actually did prevent all sin in the moral system.

If there ever was an entire prevention of sin in a moral system; then such a prevention is certainly possible, in the nature of things. For what is once a contradiction, is always a contradiction. And what is once possible in the nature of things, is always possible in the nature of things.

We have no more right to pronounce the sentiment, that God could have preserved the moral system sinless and holy, ▲ GROUNDLESS ASSUMPTION, than we have to pronounce the sentiment, that God is able to preserve, whatever he is able to create, a groundless assumption. And we might as well undertake to deny, that there is a particle of evidence" in favor of the Divine existence, as to pretend that "there is no evidence," that God possesses this power.

3. God is able to govern whatever he is able to create and preserve. He has made the material world; and he is able to govern it. He has also created the moral world; and he preserves it in existence. And he is just as able to govern it, as he pleases, as he was to create and preserve it.

"

It is a palpable absurdity, to say, that God may not" be able to govern whatever he is able to create and preserve. If he could create and preserve a moral system, he could govern it in all respects. It is certain, therefore, that the hearts of the moral creation are completely under the Divine control. God cannot govern moral agents without governing their hearts. It is just as certain, then, that he can govern the hearts of his intelligent creatures, as that he is able to govern the works of his hands.

But if God can govern the hearts of moral agents; then, he could prevent all his creatures from sinning, without destroying their moral agency.

To say that God could not govern the hearts of all his creatures without destroying their moral agency, is the same as to say, that he could not govern their hearts, without annihilating their hearts. For, their hearts comprise all the moral ex

ercises, or agency which they have. And to say, that he could not govern their hearts, without destroying their hearts, is the same as to say, that he could not govern their hearts at all. To call it "a groundless assumption," that God could prevent all sin in a moral system, is virtually the same as to call it a groundless assumption, that God can govern the hearts of his creatures, and control all the works of his hands.

But the Scriptures plainly and positively assure us, that God not only can govern, but that he actually does govern the hearts of his creatures, and all things else, according to his own sovereign pleasure. Creatures are necessarily dependent upon their Creator, and subject to the Divine control. "We are not sufficient of ourselves, to think any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God." We read, "Hath not the pot ter power over the clay, to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?" And, "As the clay is in the potter's hand, so are ye are in mine hand." We read, "The preparations of the heart in man, and the answer of the tongue, are from the Lord." God says, "Surely your turning of things upside down, shall be esteemed as the potter's clay. For shall the work say of him that made it, He made me not? Or shall the thing framed say of him that framed it, He had no understanding?" The prophet says, "Thou art our Father: we are the clay, and thou our potter." God said concerning Pharaoh, "I will harden his heart." And "He said unto Pharaoh, indeed for this same cause have I raised thee up; for to show in thee my power, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth." "Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water; he turneth it whithersoever he will." He turned the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his people, to deal subtlely with his servants. He hardened Sihon's spirit and made his heart obstinate. According to Scripture, God reigns in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth. He has

every understanding, and every heart in his hands; and he can govern all the perceptions and voluntary exercises of all his creatures, with infinite ease.

The single fact, that God can govern the hearts of all his creatures, is demonstrative evidence, that he could have prevented all sin in the moral system, by rendering every moral agent cordially obedient to his holy will.

And yet Dr. Taylor thinks it a groundless assumption, that God could have prevented even the present degree of sin in the moral system. Is it indeed so? Is there no evidence that God could have prevented our first parents from yielding to the temptations of the devil, by confining the tempter to the bottomless pit? And would this have destroyed the moral agency of our first parents? Could he not have prevented their first sin by not forbidding them to eat of the tree which was in the midst of the garden? Or could he not have prevented the sim of eating the forbidden fruit, by not creating the tree of knowledge of good and evil? And would this have destroyed the moral agency of our first parents? Had the devil and his angels always been confined in the bottomless pit, would no wickedness have been prevented in this world? Was not God able to confine them? And if he had done so, would this have destroyed the moral agency of mankind?

Could God have prevented no wickedness in Pharaoh by not hardening his heart? Could he have prevented no wickedness in Sihon, by not hardening his spirit; and making his heart obstinate? Is it a groundless assumption, that God hardened their hearts, as he says he did? Or a groundless assumption, that their hearts would have been less hard, if he had not hardened them? Or a groundless assumption, that by not hardening their hearts, God would not have destroyed their moral agency? David said of Shimei, "Let him curse, for the Lord hath forbidden him." Is it a groundless assumption, that God could have prevented Shimei from committing that sin? Could not God have prevented another sin, by not "moving David

to say, Go number Israel and Judah."? The prophet says, "O Lord, why hast thou made us to err from thy ways, and hardened our heart from thy fear?" Could not God have prevented these sins, by not "making the prophet and others to err from his ways, and hardening their heart from his fear?" Could he have prevented no wickedness, if he had not "put a lying spirit in the mouth of Ahab's prophets," as the Scripture says he did? Could he not have prevented the kings of the earth from agreeing to give their kingdom unto the beast, by not "putting in their hearts" to do so? Are not all hearts, and means, and motives, and secondary causes entirely under the Divine control? To pronounce all this "a groundless assumption," is as contrary to evidence, as to pronounce the word of God" a cunningly devised fable."

NUMBER III.

TO SUPPOSE THAT GOD MIGHT HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO PREVENT ALL SIN IN A MORAL SYSTEM, IS ABSURD.

I have shown that the entire prevention of sin in a moral system, implies nothing absurd or contradictory; and proved by direct arguments, that God could have prevented all his creatures from sinning without destroying their moral agency. But there is one mode of proof which is called "reductio ad absurdum." It consists in demonstrating a proposition by showing the absurdity of its opposite. Now I wish to apply this mode of proof to the proposition that God could have prevented all sin in a moral system. The denial of this sentiment is absurd.

1. To suppose that God could not have prevented the existence of sin in a moral system, implies that there is a tendency to sin in every moral agent, except the Supreme Being. It implies that the powers and faculties of moral agents

involve an original, inherent tendency to sin; so that God could not prevent them from sinning without taking their moral agency away.

That Dr. Taylor's theory implies, that there is a tendency to sin in holy beings, appears from his own acknowledgement. He says, (Concio ad Clerum, p. 7,)

"There is an obvious distinction between a disposition or tendency to sin, which is prior to all sin and a sinful disposition. I am not saying then, that there is not, what, with entire propriety, may be called a disposition or tendency to sin, which is the cause of all sin; nor that there is not, as a consequence of this disposition or tendency, what, with equal propriety may be called a sinful disposition which is the cause of all other sin, itself excepted."

Dr. Taylor's theory, therefore, implies, that there is a sinless tendency to sin in every finite mind; and that this sinless tendency to sin is the cause of every sinful disposition in the universe; and that this "sinful disposition is the cause of all other sin, itself excepted."

But if there is a tendency to sin, in every finite mind, as Dr. Taylor's theory implies, why has not every finite mind become sinful? Is it because this tendency, in some instances, has been counteracted by a Divine influence? If moral agents, in some instances, have been prevented from sinning, without losing their moral agency; why might they not have been thus prevented in all instances? If there was a tendency to sin in some of the angels, there must have been precisely the same tendency to sin in all the angels. For they were all originally alike by nature. Why, then, did not all the angels fall at the same time? Why is it not as absurd, to suppose, that there was a tendency to sin, in the angels who fell, as it is to suppose that there is still a direct tendency to sin in all the holy angels? Is not a tendency to sin in holy beings, as palpably absurd, as a tendency to holiness in sinful beings?

Perhaps, however, Dr. Taylor expects to avoid every absurdity, by a forced construction of the word "tendency." In his "Concio ad Clerum," (note, p. 7,) he alters the phraseology, and calls this tendency to sin, "a prevailing liableness or ex