hath made us and if that were not enough to determine our judgment, he hath farther told us expressly by his beloved Son, that he expects us to live with one another according to this rule. Nor (which completes our obligation) hath he left us any room to doubt, but that in every thing, as we obey or disobey, he will reward or punish: and certainly in a greater or smaller degree, as the matter is more or less important. Let us therefore now, III. Consider well the importance of the precept before us. Indeed the stamp of divine authority upon it, especially joined with the annexed declaration, that it contains the substance of all, that the law and prophets have taught concerning our mutual behaviour, may fully assure us, even before we make any particular enquiry, that its moment is remarkably great. And yet there seems to lie a plausible objection against it that as it only enjoins men to do to others what they see would be right for others to do to them; the question still remains, what that right part is: that where this is known, the rule of the text is needless; and where it is not known, we have no more direction for our conduct, than we had before; but are only perplexed with an imaginary change of persons to no purpose. : Now it must be confessed, that if we had neither by nature nor by revelation any sense or knowledge at all of right and wrong in particular cases, this rule could not give us any; nor could we understand it any otherwise, than very grossly and imperfectly: : but still it would be of some, and no small use to us. For if we knew nothing else, at least we should know what we desired; we should know too, that in the main we were all alike: and by treating each other as we merely wished (without considering how reasonably) to be treated in return, we should for the most part do tolerably well; please those around us, and make ourselves easy. Sometimes indeed, for want of distinguishing, what wishes were fit, and what unfit, we should act extremely ill : but in comparison perhaps not very often. And upon the whole, where we had no particular precepts, this general one would be the best that we could follow, even though we could not apprehend its full import. But the delivery of it to us presupposes, and very justly, that in the main the contrary is true: that all mankind perceive, in some good degree, one sort of behaviour to be commendable, another blamable; some things right to be done, others wrong. And hence arises, instead of an objection, the principal use of our Saviour's rule. For it enables us to apply these perceptions, where otherwise we should not know how; and inclines us to apply them justly, where otherwise we should have misapplied them. Though we every one of us have the perceptions, yet to form distinct notions of the proper measures and objects of them; to discover how far they are mere conclusions of the understanding; and how far dictates of passions or affections, which ought to be corrected and moderated by the understanding; to make a rational examination of the several interfering circumstances of a case, and judge in that manner how we are to be moved, and how to act; is a work, for which the bulk of mankind is totally unqualified. The different opinions entertained by speculative inquiries concerning the precise nature, foundation, limits of moral obligation, run into niceties, that are altogether beyond common apprehension. And of those, who can be amused with them, few, if any, have skill to proceed upon them in the ordinary affairs of life. The great thing therefore, which the world needs for practice, is, not a complete system of virtue, regularly drawn out, and strictly demonstrated; but a familiar palpable instruction, what people are to do in such matters, as chiefly come before them. Now the rule of the text will instruct them, without studying the theory and grounds of virtuous affection at all, to show such affection notwithstanding, when it is requisite ; and to conduct as they should what they are concerned in, without troubling themselves about refinements, which they may never be concerned in. Seriously asking ourselves, and waiting for a serious answer from within, how we should think it reasonable for others to behave towards us in the business, in which we must behave one way or another towards them, will excite in us a very peculiar kind of attention to it; will awaken our faculties to judge of this question with much more certainty, than we could of the more abstracted ones, upon which the philosophical solution of it may depend; and throw a strong light on the point before us, how little soever we may discern in relation to others, with which perhaps it is closely connected. At least it will cause us to feel experimentally what we ought to do, whether we see it speculatively, or not. But further, the observation of this precept will not only set our minds to work upon the subject, (and yet many want that to be done for them ;) but, which is a greater benefit still, will singularly preserve them from working unfairly. The love, that we bear to ourselves, our zeal for the persons and things which we like, and our vehemence against those which we dislike, hinder us perpetually from discovering what is our duty, where else it would be most evident; and constitute our principal danger of judging amiss. Now, if there can be in the world a method of securing us against this danger, our Saviour's rule is that method. Viewing only one face of an object is apt to deceive us; therefore we are directed to view it on the reverse too. Considering a case as our own gives us a bias: suppose then the contrary to be our own; and our second thoughts will correct the first. Self-love is what usually carries us wrong: but the rule prescribed us converts that very passion into an instrument of setting us right by placing in their turns, before our eyes, two selfs to decide between (if the expression may be allowed) the real and the fictitious one. The appearances of reason, which arise from the circumstances favourable to our own side, engross our attention: let imagination therefore change the side, and we shall attend to the opposite appearances. The inward feelings, which we have, of our own interest, our own honour, our own sufferings, of whatever relates to ourselves, are so very strong, that we quite forget, how the same feelings affect the other party. But this admirable contrivance of a feigned experience enables and obliges us to feel for each party successively, and thus to become impartial judges. Farther than this we cannot go in combating selfish prejudices, and therefore a more perfect direction than this cannot be given. But, besides being a most excellent and obvious rule to guide and try ourselves by, it is likewise a most natural and easy one for others, friends or opposers, to suggest to us: who thus, one should think, might immediately shame us into doing right, only by putting a question to our consciences, which is altogether inoffensive, and yet must produce, if we are guilty, unavoidable conviction. But here indeed it must be acknowledged, that some people, especially at times, are wicked and wild enough to reject, with indignation, even the most respectful proposals of their trying a case by any law, but their own will and pleasure: and that others may pretend to have made in their thoughts this change of persons, which our Lord enjoins, and yet not have made it in earnest. They may say (for it is very soon said), that they have already sufficiently examined the matter; and should be well content to receive the treatment, which they propose to give : that they cannot but know, whether they have consulted and answered themselves, and they are under no obligation to consult or answer any one else: the rule recommended to them makes every man his own judge, and they have judged accordingly, as well as they are able, and are very clear in their sentiments. Now undoubtedly every one, that will, may assert this, or any thing, falsely. And it is very true, that the direction in the text is of no manner of use, as none can be, to those who are absolutely resolved not to be directed. But such as have any fairness of heart remaining, let them be otherwise ever so far gone at any time in unreasonableness, may possibly still be brought to themselves, by having it put home to them: "Would you really be willing, that others, if they had power, should determine concerning you, "in the same haughty and careless, or the same angry "and vehement disposition, which you now show con 66 cerning them?" You say you would: but is it not in order to maintain your ground any how, when you are pressed? For your own sake, as well as your neighbour's, deal fairly with yourself: and remem |