PHILOSOPHICAL, HISTORICAL,

&c. &c. &c.

ESSAY

XXV.

On IMMATERIALISM.

IN the general remarks which I lately pre

fumed to offer to the public on the subject of Materialism, I endeavoured fairly to ftate the only metaphysical argument in fupport of the Immaterial Syftem, upon which it appeared to me that any ftrefs ought to be placed. But the extreme conciseness unavoidable in an Efsay, profeffing to exhibit the principal arguments on each hypothefis, muft neceffarily diminifh both its perfpicuity and force. In refuming the fubject, I fhall hope, therefore, to do lefs injustice to this famous argument, as I mean at prefent to confine my obfervations chiefly to the illuftration of it: To which I am the rather inclined, as the moft able and celebrated advocate of the oppofite fyftem, Dr. Priestley, has thought proper to clafs it in the fame rank with the trifling arguments of fo trifling a writer as Mr. Wollafton; and has fatisfied himself with decrying it as "an argument much hackneyed and confided in, but,

VOL. III.

B

in

" in his opinion, deftitute of the least force." I readily acknowledge, to adopt the language of Dr. Priestley, that "the power of fen"fation, or perception, never having been "found but in conjunction with a certain or"ganized system of matter; we ought, as phi❝lofophers, to conclude, that this power ne"ceffarily exifts in, and results from, that or

ganized system, unless it can be shown to be "incompatible with other known properties of "the fame fubftance." On the other hand, it must be admitted, that conftant conjunction implies neceffary connection only when reafons cannot be discovered to prove the conjunction to be accidental and arbitrary. In the prefent inftance, it is alleged, that difcerptibility is a property of matter abfolutely incompatible with the property of fenfation or perception; or in other words, that fenfation is a power, or property, incapable of divifion. But as the power of the entire fyftem is clearly nothing more than the fum or aggregate of the powers of all the parts, it neceffarily follows, that the pri-. mary particles of which the system is compofed, muft, upon the Material Hypothefis, poffefs diftinct powers of fenfation; and that thefe powers combined, conftitute the indivifible power of fenfation belonging to the fyftem; or in other words, that the indivifible power of fenfation is a divifible power; nay, an infinitely divifible power, if matter be as philofophers in general allow, an infinitely divifible fubftance-A conclufion obviously and grofsly abfurd and ridiculous. We are then compelled to acknowlege, that fenfation, or perception, is not the property of a material substance; i, e.

if the common mode of expression be retained, it is the property of an immaterial substance; or to avoid verbal contention, it is a property not refulting from, or neceffarily connected with, the organical fyftem, but a property wholly foreign, fuperinduced and adventitious. In oppofition to this reafoning, the Materialifts affirm, that entire fyftems may poffefs, and they think themselves warranted to pronounce that organized fyftems of matter actually do poffefs, powers effentially different from those which inhere in the feveral parts. Amongst various familiar, though ftriking illuftrations of this truth, it has been faid, that a rofe poffeffes the property of fweetness or fragrance; a globe, the property of fphericity; a harpfichord, the property or power of producing harmony; aqua regia, the property of diffolving gold, &c. &c. though the component particles of thefe different organized fyftems are themselves totally deftitute of the powers and properties here enumerated.

The Immaterialifts, in reply, affert, that it is not only falfe in fact, but a direct contradiction, and an abfolute impoffibility in the nature of things, that a system should poffefs any property which does not inhere in the component parts. To affert that the power of the whole is the fum or aggregate of the powers of all the parts, is an identical and felf-evident propofition; the whole, and all the parts, being terms precifely fynonymous. Whoever, therefore, calls in queftion the truth of this axiom, muft maintain, that the power of the whole is fomething different from the power of all the parts, i. e. that the power of the whole

is not the power of the whole. It will be eafy to demonstrate the correfpondence of facts with this plain and fimple theory. For this purpose, it is neceffary to obferve, that the properties of matter, or what are generally denominated fuch, may be divided into real and nominal. Figure, magnitude, and motion, are qualities really inherent in matter; but figure, magnitude, and motion, eternally varied, can produce only different combinations of figure,. magnitude, and motion. There are alfo powers, or qualities, vulgarly confidered as inherent properties of matter organically difpofed, which are really and truly qualities or affections of the mental or percipient principle. Thus, the sweetness or fragrance of the rose, confidered as a quality of the rose, can mean nothing more than a certain arrangement, configuration, and motion of parts, which, in fome inexplicable manner, produces the fenfation of fweetnefs. In this inftance, therefore, the power of the whole is plainly the aggregate of the powers refiding in the parts, by the motion and organization of which a certain effect is produced upon a foreign and percipient fubftance: And to reprefent the power of exciting the fenfation of fweetnefs or fragrance, which fenfation is a property or affection of that percipient substance, as a power fpecifically different from the powers inhering in the particles of the flower, is just as abfurd as it would be to reprefent the power of exciting the sensation of pain, which the thorn upon the rofe poffeffes, as a power fpecifically diftinct, and refulting from, but not inhering in, the feveral parts of which it is compofed.-But a globe,.

we