Reason and usage, he added, must direct the mode of treating national and official business. If rules had been established, they must be conformed to. If they were yet to be framed, it was hoped that they would be convenient and proper. So far as ease could be made to comport with regularity, and with necessary forms, it ought to be consulted; but custom, and the dignity of office, were not to be disregarded. The conversation continued upwards of an hour, but no change was made in the resolution of the President.

The subjects which pressed for immediate attention on the first legislature assembled under the new government, were numerous and important. Much was to be created, and much to be reformed.

The subject of revenue, as constituting the vital spring without which the action of government could not long be continued, was taken up in the house of representatives, as soon as it could be introduced. The qualification of the members was succeeded by a motion, for the house to resolve itself into a committee of the whole on the state of the union; and in that committee, a resolution was moved by Mr. Madison, declaring the opinion that certain duties ought to be levied on goods, wares, and merchandise, imported into the United States; and on the tonnage of vessels.

As it was deemed important to complete a temporary system in time to embrace the spring importations, Mr. Madison presented the scheme of impost which had been recommended by the former congress, and had already received the approbation of a majority of the states; to which he added a general proposition for a duty on tonnage. By this scheme specific duties were imposed on certain enumerated articles; and an advalorem duty on those not enumerated. Mr. Fitzsimmons, of Pennsylvania, moved an amendment, enlarging the catalogue of enumerated articles.

Mr. Madison having consented to subjoin the amendment proposed by Mr. Fitzsimmons to the original resolution, it was received by the committee; but in proceeding to fill up the blanks with the sum taxable on each article, it was soon perceived that gentlemen had viewed the subject in very different lights. The tax on many articles was believed to press more heavily on some states than on others; and apprehensions were expressed that, in the form of protecting duties, the industry of one part of the union would be encouraged by premiums charged on the labour of another part. On the discrimination between the duty on the tonnage of foreign and American bottoms, a great degree of sensibility was discovered. The citizens of the United States not owning a sufficient number of vessels to export all the produce of the country, it was said that

the increased tonnage on foreign bottoms operated as a tax on agriculture, and a premium to navigation. This discrimination, it was therefore contended, ought to be very small.

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In answer to these arguments, Mr. Madison said, "if it is expedient for America to have vessels employed in commerce at all, it will be proper that she have enough to answer all the purposes intended; to form a school for seamen; to lay the foundation of a navy: and to be able to support itself against the interference of foreigners. I do not think there is much weight in the observations that the duty we are about to lay in favour of American vessels is a burden on the community, and particularly oppressive to some parts. But if there were, it may be a burden of that kind which will ultimately save us from one that is greater.

"I consider an acquisition of maritime strength essential to this country; should we ever be so unfortunate as to be engaged in war, what but this can defend our towns and cities upon the sea coast? Or what but this can enable us to repel an invading enemy? Those parts which are said to bear an undue proportion of the burden of the additional duty on foreign shipping, are those which will be most exposed to the operations of a predatory war, and will require the greatest exertions of the union in their defence. If therefore some little sacrifice be made by them to obtain this important object, they will be peculiarly rewarded for it in the hour of danger. Granting a preference to our own navigation will insensibly bring it forward to that perfection so essential to American safety; and though it may produce some little inequality at first, it will soon ascertain its level, and become uniform throughout the union."

But no part of the system was discussed with more animation than that which proposed to make discriminations in favour of those nations with whom the United States had formed commercial treaties. In the debate on this subject, opinions and feelings with respect to foreign pówers were disclosed, which, strengthening with circumstances, afterwards agitated the whole American continent.

While the resolutions on which the bills were to be framed were under debate, Mr. Benson rose to inquire on what principle the proposed discriminations between foreign nations was founded?" It was certainly proper," he said, " to comply with existing treaties. But those treaties stipulated no such preference. Congress then was at liberty to consult the interests of the United States. If those interests would be promoted by the measure, he should be willing to adopt it, but he wished its policy to be shown."

The resolutions, as reported, were supported by Mr. Madison, Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Fitzsimmons, Mr. Clymer, Mr. Page, and Mr. Jackson.

They relied much upon the public sentiment which had, they said, been unequivocally expressed through the several state legislatures and otherwise, against placing foreign nations generally, on a footing with the allies of the United States. So strong was this sentiment, that to its operation the existing constitution was principally to be ascribed. They thought it important to prove to those nations who had declined forming commercial treaties with them, that the United States possessed and would exercise the power of retaliating any regulations unfavourable to their trade, and they insisted strongly on the advantages of America in a war of commercial regulation, should this measure produce one.

The disposition France had lately shown to relax with regard to the United States, the rigid policy by which her counsels had generally been guided, ought to be cultivated. The evidence of this disposition was an edict by which American built ships purchased by French subjects became naturalized, There was reason to believe that the person charged with the affairs of the United States at that court, had made some favourable impressions, which the conduct of the American government ought not to efface.

With great earnestness it was urged, that from artificial or adventi tious causes, the commerce between the United States and Great Britain had exceeded its natural boundary. It was wise to give such political advantages to other nations as would enable them to acquire their due share of the direct trade. It was also wise to impart some benefits to nations that had formed commercial treaties with the United States, and thereby to impress on those powers which had hitherto neglected to form such treaties, the idea that some advantages were to be gained by a reciprocity of friendship.

That France had claims on the gratitude of the American people which ought not to be overlooked, was an additional argument in favour of the principle for which they contended.

The discrimination was opposed by Mr. Benson, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Wadsworth, and Mr. Sherman.

They did not admit that the public sentiment had been unequivocally expressed; nor did they admit that such benefits had flowed from commercial treaties as to justify a sacrifice of interest to obtain them. There was a commercial treaty with France; but neither that treaty, nor the favours shown to that nation, had produced any correspondent advantages. The license to sell ships could not be of this description, since it was well known that the merchants of the United States did not own vessels enough for the transportation of the produce of the country, and only two, as was believed, had been sold since the license had been grant

ed. The trade with Great Britain, viewed in all its parts, was upon a footing as beneficial to the United States as that with France.

That the latter power had claims upon the gratitude of America was admitted, but that these claims would justify premiums for the encouragement of French commerce and navigation, to be drawn from the pockets of the American people, was not conceded. The state of the revenue, it was said, would not admit of these experiments.

The observation founded on the extensiveness of the trade between the United States and Great Britain was answered by saying, that this was not a subject proper for legislative interposition. It was one of which the merchants were the best judges. They would consult their interest as individuals; and this was a case in which the interest of the nation and of individuals was the same.

At length, the bills passed the house of representatives, and were carried to the senate, where they were amended by expunging the discrimination made in favour of the tonnage and distilled spirits of those nations which had formed commercial treaties with the United States.

These amendments were disagreed to; and each house insisting on its opinion, a conference took place, after which the point was reluctantly yielded by the house of representatives. The proceedings of the senate being at that time conducted with closed doors, the course of reasoning on which this important principle was rejected can not be stated. This debate on the impost and tonnage bills was succeeded by one on a subject which was believed to involve principles of still greater interest. In organizing the departments of the executive, the question in what manner the high officers who filled them should be removeable, came on to be discussed. Believing that the decision of this question would materially influence the character of the new government, the members supported their respective opinions with a degree of earnestness proportioned to the importance they attributed to the measure. In a committee of the whole house on the bill "to establish an executive department to be denominated the* department of foreign affairs," Mr. White moved to strike out the clause which declared the secretary to be removeable by the President. The power of removal, where no express provision existed, was, he said, in the nature of things, incidental to that of appointment. And as the senate was, by the constitution, associated with the President in making appointments, that body must, in the same degree, participate in the power of removing from office.

Mr. White was supported by Mr. Smith of South Carolina, Mr. Page, Mr. Stone, and Mr. Jackson.

* This has since been denominated the department of state.

Those gentlemen contended that the clause was either unnecessary or improper. If the constitution gave the power to the President, a repetition of the grant in an act of congress was nugatory: if the constitution did not give it, the attempt to confer it by law was improper. If it belonged conjointly to the President and senate, the house of representatives should not attempt to abridge the constitutional prerogative of the other branch of the legislature. However this might be, they were clearly of opinion that it was not placed in the President alone. In the power over all the executive officers which the bill proposed to confer upon the President, the most alarming dangers to liberty were perceived. It was in the nature of monarchical prerogative, and would convert them into the mere tools and creatures of his will. A dependence so servile on one individual, would deter men of high and honourable minds from engaging in the public service; and if, contrary to expectation, such men should be brought into office, they would be reduced to the necessity of sacrificing every principle of independence to the will of the chief magistrate, or of exposing themselves to the disgrace of being removed from office, and that too at a time when it might be no longer in their power to engage in other pursuits.

Gentlemen they feared were too much dazzled with the splendour of the virtues which adorned the actual President, to be able to look into futurity. But the framers of the constitution had not confined their views to the person who would most probably first fill the presidential chair. The house of representatives ought to follow their example, and to contemplate this power in the hands of an ambitious man, who might apply it to dangerous purposes; who might from caprice remove the most worthy men from office.

By the friends of the original bill, the amendment was opposed with arguments of great force drawn from the constitution and from general convenience. On several parts of the constitution, and especially on that which vests the executive power in the President, they relied confidently to support the position, that, in conformity with that instrument, the power in question could reside only with the chief magistrate: no power, it was said, could be more completely executive in its nature than that of removal from office.

But if it was a case on which the constitution was silent, the clearest principles of political expediency required that neither branch of the legislature should participate in it.

The danger that a President could ever be found who would remove good men from office, was treated as imaginary. It was not by the splendour attached to the character of the present chief magistrate alone