Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective, With a New PrefaceHarvard University Press, 15 maj 2004 - 266 sidor Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim’s failure to anticipate the coming of war. Emphasizing the psychological aspect of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties and mistakes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgmental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints. |
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Sida xvii
... enemy's offensive . The background to these new surprise attacks has been generally similar to those of previous attacks : a combination of faulty security concepts ; mis- judgment of the enemy's motivation , intentions , and ...
... enemy's offensive . The background to these new surprise attacks has been generally similar to those of previous attacks : a combination of faulty security concepts ; mis- judgment of the enemy's motivation , intentions , and ...
Sida xx
... enemy's use of doctrine and weaponry . Thus even if Saddam Hussein eventually grasped , both in 1991 and in 2003 , that he was about to be attacked , he proba- bly failed to foresee the nature and impact of the wars . The growing ...
... enemy's use of doctrine and weaponry . Thus even if Saddam Hussein eventually grasped , both in 1991 and in 2003 , that he was about to be attacked , he proba- bly failed to foresee the nature and impact of the wars . The growing ...
Sida xxii
... enemy's considerations and constraints pertaining to non - conventional attack are not suf- ficiently familiar , and therefore its intentions are not well under- stood . The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by many countries ...
... enemy's considerations and constraints pertaining to non - conventional attack are not suf- ficiently familiar , and therefore its intentions are not well under- stood . The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by many countries ...
Sida xxiii
... enemy's weapon systems , follow its behavior in the battlefield and in military training , and estimate the quality of its military leadership and the functioning of its maintenance system . As this book intends to show , this is a ...
... enemy's weapon systems , follow its behavior in the battlefield and in military training , and estimate the quality of its military leadership and the functioning of its maintenance system . As this book intends to show , this is a ...
Sida xxiv
... enemy's strategic intentions , especially to identify its possible decision to go to war , is new intelligence capabilities to penetrate the top level of the enemy's decision makers . So far , the progress in intelligence col- lection ...
... enemy's strategic intentions , especially to identify its possible decision to go to war , is new intelligence capabilities to penetrate the top level of the enemy's decision makers . So far , the progress in intelligence col- lection ...
Innehåll
Introduction | xxvii |
The Components of Surprise Attack | 3 |
The Essence of Surprise Attack | 5 |
Reaction to Disasters and Warnings | 7 |
Aspects of Erroneous Estimates | 10 |
The Strategic Warning | 20 |
Surprise and Military Preparedness | 29 |
Information and Indicators | 35 |
Analogies and Learning from History | 122 |
Evaluating Incoming Information | 130 |
Choosing among Alternative Hypotheses | 134 |
External Obstacles to Perception | 140 |
Changing a View | 146 |
The Environment | 155 |
The Analyst and the Small Group | 157 |
Groupthink | 161 |
Quality of Intelligence Information | 36 |
Early Warning Indicators | 40 |
Signal and Noise | 48 |
Quantity of Intelligence Information | 51 |
Intentions and Capabilities | 54 |
Inference and Difficulties in Estimating Intentions | 57 |
The Enemys Conceptual Framework | 62 |
Risk Taking by the Enemy | 67 |
Estimating Capabilities | 70 |
Judgmental Biases and Intelligence Analysis | 81 |
Conceptions and Incoming Information | 83 |
The Persistence of Conceptions | 87 |
Assimilating Information | 92 |
Information and Expectations | 96 |
Treating Discrepant Information | 99 |
Cognitive Biases and Overconfidence | 103 |
The Process of Analysis | 113 |
Stages of Intelligence Analysis | 118 |
Approaches for Generating and Evaluating Hypotheses | 120 |
Pressures for Conformity | 162 |
The Leader and the Expert | 166 |
Group Risk Taking | 171 |
Organizational Obstacles | 174 |
Rivalry Coordination and Communication | 177 |
Intrinsic Problems in the Intelligence Organization | 184 |
Military Men and Surprise Attack | 194 |
Intelligence and Decision Makers | 197 |
Decision Makers and Intelligence Production | 198 |
Commitment to a Policy | 202 |
How Decision Makers Affect the Intelligence Process | 204 |
Decision Makers and Surprise Attack | 209 |
Is Surprise Attack Inevitable? | 211 |
Why Safeguards Usually Fail | 213 |
War without Surprise? | 227 |
Bibliography | 239 |
| 257 | |
Andra upplagor - Visa alla
Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective, With a New Preface Ephraim Kam Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 2004 |
Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective, With a New Preface Ephraim KAM,Ephraim Kam Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 2009 |
Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective, With a New Preface Ephraim Kam Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 2004 |
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Al Qaeda alert ambiguous American Amos Tversky analysts and decision analytical process Arab Army assumptions availability heuristic behavior beliefs Betts biases Chinese conceptions countermeasures Cuban missile crisis deception decision makers Defense difficult discrepant information early warning indicators Egyptian enemy enemy's capabilities enemy's intentions evaluation evidence example expectations explained factors forces German invasion groupthink Hawaii Heuer Hitler hypotheses imminent incoming information influence intelligence agencies intelligence analysts intelligence assessments intelligence community intelligence estimates intelligence failure International interpretation Israel Israeli issue Janis Jervis judgment Kahneman Kimmel Korea Military Intelligence Moreover North Korean offensive operation organizational outcome overconfidence Pearl Harbor perceived perception policy makers political possible predict probability problem regard relevant reliable reports risk Russia signals situation Six-Day War Slovic South Korea Soviet Stalin strategic warning surprise attack tend threat tions Tversky U.S. Congress victim Wohlstetter Yom Kippur Yom Kippur War
Populära avsnitt
Sida xiv - It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected.
Hänvisningar till den här boken
Intelligence for Multilateral Decision and Action Perry L. Pickert Obegränsad förhandsgranskning - 1997 |