out in regard to such methods and procedures. I don't think Congress has any monopoly on such a problem. I really learned more about what goes on in the CIA by reading a few books by ex-CIA agents than in this committee. I think Congress can take its own licks, but I think the CIA, the executive branch, and others are going to allow leaks occasionally.

I think we would be pulling the rug out from under a strong part of our open society.

Chairman PIKE. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Texas to strike section "J." Those in favor of the motion signify by saying aye.

Mr. GIAIMO. I ask for a record vote.

Chairman PIKE. Those in favor of a record vote raise their hands. The clerk will call the roll.

By a vote of 2 yeas, 9 nays, and 1 present, the motion is not agreed to. Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Chairman, I move the adoption of section "J." Chairman PIKE. The question is on the motion. All those in favor, signify by saying aye. Contrary, no.

The ayes appear to have it, and section "J" is agreed to.

We might ask for comments from the staff on recommendation "K."

[The staff draft of recommendation "K" follows:]

K. NEW FOREIGN OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF NSC

1. The select committee recommends that the National Security Act of 1947 be amended to provide for the establishment of a permanent Foreign Operations

Subcommittee of the National Security Council. The subcommittee's jurisdiction, function and composition shall be as follows:

a. The subcommittee shall have sole jurisdiction over all activities of U.S. foreign intelligence agencies except those solely related to the gathering of intelligence.

b. All recommendations of covert action considered by the subcommittee as described in "a" above shall be specifically acted upon by all members of the subcommittee and their respective positions set forth in writing signed by each member.

c. The subcommittee shall be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and shall be composed of:

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Director of Central Intelligence; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Deputy Secretary of Defense; Deputy Director for Intelligence of CIA; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. DONNER. Mr. Chairman, this committee had the opportunity of examining 10 years of records of covert operation, as well as examining in depth certain actions taken. The actions taken, of course-I will just say to you, Mr. Chairman, that I am usually more articulate than this, but I am trying to avoid saying the words which I will say now-that the report contains the basis for recommendation, because, frankly, Mr. Chairman, the recommendations were prepared with the idea that the committee would have the report in front of it. I beg the Chair's indulgence.

Mr. ASPIN. I would like to talk a little bit about this section. I think this is one of the most important recommendations we have, along with the recommendations we were discussing some time ago regarding the DCI. This recommendation would set up an NSC Foreign Operations Subcommittee. What it does, which is so important, is to institutionalize the 40 Committee. What we have heard indicated is that a lot of times there is no formal procedure for approving covert operations. They are approved at the Presidential level and forced on the whole system, or they are heard by the 40 Committee, or sometimes not. Sometimes they are bypassed; sometimes they are consulted on the phone. Sometimes they meet. What this does is to institutionalize the process. It is not going to be foolproof. None of these things are ever going to be foolproof; but what you are trying to do is prevent covert operations, which are ill advised or ill considered, from taking place.

What we hope to do by this kind of recommendation, I think, is to institutionalize the 40 Committee and thereby build in responsibility for the approval of covert operations within the executive branch. This has nothing to do with congressional approval of it. It builds in a little bit more responsibility and institutionalizes a little more system within the executive branch. I would like to offer a couple of amendments which I think are important to this section.

Chairman PIKE. I would simply say that it seems to me that the language within this recommendation-which calls for the approval of covert operations in writing by the members of this new subcommittee of the National Security Council-would, itself, act perhaps as a better deterrent than almost anything we can think of.

I think the business of telephonic approval without records of these operations has been one of the more dubious things we have considered. Mr. McCLORY. I would like to be heard generally on this subject. I will not reveal any portions of the report-classified or unclassified.

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I think we should talk to unclassified matters. It is my feeling that by and large we have found that the operations intelligence agencies have been successful over the past 28 years. In a few instances, actions occurred which resulted in deficiencies. They are, perhaps, more the result of not having this kind of spelled-out, precise mechanism which, it seems to me, is important that we pursue.

I think one of the important things for this committee to do is to recommend a definite, specific pattern which must be followed with respect to any and all covert activities, and have strict responsibility and accountability there. I feel this is an extremely important recommendation.

I will be happy also to consider the amendments that may be offered.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I am terribly disappointed in this recommendation "K." It has to be considered along with "C" which is entitled "Covert Action." You can't consider "K" by itself without understanding what has been authorized. There is not one covert operation this committee studied that would be prevented under this recommendation by the staff. The 40 Committee does not have an elected representative; there is not a member of the Cabinet-perhaps the Director of Central Intelligence, should he become a member of the Cabinet.

This is the same kind of operation we have in existence now. It will be subject to the same kinds of coverups and so forth that all subsequent Presidents will want to utilize.

I can't understand wanting to legislate in light of the present administration or the past administration. Can't we forget the Democratic Presidents in the past and the Republican Presidents in the past who have to be protected, and look down the road and recognize that people abuse power? That Presidents have abused power in the past and they will in the future; that we are not putting the responsibility where it belongs-and that is jointly with the President and with the Congress, by putting the responsibility for all the covert operations that this committee studied, and that the majority of this committee don't want to see repeated, back to the Director of Intelligence the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Director of Intelligence of CIA, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I can tell you right now that whatever covert operations will be approved, somebody will say it is important to the national defense, whether it is important to the national defense or not.

We have no kind of protection by definition here. We have no kind of procedural protection against abuses in the future, and we are just going to go back through the same process.

It seems to me that if we are serious about doing anything about covert operations-and I don't think we really are as a Congress: perhaps as a committee, but I am not sure about that when I look at these recommendations-we would at least describe what kind of covert operations would not be engaged in or make an attempt to try to prevent the use of the term "national security" from sanctioning a pro forma operation.

At the present time, it has to be decided by the President that a covert operation is important to the national security, so they make

a pro forma decision: "We want to do this; therefore, it is important to the national security." There is nothing in here that changes that.

I would like to see us describe the kind of covert operations we are engaged in, as we have done with the recommendations about assassinations. Beyond that, I might say it seems to me the National Security Council should be the agency responsible for making decisions about covert operations.

Who are these guys that you are trying to give the responsibility and authority to? They are the same ones that have had it in the past. Why don't we make the NSC the ultimate authority that is going to be responsible and make the President sign his name to that, with his knowledge that ultimately the light of history will judge him.

Mr. GIAIMO. Don't we get some sort of control over covert actions under the law we passed last year, since that law requires the CIA to come up and inform three committees in the House and three in the Senate of covert actions? Albeit, it is after the fact, but the CIA still has to come and inform us of the covert action. Doesn't that give us some added protection?

Mr. JOHNSON. I refer to the one instance where something was done on that. Action was taken because of one Senator. Not as a result of the reporting process.

Chairman PIKE. It is also necessary to say the action was taken

Mr. JOHNSON. There is nothing in the present procedure to prohibit this thing from recurring.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to agree wholeheartedly with my distinguished colleague from Colorado, Mr. Johnson, and make several brief comments.

First of all, Mr. McClory, in his statement in support of this section, makes the assertion that, based upon investigation of this committee, the overwhelming majority of the covert operations were very successful.

No. 1, this committee only looked at a select number of covert operations. I will suggest to the Chair and members of the committee that if you recall the so-called unclassified chart that our staff classified and that the chairman suggested be immediately unclassified, it listed a number of covert operations in various places around the world that totaled a very extraordinary number. This committee only investigated a microscopic degree of covert operations. Perhaps less than 10 percent, perhaps less than 3 percent, perhaps even less than 1 percent.

I would suggest to my colleague from Illinois that even if people were able to read the report, one cannot factually sustain the assertion that the overwhelming majority of covert operations are successful, because we are in total ignorance of that.

No. 2, I agree with Mr. Johnson that, if there is going to be any change in the procedure used by the 40 Committee as a subcommittee of the National Security Council, we should go beyond the present structure; and I agree with the gentleman that the President should be tied very carefully to these issues.

Now, with respect to covert operations, I agree with Mr. Johnson, and I certainly would like to be able to express my opinion with respect to them. I am totally and unequivocally opposed to covert operations. Given what we have learned in this committee, I do not believe covert operations in anyway enhance the role of this country in the world. In fact, I think they detract from it.

If it is the opinion of the Chair that we should proceed with this particular recommendation prior to making any decision with respect to covert operations, I would simply join my colleague from Colorado in saying I think we ought to rewrite this section and strengthen it— perhaps making the subcommittee a committee that recommends to the National Security Council in writing and then ties the National Security Council and the President in writing to these operations, giving us greater balance and greater accountability. And I also think there ought to be someone from the public sector elected to sit on that body as well.

Mr. McCLORY. In the public statements that have been made by the former Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Colby, he has delineated a large number of operations of the CIA over a long period of time which have been eminently successful, and if anybody has come off well as a result, I would say it is former Director Colby who established a reputation which is respected throughout the country.

Chairman PIKE. I would like to say that my reading of what we learned in this committee corresponds with your reading of what we learned in this committee. Mr. Dellums. We have looked at a very tiny number of covert operations. We were led to them by looking at where the dollars were going. I don't know whether what we looked at was representative, but I would say what we looked at was not very good: and if it is representative, I don't think anybody could ever allege that our covert operations overall are very successful.

Finally, I would honestly not expect either a past or a present Director of Central Intelligence to go around saying that they were lousy.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me again talk about the recommendation which is before us and address myself to the concerns of the gentleman from California and the gentleman from Colorado.

I think the most important part about this recommendation is not that it is going to control covert operations by itself. We have something in a later recommendation about Congress role in that which we will deal with.

I don't think we can look just one way to control covert operations. There is just not one quick fix that we can deal with. This is part of the way to do it. It is not a very strong thing. If it was the only thing we had done, I would be disappointed, but I think it is a step in the right direction.

The gentleman is right; we ought to tie it in more closely to the President and not have an amendment, which is what I hope we will do.

I think it goes to the chairman's point that if you ask people to recommend an action in writing over their own name, they will take it more seriously; there are lots of examples of that throughout the Government.

When President Kennedy asked for recommendations on what to do in Laos, he asked each of the services individually for their

recommendation.

Mr. DELLUMS. I ask for unanimous consent to have 1 additional minute.

Chairman PIKE. Without objection.