functions for which it was created. Then the proper responsibility of each to their respective constituency would be destroyed; then would succeed a scene of plunder and corruption without parallel, to be followed by dissolution, or an entire change of system. Yes: if any one measure can dissolve this Union, this is that measure. The revenue is the state, said the great British statesman, Burke. With us, to divide the revenue among its members is to divide the Union. This bill proposes to divide that from the lands. Take one step more, to which this will lead if not arrested-divide the revenue from the customs, and what of union would be left? I touched more fully on this, and other important points connected with this detestable measure, during the discussions of the last session, and shall not now repeat what I then said.

What I now propose is, to trace the change it would make in our financial system, with its bearings on what ought to be the policy of the government. I have selected it, not because it is the most important, but because it is that which has heretofore received the least attention.

This government has heretofore been supported almost exclusively from two sources of revenue-the lands and the customs; excepting a short period at its commencement, and during the late war, when it drew a great portion of its means from internal taxes. The revenue from lands has been constantly and steadily increasing with the increase of population, and may, for the next ten years, be safely estimated to yield an annual average income of $5,000,000, if they should be properly administered: a sum equal to more than a fourth of what the entire expenditures of the government ought to be with due economy, and restricted to the objects for which it was instituted.

This bill proposes to withdraw this large, permanent, and growing source of revenue from the treasury of the Union, and to distribute it among the several states; and the question is, Would it be wise to do so, viewed as a financial measure, in reference to what ought to be the policy of the government? which brings up the previous question, What ought that policy to be? In the order of things, the question of policy precedes that of finance. The latter has reference to, and is dependant on, the former. It must first be determined what ought to be done, before it can be ascertained how much revenue will be required, and on what it ought to be raised.

To the question, then, What ought to be the policy of the government? the shortest and most comprehensive answer which I can give is, that it ought to be the very opposite of that for which this extraordinary session was called, and of which this measure forms so prominent a part. The effect of these measures is to divide and distract the country within, and to weaken it without, the very reverse of the objects for which the government was instituted-which was to give peace, tranquillity, and harmony within, and power, security, and respectability without. We find, accordingly, that without, where strength was required, its powers are undivided. In its exterior relations-abroad, this government is the sole and exclusive representative of the united majesty, sovereignty, and power of the states constituting this great and glorious Union. To the rest of the world we are one. Neither state nor state government is known beyond our borders. Within it is different. There we form twentysix distinct, independent, and sovereign communities, each with its separate government, whose powers are as exclusive within as that of this government is without, with the exception of three classes of powers which are delegated to it. The first is, those that were necessary to the discharge of its exterior functions-such as declaring war, raising armies, providing a navy, and raising revenue. The reason for delegating these requires no explanation. The next class consists of those powers that were necessary to regulate the exterior or international relations of the states among themselves, considered as distinct communities-powers that could not be exercised by the states separately, and the regulation of which was necessary to their peace, tranquillity, and that free

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intercourse, social and commercial, which ought to exist between confederated states. Such are those of regulating commerce between the states, coining money, and fixing the value thereof, and the standard of weights and measures. The remaining class consists of those powers which, though not belonging to the exterior relations of the states, are of such nature that they could not be exercised by states separately without one injuring the other-such as imposing duties on imports; in exercising which, the maritime states, having the advantage of good ports, would tax those who would have to draw their supply through them. In asserting that, with these exceptions, the powers of the states are exclusive within, I speak in general terms. There are, indeed, others not reducible to either of these classes, but they are too few and inconsiderable to be regarded as exceptions.

On the moderate and prudent exercise of these, its interior powers, the success of the government, and with it our entire political system, mainly depend. If the government should be restricted in their exercise to the objects for which they are delegated, peace, harmony, and tranquillity would reign within; and the attention of the government, unabsorbed by distracting questions within, and its entire resources unwasted by expenditures on objects foreign to its duties, would be directed with all its energy to guard against danger from without, to give security to our vast commercial and navigating interest, and to acquire that weight and respectability for our name in the family of nations which ought to belong to the freest, most enterprising, and most growing people on the globe. If thus restricted in the exercise of these, the most delicate of its powers, and in the exercise of which only it can come in conflict with the governments of the states, or interfere with their interior policy and interest, this government, with our whole political system, would work like a charm, and become the admiration of the world. The states, left undisturbed within their separate spheres, and each in the full possession of its resources, would, with that generous rivalry which always takes place between clusters of free states of the same origin and language, and which gives the greatest possible impulse to improvement, carry excellence in all that is desirable beyond any former example.

But if, instead of restricting these powers to their proper objects, they should be perverted to those never intended; if, for example, that of raising revenue should be perverted into that of protecting one branch of industry at the expense of others; that of collecting and disbursing the revenue into that of incorporating a great central bank, to be located at some favoured point, and placed under local control; and that of making appropriations for specified objects, into that of expending money on whatever Congress should think proper-all this would be reversed. Instead of harmony and tranquillity within, there would be discord, distraction, and conflict, followed by the absorption of the attention of the government, and exhaustion of its means and energy on objects never intended to be placed under its control, to the utter neglect of the duties belonging to the exterior relations of the government, and which are exclusively confided to its charge. Such has been, and ever must be, the effect of perverting these powers to objects foreign to the Constitution. When thus perverted, they become unequal in their action, operating to the benefit of one part or class to the injuof another part or class-to the benefit of the manufacturing against the agricultural and commercial portions, or of the non-productive against the producing class. The more extensive the country, the greater would be the inequality and oppression. In ours, stretching over two thousand square miles, they become intolerable when pushed beyond moderate limits. It is then conflicts take place, from the struggle on the part of those who are benefited by the operation of an unequal system of legislation to retain their advantage, and on the part of the oppressed to resist it. When this state of things occurs, it is neither more nor less than a state of hostility between the oppressor and oppressed -war waged not by armies, but by laws; acts and sections of acts are sent by

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the stronger party on a plundering expedition, instead of divisions and brigades, which often return more richly laden with spoils than a plundering expedition after the most successful foray.

That such must be the effect of the system of measures now attempted to be forced on the government by the perversion of its interior powers, I appeal to the voice of experience in aid of the dictates of reason. I go back to the beginning of the government, and ask, What, at its outset, but this very system of measures caused the great struggle which continued down to 1828, when the system reached its full growth in the tariff of that year? And what, from that period to the termination of the late election which brought the present party into power, has disturbed the harmony and tranquillity of the country, deranged its currency, interrupted its business, endangered its liberty and institutions, but a struggle on one side to overthrow, and on the other to uphold the system? In that struggle it fell prostrate; and what now agitates the country, what causes this extraordinary session, with all its excitement, but the struggle on the part of those in power to restore the system; to incorporate a bank; to re-enact a protective tariff; to distribute the revenue from the lands; to originate another debt, and renew the system of wasteful expenditures; and the resistance on the part of the opposition to prevent it? Gentlemen talk of settling these questions: they deceive themselves. They cry peace, peace, when there is no peace. There never can be peace till they are abandoned, or till our free and popular institutions are succeeded by the calm of despotism; and that not till the spirit of our patriotic and immortal ancestors, who achieved our independence and established our glorious political system, shall become extinct, and their descendants a base and sordid rabble. Till then, or till our opponents shall be expelled from power, and their hope of restoring and maintaining their system of measures is blasted, the struggle will be continued, the tranquillity and harmony of the country be disturbed, and the strength and resources of the government be wasted within, and its duties neglected without.

But, of all the measures which constitute this pernicious system, there is not one more subversive of the objects for which the government was instituted, none more destructive of harmony within and security without, than that now under consideration. Its direct tendency is to universal discord and distraction; to array the new states against the old, the non-indebted against the indebted, the staple against the manufacturing; one class against another; and, finally, the people against the government. But I pass these. My object is not to trace political consequences, but to discuss the financial bearings of this measure, regarded in reference to what ought to be the policy of the government; which, I trust, I have satisfactorily shown ought to be, to turn its attention, energy, and resources from within to without, to its appropriate and exclusive sphere, that of guarding against danger from abroad; giving free scope and protection to our commerce and navigation, and that elevated standing to the country to which it is so fairly entitled in the family of nations. It becomes necessary to repeat, preparatory to what I propose, that the object of this measure is to withdraw the revenue from the public lands from the treasury of the Union, to be divided among the states; that the probable annual amount that would be so drawn would average the next ten years not less than five millions of dollars; and that, to make up the deficit, an equal sum must be laid on the imports. Such is the measure, regarded as one of finance; and the question is, Would it be just, wise, expedient, considered in its bearings on what ought to be the policy of the government?

The measure, on its face, is but a surrender of one of the two sources of revenue to the states, to be divided among them in proportion to their joint delega tion in the two houses of Congress, and to impose a burden to an equal amount on the imports; that is, on the foreign commerce of the country. In every view I can take, it is preposterous, unequal, and unjust. Regarded in its most fa

vourable aspect that is, on the supposition that the people of each state would pay back to the treasury of the Union, through the tax on the imports, in order to make up the deficit, a sum equal to that received by the state as its distributive share; and that each individual would receive of that sum an amount equal in proportion to what he paid of the taxes-what would that be but the folly of giving with one hand and taking back with the other? It would, in fact, be worse. Giving and taking back must be paid for, which, in this case, would be not a little expensive and troublesome. The expense of collecting the duties on imports is known to be about ten per cent.; to which must be added the expense and trouble of distribution, with the loss of the use of the money while the process is going on, which may be fairly estimated at two per cent. additional; making, in all, twelve per cent. for the cost of the process. It follows that the people of the state, in order to return back to the treasury of the Union an amount equal to the sum received by distribution, would have each to pay, by the supposition, twelve per cent. more of taxes than his share of the sum distributed. That sum (equal to six hundred thousand dollars on five millions) would go to the collectors of the taxes-the custom-house officers-for their share of the public spoils.

But it is still worse. It is unequal and unjust, as well as foolish and absurd. The case supposed would not be the real state of the facts. It would be scarcely possible so to arrange a system of taxes under which the people of each state would pay back a sum just equal to that received; much less that the taxes should fall on each individual in the state in the same proportion that he would receive of the sum distributed to the state. But, if this be possible, it is certain that no system of taxes on imports-especially the bill sent from the other house -can make such equalization. So far from that, I hazard nothing in asserting that the staple states would pay into the treasury, under its operation, three times as much as they would receive on an average by the distribution, and some of them far more; while to the manufacturing states, if we are to judge from their zeal in favour of the bill, the duties it proposes to impose would be bounties, not taxes. If judged by their acts, both measures-the distribution and the duties-would favour their pockets. They would be gainers, let who may be losers in this financial game.

But be the inequality greater or less than my estimate, what could be more unjust than to distribute a common fund in a certain proportion among the states, and to compel the people of the states to make up the deficit in a different proportion; so that some shall pay more, and others less, than what they respectively received? What is it but a cunningly-devised scheme to take from one state and to give to another-to replenish the treasuries of some of the states from the pockets of the people of the others; in reality, to make them support the governments and pay the debts of other states, as well as their own? Such must be the necessary result, as between the states which may pay more than they receive, and those which may receive more than they pay; the injustice and inequality will increase or decrease, just in proportion to the respective excess or deficit between receipts and payments, under this flagitious contrivance for plunder.

But I have not yet reached the reality of this profligate and wicked scheme. As unequal and unjust as it would be between state and state, it is still more so regarded in its operation between individuals. It is between them its true character and hideous features fully disclose themselves. The money to be distributed would not go to the people, but to the legislatures of the states; while that to be paid in taxes to make up the deficiency would be taken from them individually. A small portion of that which would go to the legislatures would ever reach the pockets of the people. It would be under the control and management of the dominant party of the Legislature, and they under the control and management of the leaders of the party. That it would be administer

ed to the advantage of themselves, and their friends and partisans; and that they would profit more by their use and management of an irresponsible fund, taken from nobody knows who, than they would lose as payers of the taxes to supply its place, will not be doubted by any one who knows how such things are managed. What would be the result? The whole of the revenue from the immense public domain would, if this wicked measure should become the settled policy, go to the profit and aggrandizement of the leaders, for the time, of the dominant party in the twenty-six state legislatures, and their partisans and supporters; that is, to the most influential, if not the most wealthy clique, for the time, in the respective states; while the deficiency would be supplied from the pockets of the great mass of the community, by taxes on tea, coffee, salt, iron, coarse woollens, and, for the most part, other necessaries of life. And what is that but taking from the many and giving to the few-from those who look to their own means and industry for the support of themselves and families, and giving to those who look to the government for support, to increase the profit and influence of political managers and their partisans, and diminish that of the people? When it is added that the dominant party in each state for the time would have a direct interest in keeping up and enlarging this pernicious fund, and that their combined influence must for the time be irresistible, it is difficult to see by what means the country can ever extricate itself from this measure, should it be once established, or what limits can be prescribed to its growth, or the extent of the disasters which must follow. It contains the germe of mighty and fearful changes, if it be once permitted to shoot its roots into our political fabric, unless, indeed, it should be speedily eradicated.

In what manner the share that would fall to the states would, in the first instance, be applied, may, for the most part, be anticipated. The indebted states would probably pledge it to the payment of their debts; the effect of which would be to enhance their value in the hands of the holders-the Rothschilds, the Barings, the Hopes, on the other side of the Atlantic, with wealthy brokers and stock-jobbers on this. Were this done at the expense of the indebted states, none could object. But far different is the case when at the expense of the Union, by the sacrifice of the noble inheritance left by our ancestors, and when the loss of this great and permanent fund must be supplied from the industry and property of a large portion of the community, who had no agency or responsibility in contracting the debts, or benefit from the objects on which the funds were expended. On what principle of justice, honour, or Constitution, can this government interfere, and take from their pockets to increase the profit of the most wealthy individuals in the world?

The portion that might fall to the states not indebted, or those not deeply so, would probably, for the most part, be pledged as a fund on which to make new loans for new schemes similar to those for which the existing state debts were contracted. It may not be applied so at first; but such would most likely be the application on the first swell of the tide of expansion. Supposing one half of the whole sum to be derived from the lands should be so applied: estimating the income from that source at five millions, the half would furnish the basis of a new debt of forty or fifty millions. Stock to that amount would be created-would find its way to foreign markets, and would return, as other stocks of like kind have, in swelling the tide of imports in the first instance, but in the end by diminishing them to an amount equal to the interest on the sum borrowed, and cutting off in the same proportion the permanent revenue from the customs; and this, when the whole support of the government is about to be thrown exclusively on the foreign commerce of the country. So much for the permanent effects, in a financial view, of this measure.

The swelling of the tide of imports, in the first instance, from the loans, would lead to a corresponding flush of revenue, and that to extravagant expenditures, to be followed by embarrassment of the treasury, and a glut of