such a nature as to put the universal, uninterrupted, and perpetual holiness of a moral universe "beyond the limit of possibility."

NUMBER V.

THERE IS NO SOLID OBJECTION AGAINST THE POSITION, THAT GOD COULD HAVE PREVENTED ALL SIN IN A MORAL SYSTEM.

The advocates of New Haven Divinity seem to think, that there are insuperable objections against the sentiment, that God could have prevented all sin in a moral system. Some of the most weighty and plausible objections shall now be examined.

Obj. 1. If God could have prevented all sin in a moral system, and would not; then he is not sincere. The precepts and prohibitions of his law, and the admonitions, warnings and invitations of the Gospel express what God desires, all things considered. What should we think of a father who should inform his children, that he did not, all things considered, desire them to regard his precepts or prohibitions, promises or threatenings, admonitions or invitations, and punish them if they did not? And can we think this of the Father of mercies? If not, then his precepts and prohibitions, admonitions, warnings and invitations express what he desires, all things considered. He requires universal holiness, and thereby professes to desire it, all things considered. He forbids all sin, and thereby professes to desire its universal prevention, all things considered. He admonishes his creatures of the guilt, and warns them against the dangerous consequences of sin, and thereby professes to desire, all things considered, the universal exemption of his creatures from sin and misery. He earnestly invites and entreats them to walk in the way of life everlasting, and thereby professes to desire, both "in itself

considered and all things considered," that all his creatures should be forever holy and happy. If, therefore, God could prevent all sin in a moral system, and would not, then he is insincere.

Answer. The whole force of this objection rests on the assumption, that God professes to desire and ought to desire the obedience of every one of his intelligent creatures, all things considered. But this assumption is untenable. The appeal which is made in the objection to the case of an earthly parent, is not in point. The cases are not parallel. God sustains two relations to his creatures, that of Sovereign and Legislator. But earthly parents sustain only one of these relations to their children, and that only in a limited and subordinate sense. Under God they may legislate for their children, but they are not their rightful sovereigns, nor the sovereigns of the universe. Besides, earthly parents have no means of determining whether the obedience of their children is desirable, all things considered, or not. But God knows perfectly, both what is desirable in itself, and what is desirable, all things considered. The analogy between the two cases entirely fails, therofore, in those points which are essential to the argument.

Again. If God desires the obedience of every one of his creatures, all things considered, it must be on one of two accounts: either because the obedience of every one of his creatures is supremely desirable for its own sake: or because it is the necessary means of the greatest good. But neither of these points is self-evident; and neither of them is susceptible of proof. Let us take the case of Judas for an example. It does not appear, that his obedience was either supremely desirable on its own account, or the necessary means of the greatest good. To say it was supremely desirable on its own account, is the same as to say, that Judas's obedience was in itself more desirable than the glory of God and the greatest good of the universe. And this is the same as to say, that a part is greater than the whole. His obedience, therefore, was

not supremely desirable for its own sake. Nor does it appear that the obedience of Judas was the necessary means of the greatest good. To say it was the necessary means of the greatest good, is the same as to say, that it would have been better for the universe if Christ had not been betrayed and crucified, and the plan of redemption had been defeated. It is just as certain, that the obedience of Judas was not the necessary means of the greatest good, as it is that the plan of redemption is more desirable than the universal destruction of the human family. Now if the obedience of Judas was neither supremely desirable in itself, nor yet desirable as the necessary means of the greatest good; then there was no reason at all, why God should have desired his obedience, all things considered. It is demonstrably certain, therefore, that the Divine precepts and prohibitions, admonitions, warnings, entreaties and invitations, in the case of Judas, did not express what God desired, all things considered; but only what he desired, in itself considered. And if they expressed only what he desired, in itself considered, in the case of Judas; then they do in all cases. In itself considered, he sincerely and ardently desires the uninterrupted and perpetual holiness of every one of his rational creatures. And he expresses no more than this, in his precepts and prohibitions, admonitions, warnings, entreaties and invitations. In these, therefore, he is perfectly sincere, because he expresses the genuine feelings of his heart. He requires what he sincerely loves, aud forbids what he sincerely hates. In his warnings and admonitions, he points out the evils, which, in itself considered, he sincerely desires they should avoid; and in his invitations he points out the blessings, which, in itself considered, he sincerely desires they should accept and enjoy. God has never professed nor pretended to desire the obedience of every one of his creatures, all things considered. And therefore the position, that God could have prevented all sin in a moral system, but

did not on the whole choose to prevent it, does not militate against the Divine sincerity.

Obj. 2. If God could have prevented all sin in a moral system, then the moral law is of no use. For "the law is made for the lawless and disobedient."

And if there is

Answer. We are not told, in Scripture, that the law is made solely for the lawless and disobedient. And to suppose that it is made solely for transgressors, is the same as to suppose, that its only use consists in its penalty. The objection. implies that the moral law would have been of no use at all, provided God could have secured universal and uninterrupted obedience. But to say, that the law would have been of no use in case of universal and uninterrupted obedience, is the same as to say, that obedience is of no use. no use in obedience to Divine law, then there is no use in its precepts. And if there were no use in its precepts, it is dif ficult to see what use there would be even in its penalty. The objection proves too much, and therefore it proves nothing. If it proves, that the moral law would have been of no use, on the supposition, that God could have prevented all sin in a moral system, that it is of no use on any supposition whatever.

then it

proves

The objection takes it for granted, that the use of the moral law depends on the impossibility of preventing all sin. But is it reasonable to suppose that the use of a law depends on the impossibility of securing obedience to it? The truth is, the importance of the Divine law depends on the rectitude and authority of its precepts, the justice of its penalty, and the wisdom, goodness and omnipotence of its Administrator. The fact that God has all the hearts of his creatures completely in his hands, and is able to produce just such moral exercises as he pleases, is demonstrative evidence, that he can cause all the ends of his holy law to be fully answered.

Obj. 3. If God could have prevented all sin in a moral system, and would not; then he requires his creatures to do

what he will not do himself. For he requires his creatures to prevent sin.

Answer. It might be said with equal plausibility, that if God would have prevented all sin in a moral system, and could not; then he requires his creatures to do what he cannot do himself.

This objection takes it for granted, that God has no right to require his creatures to do, what he will not do himself. But is it so? Has not God a right to require sinners to repent of their conduct? And ought he either to repent of his own conduct, or to exercise repentance for his creatures? He has a right to require all his creatures to submit; but he is not bound to exercise submission for them. There would be a manifest absurdity in his requiring his creatures to do, what he does himself in their stead.

Obj. 4. If God could have prevented all sin in a moral system and would not; then he requires his creatures to do what he does not make them willing to do.

Answer. God has no right to require his creatures to do what he does not make them naturally able to do; but he has a right to require them to do what he does not render them willing to do. To say that God has no right to require his creatures to do, what he does not give them a willingness or heart to do, is the same as to say, that he has no right to require of them any thing more than they actually perform. It implies that he has no right to require of sinners any thing at all. For in every command to sinners, he requires of them something which he has not given them hearts to do. There is no weight, therefore, in this objection.

Obj. 5. If God could have prevented all sin in a moral system; then he is cruel in punishing his creatures for evil which he might have prevented.

Answer. A cruel punishment is an unnecessary, or unjust punishment. But the punishment which God inflicts upon sinners, is neither unnecessary nor unjust. He never inflicts