F. C. S.

C. S.-F. P. A.

"Free of Capture and Seizure" (1 Maude & P. 449). Vh,

5 Encyc. 324: CAPTURE.

F. G. A." Free of General Average" (1 Maude & P. 449).

F. O. B." Free on Board." This expression throughout the whole of England, means that the seller is to put the goods on board at his own expense, but on account of, and thenceforward at the risk and as the property of, the purchaser; and this is so whether the goods are specific or only a proportion of a quantity (Cowas-jee v. Thompson, 5 Moore, P. C. 173: Brown v. Hare, 27 L. J. Ex. 372; 29 Ib. 6; 3 H. & N. 484; 4 Ib. 822: Inglis v. Stock, 54 L. J. Q. B. 582; 10 App. Ca. 263: Benj. 315: Blackb. 362). In Ex p. Rosevear Co, Re Cock (11 Ch. D. 565), Bacon, C. J. in Bankry, said, "Delivery 'free on board' only means, The price shall be that which we stipulate for, and you shall not have to pay for the wagons or carts necessary to carry (to the ship); we will bear all those charges and put it free on board the ship, the name of which you furnish.'

As to whether "Free on Board" indicates that the transitus is at an end as soon as the goods are on the purchaser's Ship; V. Berndtson v. Strang, L. R. 4 Eq. 488.

A contract for PIG IRON made at Glasgow and deliverable "F. O. B.” may, by a mercantile usage, be shown to mean a particular kind of iron made in the neighbourhood of Glasgow (Mackenzie v. Dunlop, 1 Paterson, 669).

F. O. W.-" FIRST OPEN WATER": the phrase is "used in CharterParties, with reference to Ports in the Baltic, to mean immediately after the Ice breaks up'" (5 Encyc. 471). V. " Open Water," sub OPEN.

F. P. A. Free of Particular Average" (1 Maude & P. 449). "Where, in the Memorandum, the words Warranted free from Particular Average' are used, these words are not confined to losses arising from injury to the goods themselves, but amount to a warranty against any loss other than a Total Loss, or General Average; and therefore, under a Marine Policy in the ordinary form on goods, the Underwriters are not liable for expenses incurred in relation to the goods unless such expenses are paid to avert a General Average loss, and are therefore

F. P. A.

683

FACILITIES

recoverable under the Suing and Labouring Clause" (1 Maude & P. 493, citing Meyer v. Ralli, 1 C. P. D. 372, 373; 45 L. J. C. P. 741: Great Indian Peninsular Ry v. Saunders, 1 B. & S. 41; 30 L. J. Q. B. 218; 31 Ib. 206). Vh, Hendricks v. Australasian Insrce, 43 L. J. C. P. 188; L. R. 9 C. P. 461: Stewart v. Merchants Mar Insrce, 55 L. J. Q. B. 81; 16 Q. B. D. 619.

FABRIC LANDS.-"Fabrick-Lands,' are lands given to the rebuilding, repair, or maintenance, of Cathedrals or other Churches," as in 12 Car. 2, c. 11 (Cowel). V. 5 Encyc. 284, 285: Tudor, Char. Trusts, 436.

FABRICATE.-V. FALSELY ASSUMING TO ACT.

FACILITIES.-By s. 2, Ry and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, Ry and Canal Companies "shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable Facilities" for receiving, forwarding, and delivering, Traffic. The word "Facilities," here, does not mean merely facilities afforded by the management of traffic, e.g. Through Booking (Didcot, &c Ry v. G. W. Ry, 1897, 1 Q. B. 33; 66 L. J. Q. B. 33; 75 L. T. 401; 45 W. R. 282); but a Company violates the Act "if (having sufficient powers) it keeps its platforms, booking-office, and other structures, at any station, in such a condition as to space and other arrangements as to cause dangerous or obstructive confusion, delay or other impediment to the proper reception, transmission, or delivery, of the ordinary traffic of that station, whether consisting of passengers or of goods" (per Selborne, C., S. E. Ry v. Ry Commrs, 50 L. J. Q. B. 206; 6 Q. B. D. 586; 3 Ry & Can Traffic Ca. 508). But Refreshment-rooms, and Covered Platforms and Carriage Yards, even at places where invalids resort, are not "facilities" within the section (Ib.), nor are free Water-Closets (West Ham v. G. E. Ry, 9 Ry & Can Traffic Ca. 7; 64 L. J. Q. B. 340; 72 L. T. 395; 11 Times Rep. 264).

"When you speak of giving 'Reasonable Facilities' you imply that the thing with regard to which you order a Facility is an existing thing" (per Esher, M. R., Darlaston v. Lond. & N. W. Ry, 1894, 2 Q. B. 694; 63 L. J. Q. B. 826; 71 L. T. 461; 43 W. R. 29; 8 Ry & Can Traffic Ca. 233); therefore, there is no power, under the section, to order the opening of a New Station or the Re-Opening of one that has been closed (S. E. Ry v. Ry Commrs, sup: Darlaston v. Lond. & N. W. Ry, sup).

The section includes Facilities for Passengers (Winsford Local Bd v. Cheshire Lines Committee, 59 L. J. Q. B. 372; 24 Q. B. D. 456: Re Willesden Local Bd and Mid. Ry, 37 S. J. 176), e.g. a Cloak Room (Singer Co v. Lond. & S. W. Ry, 1894, 1 Q. B. 833; 63 L. J. Q. B. 411; 70 L. T. 172; 42 W. R. 347). V. RAILWAY.

Vf, G. W. Ry v. Ry Commrs, 50 L. J. Q. B. 483; 7 Q. B. D. 182; 29

FACILITIES

684

FACTOR

W. R. 901: Brown v. G. W. Ry, 51 L. J. Q. B. 529; 9 Q. B. D. 744; 3 Ry & Can Traffic Ca. 523: R. v. Ry Commrs, 58 L. J. Q. B. 233; 22 Q. B. D. 642: Nichol v. N. E. Ry, 4 Times Rep. 464: Barry Ry v. Taff Vale Ry, 1895, 1 Ch. 128; 64 L. J. Ch. 230; 71 L. T. 688; 43 W. R. 372: Newington v. N. E. Ry, 3 Ry & Can Traffic Ca. 306: Watkinson v. Wrexham, &c Ry, Ib. 446: Tharsis Co. v. Lond. & N. W. Ry, Ib. 455: James v. Taff Vale Ry, Ib. 540: Beeston Brewery Co. v. Mid. Ry, 5 Ib. 53: Distington Iron Co. v. Lond. & N. W. Ry, 6 Ib. 123: Highland Ry v. G. N. of Scotland Ry, 7 Ib. 94.

Proper and Sufficient Facilities" for TRAFFIC in a Ry Arrangement Act; V. G. W. Ry v. Central Wales Ry, 5 Ry & Can Traffic Ca. 1.

The "Facilities for IMPROVEMENT" which, under s. 16, Copyhold Act, 1852, 15 & 16 V. c. 51, are to be taken into account in valuing the Lord's rights on an Enfranchisement, are questions of fact depending in great measure on the state of the particular land and the local circumstances (Lingwood v. Gyde, cited CUSTOMARY FREEHOLD).

FACT.- An action on a Distress for church rates is commenced within three calendar months "after the Fact committed," 53 G. 3, c. 127, s. 12, if brought within that time after the sale under the distress (Collins v. Rose, 5 M. & W. 194; 8 L. J. Ex. 273).

A recital that A. B. is seised in fee, is a "recital or statement of a Fact" (and not merely of a proposition of law); and if contained in a Deed 20 years old will be sufficient evidence of the truth of that fact within s. 2(2), V. & P. Act, 1874, 37 & 38 V. c. 78, until the contrary is proved (Bolton v. London School Board, 47 L. J. Ch. 461; 7 Ch. D. 766: Vf, Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 170). V, ENTITLED.

"Question of Fact arising in the Action"; V. Fennessey v. Clark, 57 L. J. Ch. 398; 37 Ch. D. 184; 58 L. T. 289.

Existing Fact; V. FALSE PRETENCE.

"False Statement of Fact "; V. FALSE STATEMENT. V. MATERIAL FACT: PERJURY.

FACTO.-V. DE JURE.

FACTOR. -"A Factor is an Agent entrusted with the possession of GOODS for the purpose of selling them for his Principal" (per Cotton, L. J., Stevens v. Biller, inf). V. POSSESSION.

"There are two extensive classes of Mercantile Agents, namely; Factors, who are entrusted with the possession as well as the disposal of property; and Brokers, who are employed to contract about it without being put in possession" (Smith, Mer. Law, 9 ed., 106, cited with approval by Brett, L. J., Ex p. Dixon, 46 L. J. Bank. 20; 4 Ch. D. 133, and by Chitty, J., Stevens v. Biller, 53 L. J. Ch. 249; 25 Ch. D. 31. Vf, as to "Factor," A-G. v. Trueman, 13 L. J. Ex. 70; 11 M. & W.

FACTOR

685

FACTORY

694; and as to distinction between "Factor" and "Broker," Baring v. Corrie, 2 B. & Ald. 143). Vh, Evans on Agency, 2 ed., 4: Story on Agency, s. 34: 5 Encyc. 286-288: Cp, BROKER.

"Factor," ss. 41, 44, Income Tax Act, 1842, "is used in its strict legal sense as meaning a person who is in possession of the goods of his principal" (per Esher, M. R., Grainger v. Gough, 1895, 1 Q. B. 71; 64 L. J. Q. B. 197; Vthe, in H. L. 1896, A. C. 325; 65 L. J. Q. B. 410).

"Factors, Servants, or Assigns," in the Suing and Labouring Clause of a Marine Insurance; V. Uzielli v. Boston Mar Insrce, 15 Q. B. D. 11; 54 L. J. Q. B. 142.

Note. There is no definition of "Factor" in the Factors Act, 1889, but there is one of "Mercantile Agent." The Act of 1889 is extended to Scotland by 53 & 54 V. c. 40, which does not alter the general Scotch law quà PLEDGE; V. Inglis v. Robertson, cited MERCANTILE AGENT.

V. Buy.

In Scotland, "Factor" usually connotes a LAND Steward or Agent, e.g. "Factor,' shall mean a person acting under a Probative Factory and Commission for the proprietor or proprietors (including corporations being proprietors) for whom he is Factor, and in the bonâ fide actual management, as such Factor, of the lands and heritages belonging to such proprietor" (s. 42, 17 & 18 V. c. 91). V. JUDICIAL FACTOR.

A quaint use of "Factor occurs at 2 Inst. 15, where it is said that Ranulph, Chaplain to William Rufus, "a man subacto ingenio and profunda nequitia, was a Factor for the King in making merchandize of Church Livings."

FACTORY.—A "Factory," within s. 3, 30 & 31 V. c. 103, related to trades carried on in covered buildings, and not to open-air processes, such as a Quarry, or Cement Works on a large piece of land (Kent v. Astley, 39 L. J. M. C. 3; 10 B. & S. 802; L. R. 5 Q. B. 19: Redgrave v. Lee, 43 L. J. M. C. 105; L. R. 9 Q. B. 363). That ruling is not applicable to the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901 (s. 149, subs. 5).

A code of law relating to Factories and Workshops is now provided by the said Act of 1901, which repealed the previous legislation, but re-enacted its provisions with emendations and amplifications. Its main definitions of "Factory" and "WORKSHOP" are contained in s. 149, whereby "Factory" is classified as either a "Textile Factory," or a "Non-Textile Factory," and either may be a " Tenement Factory," each phrase receiving by the section an elaborate def, in addition to which there is a List of "Non-Textile Factories" given in Part 1, Sch 6, whilst Part 2 of that Sch gives a List of places which are "Non-Textile Factories, and Workshops" (V. NON-TEXTILE FACTORIES): - whilst "WORK

FACTORY

686

FACTUM

SHOP," comprises those lastly mentioned places, and others defined by the section, and also a "Tenement Workshop" as thereby defined.

By s. 104, "Every DOCK, WHARF, QUAY, and WAREHOUSE, and all MACHINERY OF PLANT used in the PROCESS of loading or unloading or coaling any SHIP in any Dock, HARBOUR, or CANAL" is included in "Factory," the "OCCUPIER" of which is defined by such section.

By s. 105, "Premises on which Machinery worked by steam, water, or other mechanical power, is temporarily used for the purpose of the construction of a BUILDING or any Structural Work in connection with a Building" is included in "Factory," the "Occupier" of which is defined by such section: by this section too, quà Notice and Investigation of Accidents, "Factory" includes, "(a) Any Building which exceeds 30 feet in HEIGHT and which is being constructed or repaired by means of a SCAFFOLDING; and (b) Any Building which exceeds 30 feet in height and in which more than 20 persons, not being Domestic Servants, are employed for wages."

By s. 115, "Domestic Factory' and 'Domestic Workshop,' mean a private house, room, or place, which, though used as a Dwelling, is, by reason of the work carried on there, a Factory or a Workshop (as the case may be) within the meaning of this Act; and in which neither steam, water, nor other mechanical power, is used in aid of the manufacturing process carried on there; and in which the only persons employed are Members of the same Family dwelling there."

"The Factory and Workshop Acts, 1878 to 1895"; V. Sch 2, Short Titles Act, 1896.

Quà Workmen's Comp Act, 1897, "Factory,' has the same meaning as in the Factory and Workshop Acts, 1878 to 1891; and also includes any Dock, Wharf, Quay, Warehouse, Machinery, or Plant, to which any provision of the Factory Acts is applied by the Factory and Workshop Act, 1895, and every Laundry worked by steam, water, or other mechanical power" (subs. 2, s. 7). That def must now be read as though it referred to and adopted the meanings of "Factory" as given in the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901 (s. 38 (1), Interp Act, 1889).

Semble, as of general application, that a Part of a BUILDING separately occupied, does not become a Factory by reason of the rest of the bg being so used (London Co. Co. v. Lewis, 82 L. T. 195; 69 L. J. Q. B. 277; 64 J. P. 39).

Quà P. II. Scotland Act, 1897, "Factory' includes, Workshop and Workplace" (s. 3). V. HOUSE.

"Factory or Workshop," quà Bills of Sale; V. 41 & 42 V. c. 31, s. 5. Ir. 42 & 43 V. c. 50, s. 5.

V. s.

Factory MAGAZINE," quà Explosives Act, 1875, 38 & 39 V. c. 17;

108.

FACTUM. V. DEED: FAIT.