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XXXIV.

On VIRTUE and MORAL OBLIGATION.

PART I.

BETWEEN moral and metaphysical disquisi

tions there is a ftrict and intimate connection; and juft, liberal, and comprehenfive ideas refpecting these branches of philofophy, are perhaps attended with effects interesting and important beyond all others, and with more inmediate and extenfive influence on the general welfare and happiness. They have been the favourite theme and ftudy of the best and wifeft of mankind in every age; and yet no class of fpeculative writers are more frequently infulted by fciolifts, and men of the world, with the question," Cui bono ?" Of what use are your fpeculations? Abafhed by the fupercilious effrontery of these infolent interrogators, the Philofopher is compelled, amidst the blushes of confufion, to acknowledge that his researches, however successful, are of no use in the view or estimation of the enquirers: for they are not defigned for the amufement of literary indolence, or calculated to clear the path to the acquifition of honour, fame, or fortune. The fole object of these difficult and abftruse inves tigations,

rigations, is, to develope the nature and pow ers of the human mind; to ascertain the juft rule of life and conduct; to explain the obligations incumbent upon man, the fanctions by which thofe obligations are enforced; and, by infpiring and diffufing noble and elevated principles of action amongst the higher ranks of fociety, gradually to extend the sphere of liberty, virtue, and happiness; fo that it may ulti. mately embrace, if it be poffible, every individual of the human race. In every age, there exifts a certain fyftem of opinions, by the influence of which men are guided and actuated. This fyftem, and every fucceffive alteration and improvement of it, muft originate with philofophical and fpeculative men. Of how

great importance, then, is it, that these inftructors of the universe feek to qualify themfelves for their high office, by the most accurate, laborious, and impartial investigation. These are the men who filently and invisibly direct the movements of the mighty lever by which the intellectual world is fwayed and governed. Of all the various fubjects of philofophical speculation, it must be acknowledged, that nothing can exceed, in practical influence or importance, the enquiry respecting the nature of Virtue and Moral Obligation. Virtue ‚may be defined as the most excellent or eligible rule of life and conduct. What then is this rule, and how is it to be distinguished and afcertained? In answer to this enquiry, a variety of fanciful and vifionary, though ingenious and fpecious theories, have been advanced. Of these I shall not defcend to a particular analyfis. As far as they are deferving of attention,

they

they are perhaps refolvable into the two ef fentially and obviously diftin&t hypothefes, of which Dr. Clarke and Mr. Hume may be confidered as the moft diftinguished and illuftrious advocates.

The fole and unalterable rule of human aċtions, fays Dr. Clarke, is RECTITUDE; and in this the effence of Virtue confifts. There refults, fays this great Philofopher, from the abfolute reafon and nature of things, even feparate from and antecedent to the pofitive will and command of GOD, certain necessary and eternal differences and relations, from which arife various moral fitneffes, agreements or proportions, to which GOD himself, from the abfolute rectitude and immaculate perfection of his nature, voluntarily and invariably conforms; and to which, fo far as they are difcernible by the light of human reafon, we are under an eternal and indifpenfable obligation to fubmit.

This obligation arifes primarily and neceffarily from the original conftitution of things, which makes it fit and reasonable for creatures thus to act, whether happinefs be, or be not, 'the refult of an inflexible and undeviating adherence to the rule of rectitude. It follows, therefore, that the pofitive will and command "of GoD, a fubmiffion to which includes the highest certainty of ultimate happiness, is in itfelf, however fuperior in practical importance, of inferior and fecondary obligation. And, in ftrict propriety, the Divine Will, and the fanctions with which it is accompanied, may be confidered, not as conftituting a new, but enforcing a prior obligation. The eternal reafon of things, that reafon which is the rule

of

of action to GOD himfelf, is alone obligatory upon his rational offspring. And this obligation is as abfolute and unalterable as the law, the abfolute and unalterable law of reason, from which it results. And the essential differences, agreements, and relations, upon which this law is founded, are in their nature as incapable of any degree of change, or shadow of turning, as the first axioms of geometrical science; and he who fhould contend that truth, juftice, temperance, and charity, do not in themselves poffefs more of intrinfic excellence than the oppofite vices, may as plaufibly and as rationally affert that the whole is not equal to all its parts, or that a fquare is not double to a triangle of equal base and height.

This, it must be acknowledged, is a very bold, lofty, and fublime system of morals: and fo imperious is its language, and impofing it's afpect, that its advocates appear to deem it unneceffary to feek for clear or fpecific arguments in vindication of it; but, confidently leaving it to rest upon the bafis of its own intrinsic evidence, content themselves with appealing to the feelings, the confcience, and the understanding of every man, whether they do not bear an internal and involuntary teftimony to the truth of these principles, of which, fay they, fuch is the importance, and fuch the ftability, that if thefe fail," the pillared firmament is rottennefs, and earth's base built on ftubble." Of this fupreme and immutable rule of action, Cicero fays, " Eft quidem vera lex, "recta ratio naturæ congruens, diffufa in omnes, conftans, fempiterna, quæ vocet ad of

"ficium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat. "Huic legi, nec obrogari fas eft, neque derogari "ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari po"teft." And again, "Erat enim ratio profecta

a rerum natura, & ad recte faciendum im"pellens, & a delicto avocans; quæ non tum "denique incipit lex effe cum fcripta eft, fed ❝tum cum orta eft; orta autem simul est cum "mente divina."

In oppofition to this popular and fplendid fyftem, Mr. Hume firft ventured, in regular form, to advance a theory, which he thought it however neceffary to inculcate with much caution and addrefs, as confcious that he was in danger of incurring, by his temerity, no fmall degree of odium and indignation: though it has gradually infinuated itself into favour, and is at this time embraced and openly avowed by many Christian as well as Sceptical moralifts; amongst the former of whom, we find the distinguished names of a Priestley and a Paley. The effence of Virtue, fays Mr. Hume, is UTILITY; Morality is founded folely upon the bafis of general utility: and this is the law by which human life and conduct ought to be regulated. This is a theory which pretends not to affume the lofty tone of the abstract and sublime philofophy to which it ftands oppofed :-it objects not to be considered as far lefs dignified, awful, and majeftic. It modeftly claims only the advantage of being eafy, intelligible, and rational. It profeffes to reduce the rule of conduct to the level of plain truth and common fenfe. Nothing, fay the advocates of this hypothefis, is really valuable, but happiness: neither power, nor wifdom, nor learning, nor

liberty,

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