with the undivided fovereignty of INDIA. This remarkable declaration gave unlimited scope to the most poignant animadverfions on the duplicity and deceit of Mr. Pitt; who thus contrived, by infidious means, to poffefs himself of that power which Mr. Fox had, from the fame motives of State policy, openly and avowedly feized. It is poffible, however, that Mr. Pitt meant originally no more than he professed —that he then deemed the power of restraint fufficient for the great purpofe of reforming the abuses of the Indian fyftem of governmentand that he gradually became convinced, by experience, of the neceffity of vefting an active and efficient authority in the Board. And certainly the Declaratory Act, or fomething equivalent to it, was obviously wanting to conftitute a regular or confiftent plan. It was therefore, in itself, a real and a very neceffary improvement of the general political fyftem. The mode of effecting this great and effential change, may indeed be justly deemed highly exceptionable: And it is much to be regretted that Mr. Pitt had not fufficient magnanimity to propofe, or Parliament fufficient refolution to adopt, a feftem in all refpects open, explicit, and decifive. The principles of the Conftitution, and the found dictates of wifdom and policy, I think, evidently required the establishment of a Supreme Council of India, avowedly acting under the immediate authority of the Crown, to whom the entire direction of the political affairs of India fhould be configned. The President of India would, upon this plan, openly act as Minifter of State for that that department; and, in order to establish an honorable, as well as feful medium of intercourfe with the Eaft-India Company, a certain proportion of the Members of the Council might be chofen from the Court of Directors for the time being. The unity of the executive power would by this means be completely restored; and, by the exertion of the fame energy throughout the entire extent of empire, the order, harmony, and happiness of the whole would be moft effectually established and fecured. To this plan it will undoubtedly be objected, that it must increafe, in a very dangerous and alarming degree, that influence of the Crown, which has been of late years fo much the fubject of complaint and apprehenfion, and which, with much labour and difficulty, has been fomewhat diminished indeed, though far from being as yet reftrained within the proper limits. To this I answer, that there is a conftitutional, as well as unconftitutional influence of the Crown; and whatever degree of influence is neceffarily connected with the undivided exercife of the executive authority, is a fpecies of influence truly conftitutional. If the acquifition of even this conftitutional addition of influence, however, be thought dangerous, as I admit that it reafonably may, are there not various modes of reducing the regal influence, highly beneficial and laudable, without violating the unity of the executive power, and which would effectually ferve to counter-balance this great acceffion of authority? Does Does not the reform of the parliamentary reprefentation come within this defcription? Are there no fuperfluous or lucrative finecures that might be fafely curtailed, or entirely abolished? Is it impoffible to limit the number of placemen and penfioners in the House of Commons, or even, were it judged neceffary, to exclude them altogether? Are we ftill credulous enough to believe, that the reduction of the prefent formidable ftanding army cannot be effected, without endangering our exiftence as a nation? Is there no hope of a gradual diminution of the public debt, which must of course be attended with a proportionable diminution of the regal influence? Surely there are conftitutional methods very easily discoverable, if by the wifdom of the Legislature deemed expedient, by which the unconftitutional influence of the Crown may be fufficiently reduced, without depriving the Crown of any conftitutional prerogative for the purpose of establishing an unconstitutional influence in any other quarter. The fact is, that the Crown is at this moment in actual poffeffion of the fubftance of that authority for which I am contending; and the danger attending it arifes chiefly from its not being fufficiently known, or openly acknowledged to be fo. And if the plan which I have prefumed to propofe, or any thing fimilar to it, be at any future period adopted, a moft advantageous opportunity will prefent itself for requiring, in return, certain conceffions from the Crown, highly favourable to to Liberty; which the artful and infidious, or, what I would rather chufe to ftile, the gradual and imperceptible manner in which the Crown has been invested with this authority, has hitherto unfortunately precluded, ESSAY ESSAY XXX. OBSERVATIONS on the CONSTITUTIONAL HAPPILY for the majority of mankind, who cannot be fuppofed to poffefs leifure or ability to engage in very elaborate or profound difcuffions, there are few questions of real importance and general concern which do not admit of being fimplified; or of being fo concifely and clearly stated, as to enable any man, not palpably deficient in knowledge or understanding, to form a true judgment concerning them. The interefting question refpecting Establishment of a Regency during the incapa city of the reigning Sovereign, which, at a recent period, engroffed the public attention, appears to me of this defcription. Divefted of the beauties of language, the pomp of declaImation, and the graces of elocution, and reduced to the level of plain truth and common fenfe, the very fhadow of doubt and difficulty feems to vanish. In order to decide upon this question the with propriety, two confiderations obviously prefent themselves to our notice and enquiry: I. Whether |