Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-makingUniversity of Michigan Press, 25 mars 2010 - 390 sidor Strategic issues and crises in foreign policy are usually managed by relatively small groups of elite policymakers and their closest advisors. Since the pioneering work of Irving Janis in the early 1970s, we have known that the interplay between the members of these groups can have a profound and, indeed, at times a pernicious influence on the content and quality of foreign policy decisions. Janis argued that "groupthink," a term he used to describe a tendency for extreme concurrence-seeking in decision-making groups, was a major cause of a number of U.S. foreign policy fiascoes. And yet not all small groups suffer from groupthink; in fact many high-level bodies are handicapped by an inability to achieve consensus at all. Beyond Groupthink builds upon and extends Janis's legacy. The contributors develop a richer understanding of group dynamics by drawing on alternate views of small-group dynamics. The relevant literature is reviewed and the different perspectives are explored in detailed case studies. The contributors link the group process to the broader organizational and political context of the policy process and stress the need to develop a multi-level understanding of the collegial policy-making process, combining the insights drawn from micro-level theories with those derived from study of broader political phenomena. The contributors include Alexander George, Sally Riggs Fuller, Paul D. Hoyt, Ramon J. Aldag, Max V. Metselaar, Bertjan Verbeek, J. Thomas Preston, Jean A. Garrison, and Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger. This book should appeal to political scienctists and international relations specialists, as well as researchers in social psychology, public administration, and management interested in group decision-making processes. Paul 't Hart is Associate Professor, Department of Public Administration, Leiden University and Scientific Director of of the Leiden-Rotterdam Crisis Research Center. Eric Stern is Professor of Political Science at Stockholm University. Bengt Sundelius is Professor of Political Science at Stockholm University. |
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Sida 3
... Prime Minister Carl Bildt of the board's decision, which was sure to have major political repercussions. Bildt asked for a short delay to enable him to confer with Ingvar Carlsson, the social democratic opposition leader. The Bank made ...
... Prime Minister Carl Bildt of the board's decision, which was sure to have major political repercussions. Bildt asked for a short delay to enable him to confer with Ingvar Carlsson, the social democratic opposition leader. The Bank made ...
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... prime negotiator for the Social Democratic Party. This was backed up by a phone call slightly before midnight from Prime Minister Bildt to opposition leader Carlsson, who told Bildt that the executive committee of his party could not ...
... prime negotiator for the Social Democratic Party. This was backed up by a phone call slightly before midnight from Prime Minister Bildt to opposition leader Carlsson, who told Bildt that the executive committee of his party could not ...
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... minister or official responsible for that part of the apparatus, in particular when his colleagues begin to form a ... prime ministers is their power of appointment and dismissal of ministers, but perhaps more importantly their control ...
... minister or official responsible for that part of the apparatus, in particular when his colleagues begin to form a ... prime ministers is their power of appointment and dismissal of ministers, but perhaps more importantly their control ...
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... chief executive, prime minister, minister, or senior official is crucially important (Hermann and Preston 1994). For example, leaders may feel uncomfortable in formal group settings; they may have a low tolerance for conflict among ...
... chief executive, prime minister, minister, or senior official is crucially important (Hermann and Preston 1994). For example, leaders may feel uncomfortable in formal group settings; they may have a low tolerance for conflict among ...
Sida 96
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Innehåll
Part 2 Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy | 151 |
Part 3 Implications | 309 |
Bibliography | 337 |
Contributors | 375 |
Index | 377 |
Andra upplagor - Visa alla
Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making Paul 't Hart,Eric Stern,Bengt Sundelius Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 1997 |
Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making Paul 't Hart,Eric Stern,Bengt Sundelius Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 1997 |
Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making Paul 't Hart,Eric Stern,Bengt Sundelius Fragmentarisk förhandsgranskning - 1997 |
Vanliga ord och fraser
Acheson action advisers advisory group advisory system Bay of Pigs behavior Blair House Brzezinski bureaucratic Carl Romme Carter chapter cognitive cohesion complex concurrence-seeking conflict conformity context crisis Cuba Cuban missile crisis Dean Rusk decision makers decision-making group decision-making process discussion Dutch effect Elsey environment example factors foreign policy foreign policy-making formal George group decision group dynamics group interaction group literature group members group process groupthink Hart Hermann Ibid impact important individual Indonesia influence interac interaction patterns interpersonal Iran issue Janis Janis’s June 29 Kennedy Kennedy’s Korea leaders leadership style Luns manipulation meeting military National Security newgroup syndrome norms operation options organizational policy decisions policy process political position preferences president presidential Prime Minister print version problem procedures Quay result risk role Secretary situation social Soviet structure suggests tend Thirty-eighth Parallel tion Truman Library Vance Vertzberger 1990 view this WH[W West New Guinea