soon pass beyond the reach of remedy. This is no party question. Every lover of his country and of its institutions, be his party what it may, must see and deplore the rapid growth of patronage, with all its attendant evils, and the certain catastrophe which awaits its farther progress, if not timely arrested. The question now is not how, or where, or with whom the danger originated, but how it is to be arrested; not the cause, but the remedy; not how our institutions and liberty have been endangered, but how they are to be rescued.

XI.

A REPORT ON THAT PORTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WHICH RELATED TO THE ADOPTION OF EFFICIENT MEASURES TO PREVENT THE CIRCULATION OF INCENDIARY ABOLITION PETITIONS THROUGH THE MAIL, FEBRUARY 4, 1836.

The Select Committee to whom was referred that portion of the President's Message which relates to the attempts to circulate, through the mail, inflammatory appeals, to excite the slaves to insurrection, submit the following report:

THE Committee fully concur with the President as to the character and tendency of the papers which have been attempted to be circulated in the South through the mail, and participate with him in the indignant regret which he expresses at conduct so destructive of the peace and harmony of the country, and so repugnant to the Constitution and the dictates of humanity and religion. They also concur in the hope that, if the strong tone of disapprobation which these unconstitutional and wicked attempts have called forth does not arrest them, the non-slaveholding states will be prompt to exercise their power to suppress them, as far as their authority extends. But, while they agree with the President as to the evil and its highly dangerous tendency, and the necessity of arresting it, they have not been able to assent to the measure of redress which he recommends-that Congress should pass a law prohibiting, under severe penalty, the transmission of incendiary publications through the mail, intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection.

After the most careful and deliberate investigation, they have been constrained to adopt the conclusion that Congress has not the power to pass such a law; that it would be a violation of one of the most sacred provisions of the Constitution, and subversive of reserved powers essential to the preservation of the domestic institutions of the slaveholding states, and, with them, their peace and security. Concurring, as they do, with the President in the magnitude of the evil and the necessity of its suppression, it would have been the cause of deep regret to the committee, if they thought the difference of opinion, as to the right of Congress, would deprive the slaveholding states of any portion of the protection which the measure recommended by the President was intended to afford them. On the contrary, they believe all the protection intended may be afforded, according to the views they take of the power of Congress, without infringing on any provision of the Constitution on one side, or the reserved rights of the states on the other.

The committee, with these preliminary remarks, will now proceed to establish the positions which they have assumed, beginning with the first-that the passage of a law would be a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

In the discussion of this point, the committee do not deem it necessary to inquire whether the right to pass such a law can be derived from the power to establish postoffices and postroads, or from the trust of "preserving the relation created by the Constitution between the states," as supposed by the President. However ingenious or plausible the arguments may be by which it may be attempted to derive the right from these or any other sources, they must fall short of their object. The jealous spirit of liberty which characterized our ancestors at the period when the Constitution was adopted, forever closed the door by which the right might be implied from any of the granted powers, or any other source, if there be any other. The committee refer to the amended article of the Constitution, which, among other things, provides that Congress shall pass no law which shall abridge the liberty of the press-a provision which interposes, as will be hereafter shown, an insuperable objection to the measure rec