DIPLOMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT IN ZAIRE ON U.S. POLICY Mr. LONG. What would be the diplomatic consequences to the U.S. quest for political conciliation in southern Africa of a Communist and Western-aided conflict in Zaire? Mrs. BENSON. Any escalation of the conflict in Zaire would have adverse affects on the U.S. quest for a political conciliation in southern Africa, if only because it would divert attention away from that area. In addition, such a conflict in Zaire involving increased Communist and Western aid to opposing sides would polarize political opinion among the various African governments and make it that much more difficult to obtain a workable consensus on southern African questions. ZAIRE AS AN ALLY Mr. LONG. Although Mobutu has sometimes defended U.S. interests in the Third World, he has also broken relations with Israel, obtained the recall of U.S. Ambassador Godley in 1966, expelled Ambassador Hinton in 1977, and led the opposition to the nomination of Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. How reliable an ally is Mobutu? To what extent does U.S. aid to Zaire represent blackmail money to keep Mobutu from taking antiUnited States actions, whether economic or political? Mrs. BENSON. U.S. aid to Zaire does not, and never has, represented blackmail money to keep the Zairian Government from taking anti-United States actions. Zaire is a major country in Africa; since the first days of Zairian independence, the United States has supported the central government in its pursuit of territorial integrity and economic and political development. The Zairian Government often shares American views of world developments, but sometimes publicly differs with us. In sum, we consider Zaire a friend in a disturbed area of the world, which is actually seeking closer relations with us after disappointment in its flirtation with Communist powers. U.S. DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES IN ZAIRE Mr. LONG. What diplomatic actions to resolve the crisis have been taken by the United States? Specifically, how successful is Nigerian mediation encouraged by the United States likely to be? Has the United States pressured Mobutu to negotiate with the Kataga gendarmes, either during their years of exile or since their invasion began? Mrs. BENSON. The current Zairian crisis is primarily an African problem, which threatens basic African principles of territorial integrity. The Zairian Government asked the Nigerian Government to take the lead in finding a diplomatic solution. We support this approach and have indicated our attitude to the most concerned parties. We cannot tell at this moment how successful the Nigerian effort will be, but we are encouraged by Nigeria's willingness to undertake this task, and by indications of widespread African support. We have not thought it appropriate to advise, much less pressure, the Zairian Government to negotiate with the Katangan gendarmes, either before or after their recent invasion of Zaire. Mr. LONG. The gentlelady from California. Mrs. BURKE. I would just like to get one thing clear. We do not give security assistance to Iran. We have no financing in military sales to Iran. Mrs. BENSON. That is correct. Or to Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait. Mrs. Burke, the only country in the Arab world to which we give any assistance at all is Jordan-military assistance. Mr. LONG. Let me point out Mrs. BURKE. I understand what you are saying. I was just trying to get it straight in my own mind. Mr. LONG. That is perfectly true. We sell this material for cash. But we have made a great mistake-when Mr. Nixon stopped in there and saw the Shah of Iran some years ago and promised him, and followed through on the promise of a vast military buildup. You see, we are the great supermarket of arms in the world. It is true you can get them from Germany and other countries in Europe. You can get something from Russia and so on. But we opened up the greatest supermarket of arms in the world. We gave it to the Shah of Iran. We opened it up to him. We have thousands of technicians over there, thousands of them, who are working there, helping them improve every aspect of their military sector. I would invite anybody on this committee to take a trip and visit Tehran. It will open your eyes. You never saw such a thing in your life. Now, let me point this out. While it is true that we sell equipment to them, it is also true that we have in this country one of the most shortsighted energy policies that probably we have ever followed. We have studiously done nothing to achieve energy independence. The result is that we are paying increasingly billions and billions and billions of dollars for this oil. And it is money that is going from the United States over to the Arab countries and then coming back for U.S. weaponry. So in a way you can regard this as being paid for by them, and in another way, if you want to, you can look at it as being paid for by Americans in the United States, because we have not done what we could to make ourselves sufficiently independent of the OPEC nations. Mrs. BENSON. Mr. Chairman, as regards your comment and description of Iran, it is very similar to what the President said during the campaign. He has not really had time to institute any new policies. Mr. LONG. I had very grave doubts about Mr. Carter up to the point of the second debate. When he said some of the things he had to say in the second debate on the sale of arms, on nuclear proliferation, on human rights, and so on, I said he is my man, and I went out and worked for him. But I thought here is the kind of policy that I want to see followed. So I applaud Mr. Carter's statements, and I do hope he follows through. In all the things I have said I mean no criticism at all of the policies of the administration. I simply hope we will get a real turnaround in our policy. And I think it has to be a real turnaround. Mrs. BENSON. It will be. Mr. LONG. Thank you very much. Mrs. BURKE, I would just like to commend the witnesses also for the statements they have made. Mr. LONG. Yes. I think you have been very forthright before this committee. I want to praise you for that. Mrs. BENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. LONG. I want to congratulate you on what I think has been very forthcoming testimony. We don't always get it, especially in this area. We look forward very much to seeing you again in the not-too-distant future. Mrs. BENSON. Thank you. Mrs. BURKE. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn, is it possible that at the public meeting we have a large enough room to accommodate people at the public meeting we have set? Mr. LONG. So far we haven't had too much of a problem. The one time we had Secretary Vance we took a larger room. We shall try and anticipate when we do have a big crowd to have a bigger room, The committee stands adjourned. RICHARD A. ERICSON, JR., DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS AND LT. GEN. HOWARD M. FISH, USAF, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY ACCOMPANIED BY: NICHOLAS A. VELIOTES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF JOHN KING, DIRECTOR, REGIONAL POLITICAL PROGRAMS, RAYMOND C. EWING, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SOUTHERN DEFENSE Mr. LONG. The hearing shall come to order. Mr. Ericson, would you like to have your statement inserted in the record and then summarize your remarks in 5 minutes? Without objection, it is so ordered. [The statement follows:] REMARKS OF RICHARD A. ERICSON, JR. I appreciate the invitation to discuss with this committee the President's security assistance program for fiscal year 1978. Secretary Vance and Under Secretary-Designate Benson have already described for you the overall content and goals of our security assistance programs. I would like to concentrate more specifically today on military assistance under the foreign military sales program and the grant military assistance and training programs. Our approach to these programs has been based on the fact that security assistance is properly an instrument of foreign policy, acceptable to a peaceloving people only insofar as serves important foreign policy goals. We see no intrinsic merit in providing other countries with arms or the means to buy them; but we recognize that in our unpredictable, often violent world, it is sometimes necessary to do so. Accordingly, as we have reviewed these programs for presentation to the Congress we have been guided primarily by two criteria: Will the programs be effective in promoting important interests; and are the means we have chosen appropriate to the goals we seek. We are convinced that these criteria have been met in the military assistance budget proposals now before you. An example of how military assistance can be a valuable instrument of foreign policy is our program in the Middle East. We have provided Israel, since 1973, with more than $5 billion in military assistance through the foreign military sales financing program. We have carefully considered the impact of such large loans on the Israeli economy and developed with the Congress the provision of current law that repayments of one half the loans will be forgiven, and the remainder will be repayable over 30 years, with a 10-year grace period. These funds, and the weapons they provide, have been of vital importance in keeping the peace by helping to make Israel more than a match for the potential military threat from its neighbors. Our only other military assistance program funding request in the Middle East goes to support the moderate government of King Hussein in Jordan. As you are aware, we also provide economic assistance through the security supporting assistance program to the hardpressed economies of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria; we see no benefit to peace in the kind of economic chaos which can give comfort only to the radical elements in the area. The goal of our assistance effort in the region is to provide a stable political and economic base as the foundation of our continued efforts to find a just and durable settlement. In recent years, military assistance has also become an important means of achieving another vital national security goal, access to military base facilities overseas to support our foreign policy objectives. We have, or are negotiating, base agreements with five of the eight MAP recipients proposed for fiscal 1978. In each such instance, MAP and FMS are valuable means of assuring base access, while underlining the fact that the base rights are in the mutual security interest of the United States and the host country. In the Middle East, in base rights countries, and in the other programs we are presenting for your consideration we have attempted to recommend assistance levels which, in our judgment, will be both effective and appropriate in promoting important foreign policy interests. We have not asked for unnecessary funds, and we will not spend more funds than required to achieve our goals. In developing these programs we have also been cognizant of the need to reflect in our assistance programs our concern with the human rights practices of countries whose security we help to insure. In this area, however, the task of choosing the appropriate means to reach the goals we seek is especially difficult. Recent experience indicates that once we evoke human rights publicly as the reason for reducing or eliminating assistance, we risk loosing whatever influence we may have had to change for the better the human rights practices we oppose. The time may come when blatant abuses will cause us to reduce or end our aid; but this very significant step should perhaps be used only when our attempts to exert a positive influence have failed. I would like to mention one other consideration which should be kept in mind in assessing the programs before you. The Carter administration has been able in the short time available to make some important changes in the budget proposals prepared by the previous administration. There has not been time, however, for the kind of thorough going analysis and consultation which must precede any fundamental departures in programs which have served our interest well. Accordingly, the programs before you emphasize continuity. They provide money for essential ongoing programs and will assure valued friends and allies that we do not intend to take precipitous action damaging to their security interests. They will give us the time we need to work with you in developing and implementing new programs reflecting our mutual desire to bring greater coherence and control to the areas of security assistance and arms transfer. Mr. ERICSON. Following Secretary Vance's and Under SecretaryDesignate Benson's appearance before you, I would like to concentrate especially on the foreign military sales programs and the current military assistance and training programs. Our approach to these programs is based on the fact that security assistance is properly an instrument of foreign policy. Accordingly, we have reviewed these programs to determine whether they are effective in promoting important interests and appropriate to the goals we seek. We are convinced that we have met these criteria. For example, in the Middle East our assistance has been of vital importance in keeping the peace by helping to make Israel more than a match for the military threat confronting it, and by providing throughout the region the stable political and economic base needed as the foundation for our continued efforts to find a just and durable settlement. Military assistance has also been of great importance in assuring access to military base facilities overseas, while underlining the fact that base rights are in the mutual security interest of the United States and host country. We have been cognizant of the need to reflect in our assistance programs our concern for human rights. In this area, however, the test of choosing appropriate means to reach the goals we seek is especially difficult. Recent experience indicates that by reducing or eliminating assistance on human rights grounds we can risk what influence we have to change human rights practices for the better. This should perhaps be a final step, to be taken only after all our efforts to have a positive influence have failed. The proposals before you represent a transitional program, providing money for essential ongoing programs while we work with you in developing and implementing new policies reflecting our mutual desire to bring greater coherence and control to the areas of security assistance and arms transfers. Mr. LONG. Thank you very much, Mr. Ericson, for your succinct presentation. MILITARY BUILD-UP IN THE MIDDLE EAST I think a great many people recognize that we must provide military assistance to Israel in order to offset the tremendous military buildup by its Arab neighbors. A buildup financed by the higher oil revenues. A buildup supplied by weapons purchased in the United States with this newfound oil wealth. Why can't we find some way to scale down this tremendous escalation? Mr. ERICSON. Well, several comments, sir. The Arabs that threaten Israel do not obtain arms from us. Mr. ERICSON. Those Arab nations which are a direct threat to Israel are not the ones which obtain large numbers of arms from us. Syria and Egypt do not. Mr. LONG. Directly. But Egypt is getting three-quarters of a billion dollars in security supporting assistance, and please don't tell me, Mr. Ericson, they are not able to use that money indirectly to pay for arms they are getting from other countries. Mr. ERICSON. As to the fungibility of the money that we provide Egypt for security supporting assistance, how much in terms of resources this frees for the Eovptians to devote to arms purchases, I don't know. But, it is certainly not entirely fungible, all of it is not used for that purpose, and I don't know exactly what proportion might be. The same is true of Syria. But, the whole purpose of our efforts in the Middle East is to bring a stability and peace to that area. |