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cessation of their present war with Eng- entangle our peace and prosperity in the land."

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Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote, re

lation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are

essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions from us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interests, guided by jus

tice, shall counsel.

"Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand on foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe,

September 17, 1796.

toils of European ambition, rivalships, interests, humor, or caprice?

"It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the at liberty to do it; for let me not be underforeign world, so far, I mean, as we are now stood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is the best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be But, in observed in their genuine sense. my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them."

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No decided—at least no avoweddeparture from this policy had occurred down to 1823, when President Monroe was required to address a new Congress under peculiar circumstances. The Spanish people had revolted against the despotism of their imbecile, treacherous monarch, Ferdinand VII., and had established a Constitution which left him still in possession of the trappings, but with little of the substance, of royalty. He was, of course, profoundly hostile to this change, though affecting to acquiesce in it. A congress of the great powers of continental Europe, then united in a league, known as the "Holy Alliance," for the maintenance of their despotic authority and the repression of popular aspirations, had decreed the overthrow of this dangerous example; and, under its auspices, a French army of 100,000 men, led by the Duke d'Angoulême, a prince of the blood royal, had invaded Spain, and, meeting with little serious resistance, overthrown thrown the Constitution and the Cortes, and restored to Ferdinand his beloved and grossly abused autocracy. Apprehensions were entertained that the discipline thus bestowed on Spain was about to

4 Held at Verona, Italy, in 1822.

THE "MONROE DOCTRINE."

be extended to her revolted and nearly independent American colonies, whereby they should be reduced to abject servitude to their mother country, and to the despotism that now enthralled her. To such a consummation, Great Britain, as well as this country, was intensely opposed -quite as much, probably, for commercial as for political reasons. Mr. Canning, then the master-spirit of the British Cabinet, at least with respect to foreign affairs, hinted to our Government the expediency of a moral demonstration against the apprehended design of the Holy Alliance with regard to this Continenta demonstration which could be made with less offense, yet with no less efficiency, from this side of the Atlantic than from the other. Thus prompted, Mr. Monroe spoke as follows:5

"Of events in that quarter of the globe with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced, that we resent injuries, or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere, we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the Allied Powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from

that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is de voted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between

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the United States and those powers, to declare, that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

** *

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"With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments which have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless, remains the same: which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it; firm, and manly policy; meeting, in all inand to preserve those relations by a frank, stances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none.

"But, in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the Allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor

can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course."

In this remarkable passage, may probably be found the impulse to the invitation from several of the South American Republics to that Congress at Panama of representatives of American Republics, which Messrs. Adams and Clay so promptly and heartily accepted, and which the Opposition or Jackson party of 1825-6

5 Seventh Annual Message, December 2, 1823.

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so generally and resolutely opposed. | conspicuous of our envoys, had sternThat Congress proved, practically, a ly opposed the admission of Missouri failure, whether through European as a Slave State. intrigue, or Spanish-American jealousy and indolence, is not apparent. Our envoys were duly appointed; but the strenuous opposition in our Senate had so protracted the discussion that it was found too late for Mr. Sergeant to reach Panama at the time appointed for the meeting of the Congress; and Mr. Anderson, then Minister to Colombia, when at Carthagena on his way to Panama, was attacked by a malignant fever, whereof he died.

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But, long ere this, the jealousy of the slaveholders had been aroused, and their malign influence upon the course of our Government made manifest. Among the means employed to render the Panama Congress odious at the South, was the fact that John Sergeant, the more

6 John Sergeant, of Pennsylvania, and Richard C. Anderson, of Kentucky.

"In the course of the debate, Mr. John Randolph, of Virginia, said:

"Cuba possesses an immense negro population. In case those States [Mexico and Colombia] should invade Cuba at all, it is unquestionable that this invasion will be made with this principle, the genius of universal emancipation,

this sweeping anathema against the white population in front,-and then, Sir, what is the situation of the Southern States ?"

Mr. John M. Berrien, of Georgia, said:

"The question to be determined is this: with a due regard to the safety of the Southern States, can you suffer these islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) to pass into the hands of buccaneers drunk with their new-born liberty? If our interest and our safety shall require us to say to these new republics, 'Cuba and Porto Rico must remain as they are,' we are free to say it, and, by the blessing of God, and the strength of our arms, to enforce the declaration; and let me say to gentlemen, these high considerations do require it. The vital interests of the South demand it."

Mr. John Floyd, of Virginia, said [in the House] "So far as I can see, in all its bearings, it [the Panama Congress] looks to the conquest of Cuba

The Spanish-American Republics had already decreed general emancipation; and fears were naturally expressed that they would extend this policy to Cuba, should they, as was then contemplated, combine to invade and conquer that island. Mr. Clay had already 10 written as Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander H. Everett, our Minister at Madrid, instructing him to urge upon Spain the expediency of acknowledging the independence of her lost colonies. He said:

"It is not for the new Republics that the pediency of concluding the war. If the war President wishes to urge upon Spain the exshould continue between Spain and the new Republics, and those islands [Cuba and Porto Rico] should become the object and theater of it, their fortunes have such a connection with the people of the United States, that they could not be indifferent spectators; and the possible contingencies of a protracted war might bring upon the Government and Porto Rico; or, at all events, of tearing them from the crown of Spain. The interests, if not safety, of our own country, would rather require us to interpose to prevent such an event; and I would rather take up arms to prevent than to accelerate such an occurrence."

Mr. Josiah S. Johnston, of Louisiana, a friend of the Administration, parried these attacks as follows:

"We know that Colombia and Mexico have long contemplated the independence of the island [Cuba]. The final decision is now to be made, and the combination of forces and the plan of attack to be formed. What, then, at such a crisis, becomes the duty of the Government? Send your ministers instantly to the diplomatic assembly, where the measure is maturing. Advise with them--remonstrate-menace, if necessary—against a step so dangerous to us, and perhaps fatal to them."

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VAN BUREN AND TAYLOR ON CUBA.

of the United States duties and obligations, the performance of which, however painful

it should be, they might not be at liberty to decline."

In the same spirit, his instructions to Messrs. Anderson and Sergeant" contained the following passage:

"It is required by the frank and friendly relations which we most earnestly desire ever to cherish with the new Republics, that you should, without reserve, explicitly state that

the United States have too much at stake in the fortunes of Cuba, to allow them to see with indifference a war of invasion prosecuted in a desolating manner, or to see employed, in the purposes of such a war, one race of the inhabitants combating against another, upon principles and with motives that must inevitably lead, if not to the extermination of one party or the other, to the most shocking excesses. The humanity of the United States in respect to the weaker, and which, in such a terrible struggle, would probably be the suffering, portion, and the duty to defend themselves against the contagion of such near and dangerous examples, would constrain them, even at the hazard of losing the friendship of Mexico and Colombia, to employ all the means necessary to their security.'

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Several years later, Mr. Van Buren, writing as Gen. Jackson's premier to Mr. C. P. Van Ness, our then Minister at Madrid, urges upon Spain, through him, the acknowledg ment of South American independence, on this among other grounds:

"Considerations connected with a certain class of our population make it the interest of the Southern section of the Union that

no attempt should be made in that island [Cuba] to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence; the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, whose result could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent

shores of the United States.'

Thus, so long as any revolution in Cuba, or displacement of the Spanish authority there, seemed likely to affect the stability or perpetuity of Slavery, our Government steadily, officiously opposed such revolution;

11 May 8, 1826.

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and, while refusing, so early as 1825, to guarantee the possession of that island to Spain, and informally giving notice that we would never consent to its transfer to any more formidable power, seemed entirely sattention by Spain as her most precious isfied with, and anxious for, its reand valued dependency-The Queen of the Antilles.'

But, at length, having reännexed Texas, the Slave Power fixed covetous eyes on this fertile, prolific island. In 1848, our Minister, under instructions from President Polk, made an offer of $100,000,000 for it, which was peremptorily, conclusively rejected. Directly thereafter, the South became agitated by 'fillibustering' plots for the invasion and conquest of that island, wherein real or pretended Cubans by nativity were prominent as leaders. President Taylor was hardly warm in the White House before he was made aware that these schemes were on the point of realization, and compelled to issue his proclamation 12 against them in these words:

"There is reason to believe that an armed expedition is about to be fitted out in the United States with an intention to invade the island of Cuba, or some of the provinces of Mexico. The best information which the

Executive has been able to obtain points to the island of Cuba as the object of this expedition. It is the duty of this Government to observe the faith of treaties, and to prevent any aggression by our citizens upon the territories of friendly nations. I have, therefore, thought it necessary and proper to issue this Proclamation, to warn all citizens of the United States, who shall connect violation of our laws and our treaty obligathemselves with any enterprise so grossly in tions, that they will thereby subject themselves to the heavy penalties denounced will forfeit their claim to the protection of against them by our acts of Congress, and their country. No such persons must ex

12 August 11, 1849.

pect the interference of this Government, in any form, on their behalf, no matter to what

extremities they may be reduced in consequence of their conduct. An enterprise to invade the territories of a friendly nation, set on foot and prosecuted within the limits of the United States, is, in the highest degree, criminal, as tending to endanger the peace, and compromit the honor, of this na

whence they were ultimately liber ated by pardon.

The discipline proved effective. There was much talk of further expeditions against Cuba from one or another Southern city. A secret ca

tion; and, therefore, I exhort all good citi-bal, known as the "Order of the Lone zens, as they regard our national reputation, as they respect their own laws and the Law of Nations, as they value the blessings of peace and the welfare of their country, to discountenance and prevent, by all lawful means, any such enterprise; and I call upon every officer of this Government, civil or military, to use all efforts in his power to arrest, for trial and punishment, every such offender against the laws providing for the performance of our sacred obligations to foreign powers."

This emphatic warning probably embarrassed and delayed the execution of the plot, but did not defeat it. Early in August, 1851-or soon after Gen. Taylor's death-an expedition under Lopez, a Cuban adventurer, sailed in a steamer from New Orleans-always the hotbed of the projects of the Slavery propagandists. About five hundred men embarked in this desperate enterprise, by which a landing was effected on the island of Cuba. All its expectations, however, of a rising in its behalf, or of any manifestation of sympathy on the part of the Cubans, were utterly disappointed.

The invaders were easily defeated and made prisoners, when their leader was promptly garroted at Havana,13 and a few of his comrades shot; but the greater number were sentenced to penal servitude in a distant Spanish possession,

13 August 16th.

14 The body of the Convention proposed to us, on the part of Great Britain and France, was in the following words:

"The high contracting parties hereby severally and collectively disclaim, both now and for hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba; and they respectively

Star," recruited adventurers and tried to raise funds through all the seaboard cities of the Union, and it was understood that Gen. John A. Quitman, of Mississippi, one of the ablest and strongest of Mr. Calhoun's disciples, had consented to lead the next expedition against Cuba; but none ever sailed. The "Order of the Lone Star" proved useful to Gen. Pierce in swelling his vote for President in 1852, and soon after subsided into nothingness.

As our Government had long expressed satisfaction with the possession of Cuba by Spain, while proclaiming hostility to its transfer to any other power, Great Britain and France determined to put our sincerity to the test; and, accordingly, in 1852, proposed to unite with us in a treaty mutually guaranteeing that island to Spain. But Mr. Edward Everett, as Secretary of State to Mr. Fillmore, rejected the overture in an exceedingly smart dispatch.

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The formal proposition for a joint agreement of perpetual renunciation, on the part of Great Britain, France, and the United States, respectively, of any covetous designs on Cuba,

bind themselves to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any power or individuals whatever.

"The high contracting parties declare, severally and collectively, that they will not obtain or maintain, for themselves, or for any one of themselves, any exclusive control over the said island, nor assume nor exercise any dominion over the same."

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