U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES: COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS PROCEEDINGS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION 63-746 SEPTEMBER 10, 29, OCTOBER 1, NOVEMBER 4, 6, 13, 14, PART 4 Printed for the use of the U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1976 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office CONTENTS Page Meeting of November 20: Compliance with subpenas. (Principal witness, Mr. Kasten (substitute resolutions) Committee staff: "Post Mortem Report and Examination of the In- telligence Community's Performance Before and During Cyprus 1288 Appendix II.-Correspondence relating to committee subpenas_ Appendix III.-Correspondence relating to classified information_. U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES: COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1975 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 a.m., in room 2222, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Otis G. Pike [chairman], presiding. Present: Representatives Pike, Stanton, Dellums, Murphy, Aspin, Hayes, Lehman, Treen, and Johnson. Also present: A. Searle Field, staff director; Aaron B. Donner, general counsel; and Jack Boos, counsel. Chairman PIKE. This meeting was called to make policy decisions. Senator Church and I have discussed this and agreed not to hold hearings on the same subjects. We also agreed that the most useful thing we could do would be to go from the cost of intelligence-gathering operations all the way to the other end of the spectrum-the results of our intelligence-gathering operations. We decided that the best way to look at the end results of intelligence-gathering operations was to examine certain situations which have already taken place. You may recall, I asked for input from the committee as to which particular situations we would look at, and we have, at least for the time being, chosen four: The Tet offensive, the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the invasion of Cyprus by the Turks and the coup in Portugal. We propose to look at what the intelligence community was saying about each of those particular situations immediately before the events took place. In the final analysis, our intelligence may be worth a certain amount of money if results are good and a lesser amount if they are poor. You can't evaluate without looking at results. We have tried to make very clear to the intelligence community precisely what we are going to do, so there would be no question about where we are going next. We asked for certain information. We wrote letters. I concede that our requests were much broader than what we needed, simply because we did not know the names of particular documents which we were seeking. It has been difficult. We received a response to my letter of August 17 only yesterday. What we asked for is this: We wanted the briefings which were given to the President during the week before each of these occurrences. It is a very simple and limited request. Mr. Colby referred to these documents when he testified before us-the briefing given to the President, called the President's briefing document and referred |