HUNDRED

902

HUNTING

not his lands within the Hundred: per King, C., Bays v. Bird, 2 P. Wms. 400" (Elph. 589; whv).

"Hundred or Tithing "; V. R. v. Milland, 1 Burr. 577.

V. CWT.

Per HUNDRED.

Evidence of usage is admissible to show that

'per Hundred " in a contract means some other figure than 100; — e.g. six score (Smith v. Wilson, 1 L. J. K. B. 194; 3 B. & Ad. 728). V. PER CWT.

HUNTING. The grant or reservation of "Hunting, Shooting, Fishing, and Sporting," includes all things generally hunted, shot, fished, or sported after, in contradistinction to small birds and things of a similar character, e.g. rats and sparrows (per Willes, J., Jeffryes v. Evans, 34 L. J. C. P. 261; 19 C. B. N. S. 265, 266: Va, Graham v. Ewart, 25 L. J. Ex. 48). Jeffryes v. Evans decided that rabbits would be included in such a reservation. It also decided that a covenant for Quiet Enjoyment, in such a grant or reservation, does not imply any undertaking restricting the ordinary use of the land: Va, Gearns v. Baker, 44 L. J. Ch. 334; 10 Ch. 355. But a grant or reservation as to Hares and Rabbits is now subject to the Ground Game Act, 1880, 43 & 44 V. c. 47; and as to Informations (apart from that Act) against a tenant for killing rabbits contrary to such a reservation, V. Spicer v. Barnard, 28 L. J. M. C. 176; 1 E. & E. 874; 7 W. R. 467; 33 L. T. O. S. 121: Padwick v. King, 29 L. J. M. C. 42; 7 C. B. N. S. 88: Pryce v. Davies, 35 J. P. 374. V. GROUND GAME.

Vf, Sowerby v. Smith, and cognate cases, cited Freehold.

The Grant of A right to sport, without more, would probably be held not to exclude the grantor (Bloomfield v. Johnston, Ir. Rep. 8 C. L. 68); secus, of a reservation of THE right (Paget v. Milles, 3 Doug. 43).

"The liberty of Fowling has been decided to be a profit à prendre, and may be prescribed for as such (Davies' Case, 3 Mod. 246). The liberty to Hawk is one species of aucupium (Manwood, c. 18, s. 10, p. 107), the taking of birds by hawks, and seems to follow the same rule. The liberty of Fishing appears to be of the same nature; it implies, that the person who takes the fish, takes for his own benefit; it is Common of Fishing. The liberty of Hunting is open to more question, as that does not of itself import the right to the animal when taken; and if it were a license given to one individual either on one occasion, or for a time, or for his life, it would amount only to a mere personal license of pleasure, to be exercised by the individual licensed" (per Parke, B., Wickham v. Hawker, 10 L. J. Ex. 159, 160; 7 M. & W. 72); but even in the latter case if the grant were to the grantee "his heirs and assigns," or to be exercised by him or his "servants," it would be a profit à prendre (Ib.). V. FREE LIBERTY: PROFIT À PRENDRE: SERVANTS.

HURST

903

HYDRANT

HURST. V. GRAVA.

HURT. V. INGENIOUSLY AFFECTED: SERVICE OF THE SHIP.

HUSBAND. - A gift to A. (a woman) for life, remainder, "in trust for any husband with whom she may intermarry, if he shall survive her "; held, that a man whom A. had married but from whom she had been divorced and who survived her, was entitled as A.'s "Husband," although he had married again before her death (Re Bullmore, 52 L. J. Ch. 456; 22 Ch. D. 619). But in Hitchins v. Morrieson (40 Ch. D. 32; 37 W. R. 91), Kay, J., said he should certainly have decided Re Bullmore otherwise, and refused to follow and apply it to a similar bequest in which however the word was " Wife" instead of "Husband." V. WIFE.

A gift to an unmarried woman for life, remainder to her Husband in fee, gives a vested remainder in fee to her first husband (Radford v. Willis, 41 L. J. Ch. 19; 7 Ch. 7).

"Husband," may, by a context, include a reputed husband (V. per Ld Cairns, Hill v. Crook, 42 L. J. Ch. 716; L. R. 6 H. L. 285: per Halsbury, C., Re Jodrell, 59 L. J. Ch. 542, affd H. L. nom. Seale-Hayne v. Jodrell, 1891, A. C. 304; 61 L. J. Ch. 70; 65 L. T. 57: Vf, WIFE: RELATIONS).

A gift to the children of A., "whether by her present or any future husband"; held, not to exclude a child of A. by a former husband, the words quoted being rejected as surplusage (Re Pickup, 30 L. J. Ch. 278: 9 W. R. 251; 4 L. T. 85).

Vh, Roper on Husband and Wife: Thicknesse, Ib.: Macqueen, Ib.: Crawley, Ib.: Eversley on Domestic Relations: 1 White & Tudor, 535-729.

V. BARON: COHABITATION: MARRIAGE: WIDOW: NEXT OF KIN: SHIP'S HUSBAND: JOINT TENANCY.

HUSBANDRY.-V. CUSTOM OF THE COUNTRY: SERVANT IN HUSBANDRY: TRADE: IMPLEMENT OF HUSBANDRY.

In the phrase " According to the best rules of Husbandry practised in the neighbourhood," "Husbandry,' is equally applicable to a MARKET GARDEN as to a FARM arable or pasture" (per Kekewich, J., Meux v. Cobley, 1892, 2 Ch. 261).

HYDEGILD. "Is the price or ransom to be paid for the saving of his skin from being beaten " (Termes de la Ley).

HYDRANT. — V. PLUG.

HYPOCRITE

904

HYTH

HYPOCRITE.-To write of a person that he is a Hypocrite is a Libel, and needs no innuendo (Thorley v. Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355).

HYPOTHECATION.-V. PLEDGE.

HYPOTHETICAL." Hypothetical Tenant" is a phrase employed to denote a possible tenant of property which is, ordinarily, not let and is in the hands of its Owner, its ANNUAL VALUE (for rating purposes) being the rent which such a possible tenant may be reasonably considered as willing to pay Vh. London Co. Co. v. Erith, and cognate cases, cited BENEFICIAL.

HYTH." A Port or little Haven to lade or unlade Wares at " (Cowel).

I ENGAGE-ICE-BOUND

I ENGAGE. "I engage to pay "; V. I PROMISE.

I HAVE.-V. HAVE: Now.

I. O. U.-V. p. 1009, post.

I PROMISE. "Where a note runs I promise to pay,' and is signed by two or more persons, it is deemed to be their joint and several Note" (s. 85 (2), Bills of Ex. Act, 1882, codifying March v. Ward, Peake, 177: Cp, per Wightman, J., R. v. Silkstone, cited ME).

But if it runs "I promise to pay" and is signed by one for himself and others, it is his and their joint Note (Ex p. Buckley, 14 M. & W. 469; 14 L. J. Ex. 341; over-ruling Hall v. Smith, 1 B. & C. 407). Probably, Shipton v. Thornton (9 A. & E. 314; 8 L. J. Q. B. 73, in whe "I hereby engage to pay," signed by one of two partners but with the style of the firm, was held evidence of a several contract by the actual signatory) is explainable on the ground that the decision was against a very technical stamp objection.

I REQUEST.-V. REQUEST.

I WILL BE READY.-V. READY.

I WILL SEE YOU PAID. These words amount, primâ facie, to an original and independent agreement to pay, as distinguished from a GUARANTEE for payment (Birkmyr v. Darnell, 1 Salk. 27; 1 Sm. L. C. 335: per Tenterden, C. J., Oldfield v. Lowe, 9 B. & C. 77: Lakeman v. Mountstephen, 43 L. J. Q. B. 188; L. R. 7 H. L. 17). V. ANOTHER: DEBT, DEFAULT, OR MISCARRIAGE.

V. ATTENDED TO.

IBBETSON'S ACTS.- The Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869, 32 & 33 V. c. 27:

The Wine and Beerhouse Act Amendment Act, 1870, 33 & 34 V. c. 29.

ICE.-V. DETENTION BY ICE.

ICE-BOUND. — A ship is "Ice-bound" when "the ice is so round the ship that she cannot move away because of the ice. I do not think that it, necessarily, means that the ship cannot move at all. But it means that she cannot move so as to get out of the ice" (per Esher,

M. R., Sunderland S. S. Co v. North of England Insrce, 14 The Reports, 198; 1 Times Rep. 106).

Cp, "Open Water," sub OPEN. V. FIRST OPEN WATER.

IDENTICAL. V. CORRESPOND.

IDIOT. "Ideot,' is he that is a foole naturall from his birth, and knoweth not how to account or number twenty pence, or cannot name his father or mother, nor of what age himselfe is, or such like easie and common matters; so that it appeareth hee hath no manner of understanding, of reason, or government of himselfe, what is for his profit or disprofit, &c" (Termes de la Ley).

Vh, Beverley's Case, 4 Rep. 124: Crosswell v. People, 13 Mich. 435: Cowel, Ideot: 1 Bl. Com. 302; 4 Ib. 24: Jacob: Wood Renton on Lunacy: Pope, Ib.: Archbold, Ib.: 6 Encyc. 295, 296.

Quà Idiots Act, 1886, 49 & 50 V. c. 25, "Idiots,' or 'Imbeciles' do not include Lunatics" (s. 17).

Cp, LUNATIC: UNSOUND MIND.

IDLE AND DISORDERLY PERSON. - For the catalogue of those who come within this phrase, V. s. 3, Vagrancy Act, 1824, 5 G. 4, c. 83, enlarged by s. 7, 34 & 35 V. c. 108: Steph. Cr. 129. Cp, ROGUE AND VAGABOND.

The phrase includes able-bodied men who can work but will not because they are on strike, and so become indigent; but not their wives and children (A-G. v. Merthyr Tydfil, 1900, 1 Ch. 516; 69 L. J. Ch. 299; 82 L. T. 662; 48 W. R. 403; 64 J. P. 276). But however idle a person is he is not within this Act unless he is able and will not maintain himself; and it is immaterial that his inability is brought about by his own act, e.g. drinking to excess and thereby bringing on delirium tremens (St. Saviour v. Burbridge, 1900, 2 Q. B. 695; 69 L. J. Q. B. 886; 83 L. T. 317; 64 J. P. 725: 48 W. R. 685).

IDONEUS.-V. FIT.

IF."If he should die," construed as "When he should die," and not as importing a Contingency but as giving a Remainder after the death (Smart v. Clark, 3 Russ. 365; 5 L. J. O. S. Ch. 111; following Billings v. Sandom, 1 Bro. C. C. 393, 394, where the words were "In case of her demise"). V. WHEN: WHENEVER.

The four phrases apt for attaching a CONDITION to an estate are, sub conditione (On Condition); proviso semper (PROVIDED ALWAYS); ita quoad (So that); and si contingat (If it happen): each of the first three, of itself, operates as a Condition, but the last is "nought worth to such a Condition" unless it be followed by words of cesser or right of re-entry (Litt. ss. 328-331: Vf, Touch. 121-123: Doe d. Henniker v. Watt, 8 B. & C. 308).