progress; nor do we imagine that it is very likely to do so hereafter. From all we have read upon the subject of Indian cotton cultivation, it seems to us that the best chance of success is to be found in a careful and discriminating growth of native varieties, and a careful gathering and cleaning of the produce. This was one of the objects towards which the attention of the American planters was to be directed, but hitherto we find very little has been done. At the date of the latest advices from Broach (the 24th of November), they were putting up a ginhouse for ginning native cotton; but, owing to the great number of obstacles necessarily experienced in such a country as India, they made very slow progress with their work, and it was feared that the growing crop would be entirely over before their gins were ready. Up to the date mentioned, no satisfactory experiments had been made as to the capability of the native cotton to stand ginning. Some trials were about to be made with a hand-gin, which, one would suppose, ought to have been the first step taken, before incurring a large expense in erecting machinery, which may prove useless. On the whole, we fear the prospect of receiving any large supply of superior cotton from India is not at present very flattering. In order to overcome the difficulties presented by the habits of the people, and by other causes, great energy and perseverance on the part of the agents of the Indian government intrusted with the control of the experiments are absolutely necessary; and those qualities cannot be expected from parties who do not feel a strong interest in their success. Hitherto, we believe, the government agents have lent but a cold and indifferent aid to the experiments; and it is, therefore, to be feared that, unless the matter should be put into other hands, there does not seem to be much chance of any good result from experiments from which so much was expected."-Manchester Guardian.

In confirmation of the opinion of the writer of the article, that of intelligent individuals, well acquainted with the country, might be added, who speak with confidence that, taking price and quality into consideration, we have nothing serious to apprehend. We might, indeed, have something to fear during the continuance of the Chinese war. That country is the principal market for the cotton of Hindostan, and while it remains closed, the cotton intended for its market may be thrown in such quantities on the European as may materially depress the price. But the present relation between Great Britain and China cannot long continue. It can scarcely be doubted that the former will at last succeed in opening the market of China to the commerce of the world to a much greater extent than it has ever been heretofore; when, so far from competing with us, the cotton of Hindostan will not be sufficient to supply the demands of that great market.

But I am not ignorant that we must rely for holding the cotton market on our superior skill, industry, and capacity for producing the article. Nearly, if not altogether, one half of the solid contents of the globe is capable of producing cotton; and that, too, in the portion the most populous, and where labour is the cheapest. We may have rivals everywhere in a belt of 70 degrees at least, lying on each side of the equator, and extending around the globe. Not only the far East, but all Western Asia, quite to the 35th, or even the 40th degree of latitude, a large portion of Europe, almost all Africa, and a large portion of this continent, may be said to be a cotton-producing region. When the price of cotton rises high, a large portion of that immense region becomes our competitors in its production, which invariably results in a great fall of price, when a struggle follows for the market. In that struggle we have ever, heretofore, succeeded, and I have no fear, with fair play on the part of our own government, we will continue to be successful against the world. We have the elements of success within us. A favourable soil and climate, a plenty of cheap land, held in fee simple, without rent, tithes, or poor rates. But, above all, we have a cheap and efficient body of labourers, the best fed, clothed, trained, and Sss

provided for of any in the whole cotton-growing region, for whose labour we have paid in advance. I say paid for in advance, for our property in our slaves is but wages purchased in advance, including the support and supplies of the labourers, which is usually very liberal. With these advantages, we may bid defiance to Hindu or Egyptian labour, at its two or three cents a day. Ours being already paid for, is, as far as the question of competition is concerned, still cheaper, to say nothing of its superior efficiency, its better and more skilful direction, under the immediate eye of intelligent proprietors, of cheap, unencumbered land, favourable soil and climate, and greater facility and cheapness of transportation to the great markets of the world. But this is not all. We have another and great advantage. There is not a people on earth who can so well bear the curtailing of profits as the Southern planters, when out of debt. A plantation is a little community of itself, which, when hard pressed, can furnish within itself almost all of its supplies. Ours is a fine provision country, and, when needs be, can furnish most of its supplies of food and clothing from its own resources. In prosperous times, when the price of our staples is high, our labour is almost exclusively directed to their production; and then we freely and liberally part with their proceeds in exchange for horses, mules, cattle, hogs, and provisions of all description from the West, and clothing and all the products of the arts with the North and East; but when prices fall and pressure comes, we gradually retire on our own means, and draw our own supplies from within. With these great advantages, it is not wonderful that in all the great struggles that we have had for the cotton market (they have been many and great), we have ever come off successful. It is incident to that great staple article, cotton, the first in the whole circle of commerce, to be subject to extraordinary vibrations of price from the causes to which I have alluded. At one time prices are high and profits great, and at another low and the profits small. It can be permanently cultivated only by those who can best go through these great vibrations. We are willing to hold it on that condition, and feel confident we can, with justice from this government. We dread not the competition of Hindostan; but your unequal, unconstitutional, and oppressive legislation-that legislation which pushes the expenditures of the government to the most extravagant extent, and which places the burden of supporting the government almost exclusively on the exchanges of our products with the rest of the world. Every dollar of tax, imposed on our exchanges in the shape of duties, impairs to that extent our capacity to meet the severe competition to which we are exposed; and nothing but a system of high protective duties, long continued, can prevent us from meeting it successfully. It is that which we have to fear. Let the planters avoid banks, keep out of debt, and have a sound currency and low duties, and they may bid defiance to competition, come from what quarter it may, and look forward with confidence to a prosperity greater than they have ever yet experienced.

TABLE G.

Statement showing the quantity, price, and value of the Cotton grown in the United States from 1819 to 1840.

The quantity of cotton received at the port of Boston from October,

Since January 1st, 1841, there was received to this, the 26th of May, less than five months, 93,057 bales, and the quantity received this year will probably be 150,000 bales.-Boston Atlas.

TABLE H.-DOMESTIC EXPORTS OF SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1819 TO 1841.

XXXV.

SPEECH ON THE LOAN BILL, APRIL 12, 1842.

THE question being put on the passage of the bill, and the yeas and nays having been ordered,

Mr. Calhoun said, that it was not his object, in rising at this late stage of the question, to discuss the provisions of this bill. That had been done so fully and ably by those who had preceded in the debate on the same side, that he had nothing to add. But, in order to have a full and clear understanding of the bearing of this measure on the finances of the government, we must look beyond the provisions of the bill. It was not a lone measure, unconnected with those which preceded it, or would succeed it, but quite the reverse. It was a link in the sytem of policy commenced at the special session, and which had hitherto been perseveringly followed up, and, if he was not greatly deceived, would be persisted in so long as those who now have the control held power. Already has the system contributed greatly to depress the credit of the government, and it is to be feared, if it be not arrested, that it will sink it far below its present level. What he proposed, in the remarks which he was about to offer, was to trace the consequences of the system in its bearings on the finances and credit of the government.

That the credit of the government is greatly impaired of late, will not be denied. It is but a short time since the very committee which reported this loan bill reported another for about the same amount, which became a law. At that time, so high did the credit of the government stand, that it was expressly provided that not more than six per cent. interest should be allowed, and that the loan should be redeemable in three years. As short as was the period, it was confidently predicted that it would be taken at five per cent.; and the Secretary of the Treasury commenced his negotiation for the loan with that expectation, and actually obtained a considerable portion of it under six per cent. The bill passed late in July last; and, in the period of nine short months, the very same committee reported this bill, which proposes to send the public credit into the market to be sold for what it will bring; and that, too, for twenty years, a period nearly seven times longer than the term prescribed in the former bill.

The conditions offered for a loan may fairly be regarded as indicating the value which the government stamps on its own credit; and we may be assured that the keensighted race who have money to lend will rarely affix a higher value.than what that stamp indicates. Judged by that standard, the credit of the government has never before been as low; no, not in the late war with England-a war with one of the greatest, if not the greatest power on earth-commenced with a remnant of an old debt of more than forty millions of dollars, and at the very beginning of which there was a universal suspension of payments by all the banks south of New-England. Even in that great struggle, under all its embarrassments, no secretary of the treasury or committee ever dared to put the credit of the government into market under such disadvantageous terms as is proposed in this bill. The longest period for the redemption of any loan contracted during the war, if his memory served him, was but twelve years a period not much exceeding half the time allowed by this bill. Such and so great has been the decay of the public credit in the short space of a few months! And here the question is presented, What