Surprise Attack

Framsida
Harvard University Press, 2004 - 266 sidor

Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to anticipate the coming of war. Emphasing the psychological aspect of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties and mistakes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgemental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints.



Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective offers implications based on the intelligence perspective, providing both historical background and scientific analysis that draws from the author's vast experience. The book is of utmost value to all those engaged in intelligence work, and to those whose operational or political responsibility brings them in touch with intelligence assessments and the need to authenticate and then adopt them or discount them. Similarly, the book will interest any reader intrigued by decision-making processes that influence individuals and nations at war, and sometimes even shape national destiny.
--Ehud Barak, Former Prime Minister of Israel

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Introduction
xxvii
The Components of Surprise Attack
3
The Essence of Surprise Attack
5
Reaction to Disasters and Warnings
7
Aspects of Erroneous Estimates
10
The Strategic Warning
20
Surprise and Military Preparedness
29
Information and Indicators
35
Analogies and Learning from History
122
Evaluating Incoming Information
130
Choosing among Alternative Hypotheses
134
External Obstacles to Perception
140
Changing a View
146
The Environment
155
The Analyst and the Small Group
157
Groupthink
161

Quality of Intelligence Information
36
Early Warning Indicators
40
Signal and Noise
48
Quantity of Intelligence Information
51
Intentions and Capabilities
54
Inference and Difficulties in Estimating Intentions
57
The Enemys Conceptual Framework
62
Risk Taking by the Enemy
67
Estimating Capabilities
70
Judgmental Biases and Intelligence Analysis
81
Conceptions and Incoming Information
83
The Persistence of Conceptions
87
Assimilating Information
92
Information and Expectations
96
Treating Discrepant Information
99
Cognitive Biases and Overconfidence
103
The Process of Analysis
113
Stages of Intelligence Analysis
118
Approaches for Generating and Evaluating Hypotheses
120
Pressures for Conformity
162
The Leader and the Expert
166
Group Risk Taking
171
Organizational Obstacles
174
Rivalry Coordination and Communication
177
Intrinsic Problems in the Intelligence Organization
184
Military Men and Surprise Attack
194
Intelligence and Decision Makers
197
Decision Makers and Intelligence Production
198
Commitment to a Policy
202
How Decision Makers Affect the Intelligence Process
204
Decision Makers and Surprise Attack
209
Is Surprise Attack Inevitable?
211
Why Safeguards Usually Fail
213
War without Surprise?
227
Bibliography
239
Index
257
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Sida xiv - It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected.

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Om författaren (2004)

Ephraim Kam is Senior Research Fellow and former Deputy Director at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, Israel.

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