with some of the testimony which would seem to indicate that much of the field of intelligence is passing into the realm of economics, as well as political in the current arena-it would be more appropriate that an organization of such a size and such an impact to be a creature of legislation specifically created by Congress and controlled by Congress. In a sense, as far as its creation is concerned, it would almost bring it under an oversight function much clearer than in its present

status.

There was testimony that some of the activities of the NSA may have gone further afield than most of the members had known at the time of the testimony, and the question of whether or not there should be a more specific guideline as to the functions of the NSA was the basis or the genesis of the idea that it should be the subject of specific legislation and should be a civilian agency as opposed to a military

agency.

Chairman PIKE. Is there any member of the committee who does not agree with that recommendation?

Mr. MILFORD. In all honesty, I am not sure. I am a little concerned about making such a recommendation without first making a specific record on the other side, if there is another side.

It seems to be a good idea, but I am somewhat reluctant to vote for it without looking into it more closely. Again, I am thinking out loud here, but it might be an item to hold over for the permanent committee where it could be given close study.

Mr. TREEN. I wanted to raise a point with Mr. Donner.

The recommendation calls for providing for civilian control of NSA. A little while ago you said. "Make it a civilian agency." That is not in the recommendation. I realize we will be voting on this language, but when you say make it a civilian agency, do you mean not to have military personnel?

Mr. DONNER. No, I refer only to control.

Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Milford, you raise a good point. However, is our committee the one that should do that? If we were to do that and if we were to develop hearings on every one of these recommendations, not only would we not finish this week, we wouldn't even finish this year.

Isn't it a fact that what this committee is designed to do is to give, let's say, a prima facie opinion in this area-that we think there is something wrong with the NSA; that it is too subservient to the military; that we are troubled about that; and that we suspect or feel that if we passed specific legislation to restructure the NSA with civilian control, this might help? Once having made that recommendation, then does it not go to the pertinent legislative committee of the Congress, which in this case I assume would be Government Operations? Mr. DONNER. I would think so; yes, Mr. Giaimo.

Mr. GIAIMO. And would they not then hold the hearings and act favorably or unfavorably on our recommendation and aren't we thus protected in that area?

Mr. MILFORD. I would not like to go on record as making a hard case recommendation, rather than saying, "Here is a trouble spot that somebody needs to look at in detail." Perhaps it is the way the thing is worded. In other words, I am not willing to say we definitely should do it because I don't think we have enough information to say that. It certainly should be looked at, and looked at in depth.

Chairman PIKE. We are not a legislative committee. All any of our recommendations are going to be are recommendations for other committees which have jurisdiction to look at them and act upon them. Mr. MILFORD. Will there be wording to that effect? Chairman PIKE. I don't think it is necessary.

Mr. MILFORD, Will there be a foreword or something to make that clear?

Chairman PIKE. I would say certainly, yes, there could be a foreword to our recommendations. Our recommendations will go many different places. Some will go to congressional committees; some of them, I suspect, will go to the executive branch because they will call for action by the executive branch without the necessity for legislation. Some, which will go to the House of Representatives, will pertain to House rules, and won't require any legislation.

Mr. KASTEN. I wonder if the staff could answer a couple of questions? Mr. Donner, why was NSA not recognized by specific legislation? Mr. DONNER. It grew up as a military function. It was originally a part of Signals Intelligence, and when it was to be institutionalized into a separate agency, it was created by an Executive order. Like many things, it probably just worked out that way, rather than by plan or design. Just in the nature of things, since it came out of the military, its genesis was military, and it became a part of an executive function.

Mr. KASTEN. Has specific legislation ever been proposed that would cause the National Security Agency to be recognized officially? Mr. DONNER. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. KASTEN. Has this recommendation been discussed with NSA or the administration and, if so, have they expressed their support or opposition?

Mr. DONNER. We have had discussions with some of the intelligence community representatives in an informal manner, but I will state here that these recommendations were not arrived at specifically in consultation with any of the agencies.

Mr. KASTEN. I don't think they should be done in consultation with the administration, but I asked you if you have had any consultation with them on this particular point?

Mr. DONNER. The agencies themselves, having somewhat separate interests, it depends on who you talk to.

Mr. KASTEN. Who did you talk to on this recommendation and what did they say?

Mr. DONNER. We talked to some of the representatives of CIA about it and these were discussions ancillary to other matters. They presented technical questions which may have been that some of the NSA functions will have to remain partly military in nature, and we discussed how we would work out the jurisdiction with the respective military services; but as I recall, that was primarily the question that was addressed.

Mr. McCLORY. I have looked at the Murphy Commission report and recommendations and they do not specifically refer to this. I would say the Murphy Commission refers to it rather generally; but when General Allen appeared before the committee, as I recall, I asked the question of him as to whether or not he would be opposed to having

his authority established by statute in lieu of being established by Executive order and he said he would have no objection to that. I think we have on the record of the public hearing the aquiescence of the NSA.

Chairman PIKE. How did he feel about civilian control?

Mr. McCLORY. We did not ask him that question and he may not feel the same about that; but I feel strongly that all components of the intelligence community must be under civilian control, just as all the military must be under civilian control. So I think that is important to put in here.

I would suggest the use of the word "established" instead of "recognized"-that we "establish" this authority by legislation. And then I am not certain that we should use the exact words used in the last phrase. I mean I think there are many things that we want to define, or we want to see defined, in legislation other than the implication that somehow they are listening in on private conversations of American citizens. That is somewhat controversial insofar as what they actually get and what they don't get; but in general I think it is a very sound and very important recommendation for us to make.

Mr. GIAIMO. I think it is downright illegal-not somewhat controversial to listen to the conversation of American citizens.

Mr. McCLORY. If the American citizen happens to be a spy for a foreign country, I don't know whether it is illegal or undesirable at all. As I recall, the monitoring system doesn't necessarily involve this kind of wholesale listening in on conversations, but I think those are questions which can be handled by legislation without necessarily frightening people by implying that all their communications are being listened in on.

I don't want to say anything more about this now.

Mr. TREEN. Is the NSA not under civilian control now? Isn't it under the Defense Department?

Mr. Boos. The Executive order, Mr. Treen, provides that the Director of NSA must be a military man and the Deputy Director must be a career cryptologist. So it is under military control to that extent. Mr. TREEN. Who is the appointing authority for the NSA? The Secretary of Defense?

Mr. Boos. It is the President.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is the point I wanted to raise. I don't think this is a sufficiently specific recommendation. There is a certain amount of civilian control, if you think of the Armed Services Committee as being a civilian organization.

The recommendation, it seems to me, should point out which committee we believe should have jurisdiction, and whether the head of the Agency should be subject to the Director of Central Intelligence; whether he will come under his jurisdiction; whether he will have separate authority; whether it will be a part of the intelligence community, or whether it will be a separate organization.

Chairman PIKE. It seems to me that all of the questions you raise are valid, but they would be covered by the specific legislation of which we speak and I don't think we can write the specific legislation.

Mr. JOHNSON. Of course not, but we can make recommendations. It seems to me if we are going to make a recommendation about commit

tee jurisdiction, we might very well consider that it could go to the Armed Services Committee. I don't know where else it would go.

Chairman PIKE. Frankly, I don't think this committee ought to get bogged down-and I think we would get bogged down-in the realm of deciding which other committees of Congress should have specific jurisdiction. It is my personal feeling that jurisdiction over large chunks of NSA should go to a new, standing committee on intelligence; but we haven't gotten to that point yet.

Mr. JOHNSON. What about the idea of the head of the Agency being responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence? Would he come under his jurisdiction?

Mr. FIELD. That is referred to elsewhere in the recommendations. Chairman PIKE. Let's try to evolve a procedure which will allow us to move forward.

Mr. McCLORY. I move tentative approval of "D" with the substitution of the word "established" for "recognized."

Mr. FIELD. The National Security Agency is already established, so we used the word "recognized" so it could be recognized by statute. We originally had "establish" in there. I don't believe it really makes any difference.

Mr. McCLORY. Very well. I don't feel strongly about the word "established." I felt that could be a more specific word.

Mr. MILFORD. You might say "recognized and established."

Mr. McCLORY. I will withdraw my suggestion and move for tentative approval.

Chairman PIKE. What does "tentative approval" mean?

Mr. McCLORY. It seems to me we should have the right to come back at a later time with respect to all of these items. It might be that in our later consideration we might cover something that we haven't included, or we may want to come back and supplement some recommendation. I don't think we have to be ironclad.

Chairman PIKE. I think we can proceed in that manner for the time being, but there will come a point where "tentative" has to yield to "final."

Would the staff discuss item "E" please?

Mr. ASPIN. Do we have to vote on the first one?
Chairman PIKE. No; it is without objection.

[The staff draft of recommendation "E" follows:]

E. DISCLOSURE OF BUDGET TOTALS

1. The select committee recommends that all intelligence-related items be included as intelligence expenditures in the President's budget, and that there be disclosure of the total single sum budgeted for each agency involved in intelligence, or if such an item is a part or portion of the budget of another agency or department that it be separately identified as a single item.

Mr. DONNER. The committee has spent a substantial amount of time on this, and the end of our report is directed to the financial aspects of it. I would almost say it would be better to refer to Mr. Giaimo, who has been more of a participant in the battles directed to this subject than anyone else.

It was our feeling that, as a staff recommendation, there be a disclosure of the total budget of the intelligence agencies. This was mainly because, first of all, the investigation, in the staff's opinion, has come

up with items that we feel should be addressed, and that the Congress has been ignorant of for a long period of time—and also, of course, the American people have been.

As to the total cost of intelligence and handling of funds within the intelligence community, it is a very broad recommendation. Possibly there are other specifics stated further on. But we feel this is an area, the secrecy of which-as Mr. Schlesinger stated on "Firing Line" one time-is not a secret from the Russians; but it is a secret from the American people and it is a secret from Congress. He stated that the disclosure of the intelligence budget would be just a whittling-away on the floor. That was the only reason to keep it secret. We feel that it would be very important for the Congress and the American people to know what this item is costing them.

Mr. FIELD. In the first phrase we recommend that all intelligencerelated items be included in the intelligence budget. This would have to be drafted into specific legislation, obviously; but it is intended to get into the problem of what is and is not included-trying to enforce some standard here, and trying to get intelligence-related items into the budget.

Mr. MURPHY. There was testimony before this committee, I think in executive session, that we would get into what you referred to-we would be detailing fields where our intelligence agencies were active. Mr. FIELD. This would be a lump sum total.

Mr. GIAIMO. What you propose to do is put in the budget for the CIA dollars for NSA, One line item. For DIA you also would put in a dollars. For FBI-well, that is in there. Isn't that right? That is what you intend to do?

Mr. DONNER. Yes.

Mr. GIAIMO. Does that one lump sum for the CIA-we will use that one as an example because that is a controversial agency-does that divulge anything to anyone? That is the question.

Mr. DONNER. Really, there is no end to that discussion. You can't go behind it. However, once again we have discussed our military budgets in very great detail as to a specific weapons system. They are discussed publicly. They have discussed long-range programs of the United States' military programs. There have been detailed discussions of weapons systems, and other items are discussed.

If somebody says "Is it possible," of course, anything in the world is possible. However, measured against what the staff has felt is a system that has allowed for misuse of funds-misuse in the sense of not being directed as Congress had thought when it approved

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Donner, the second part of the paragraph says, **** if such an item is part or portion of the budget of another agency or department that it be separately identified as a single item." My question is, how can you identify it as a single item of another budget and not disclose exactly what we are doing?

Mr. GIAIMO. I think what you are intending to do with that language is to stop the practice which is used presently with the CIA budget. The CIA budget-as came out in the House debate on September 3is in "Other Procurement, Air Force" in the Defense Appropriations bill. What is it doing in that classification?

Mr. DONNER. Yes, and with reference to the FBI, there was a question about stating its budget as a separate item.