dependence, and that if one is supposed to be abstracted, the whole is put out of order and cannot fulfill its evident functions. If we select, as a well known instance, the Hive-bee for an example. Its long tongue is specially formed to collect honey; its honey stomach to receive and elaborate it either for regurgitation, or for the formation of wax; and other organs or pores are added, by which the latter can be transmitted to the wax pockets under its abdomen; connected with these, are its means and instruments to build its cells, either for store cells to contain its honey and bee-bread, or its young brood, such as the form of its jaws, and the structure and furniture of its hind legs. Now here are a number of organs and parts that must have been contemporary, since one is evidently constructed with a view to the other and the whole organization and structure of the whole body forming the societies of these wonder-working beings, that I mean, of the males, females, and workers, is so nicely adjusted, as to concur exactly in producing the end that an intelligent Creator intended, and directing each to that function and office which he devolved upon them, and to exercise which he adapted them. Were we

to go through the whole animal kingdom the same mutual relation and dependence between the different parts and organs of the structure and their functions would be found.

Can any one in his rational senses believe for a moment that all these adaptations of one organ to another, and of the whole structure to a particular function, resulted originally from the wants of a senseless animal living by absorption, and whose body consisted merely of cellular tissue, which in the lapse of ages, and in an infinity of successive generations by the motions of its fluids, directed here and there, produced this beautiful and harmonious system of organs all subservient to one purpose; and which in numerous instances vary their functions and organs, but still preserving their mutual dependence, by passing through three different states of existence.

Lamarck's great error, and that of many others of his compatriots, is materialism; he seems to have no faith in any thing but body, attributing every thing to a physical, and scarcely any thing to a metaphysical cause. Even when, in words, he admits the being of a God, he employs the whole strength of his intellect to prove that he had nothing to

do with the works of creation. Thus he excludes the Deity from the government of the world that he has created, putting nature in his place; and with respect to the noblest and last formed of his creatures into whom he himself breathed the breath of life; he certainly admits him to be the most perfect of animals, but instead of a son of God, the root of his genealogical tree, according to him, is an animalcule, a creature without sense or voluntary motion, or internal or external organs, at least in his idea-no wonder therefore that he considers his intellectual powers, not as indicating a spiritual substance derived from heaven though resident in his body, but merely as the result of his organization,' and ascribes to him in the place of a soul, a certain interior sentiment, upon the discovery of which he prides himself. In one of his latest descriptions of it, he thus describes the office of this internal sentiment: 66 Every action of an intelligent individual, whether it be a movement or a thought, or an act amongst the thoughts, is

1 N. Dict. D'Hist. Nat. xvi. Artic. Intelligence, 344. comp. Ibid. Artic. Idée, 78, 80.

2.Ibid. 332.

necessarily preceded by a want of that which has power to excite such action. This want felt immediately moves the internal sentiment, and in the same instant, that sentiment directs the disposeable portion of the nervous fluid, either upon the muscles of that part of the body which is to act, or upon the part of the organ of intelligence, where are impressed the ideas which should be rendered present to the mind, for the execution of the intellectual act which the want demands." In fact Lamarck sees nothing in the universe but bodies, whence he confounds sensation with intellect. Our eyes certainly shew us nothing but bodies their actions and motions, their structure, their form and colour; our ears the sounds they produce; our touch their degree of resistance, or comparative softness or hardness; our smell their scent; our taste their flavour; but though our senses can conduct us no further, we find a very active substance in full power within us that can. At a very early period of life we feel a wish to know something further concerning the objects to which our senses introduce

1 N. Dict. D'Hist. Nat. xvi. Artic. Intelligence, 350.

us, which often generates a restless desire in the mind to gain information concerning the causes and origin of those things perceived by them; now this is the result of thought, and thought is no body, and though the thinking essence inhabits a body, yet we cannot help feeling that our thoughts are an attribute of an immaterial substance. Thought, discursive and excursive thought, that is not confined to the contemplation of the things of earth, things that are immediately about us, but can elevate itself to heaven, and the heavenly bodies, not only to those of our own system, but can take flights beyond the bounds of time and space, and enter into the Holy of Holies, and contemplate Him who sitteth upon the cherubim, the throne of his Deity. Thought, that not only beholds things present, however distant and removed from sense, but can contemplate the days of old and the years of many generations, can carry us back to hail with the angelic choirs, the birth-day of nature and of the world that we inhabit; or looking into the abyss of futurity, can anticipate the termination of our present mixed scenechequered with light and darkness, good and