rejoice to see the party opposed to me pursuing the course they do. I feel the most thorough conviction that, under their system, the credit of the government, instead of improving, will grow worse and worse; and will end, if persisted in, not only in the overthrow, but in the dissolution of the party, and affixing permanent odium to their measures and policy, but, in the mean time, with no small hazard to the country and its institutions.

XXXVI.

SPEECH ON THE PASSAGE OF THE TARIFF BILL, AUGUST 5, 1842.

MR. PRESIDENT-The Tariff Bill of 1828 has, by common consent, been called the bill of abominations; but, as bad as that was, this-all things considered-is worse. It is, in the first place, worse, because it is more onerous; not that the duties are on an average higher-for they are probably less by about 10 per cent. This, it is estimated, will average about 36 per cent. ad valorem on the aggregate of the imports; and that averaged, according to the best estimate that I have been able to make, about 46. But this difference is more than made up by other considerations; and, among them, that allowed long credit for the payment of the duties; this requires them to be paid in cash, which will add to their burden not less than 4 or 5 per cent. Again there has been a great falling off in prices on almost all articles, which increases, in the same proportion, the rate per cent. on the cost of all specific duties-probably not much less than 50 per cent.; which, considering the number and the importance of the articles on which they are laid in this bill, will much more than make up the difference. To these may be added its arbitrary and oppressive provisions for valuing goods and collecting duties, with the fact that it goes into operation, without notice, immediately on its passage, which would fall heavily on the commercial interest; and the undue weight it would impose on the less wealthy portions of the community, in consequence of the higher duties it lays on coarse articles of general consumption.

It is, in the next place, worse, because, if it should become a law, it would become so under circumstances still more objectionable than did the tariff of 1828. I shall not dwell on the fact that, if it should, it would entirely supersede the Compromise Act, and violate pledges openly given here in this chamber, by its distinguished author, and the present Governor of Massachusetts, then a member of this body-that, if we of the South would adhere to the compromise while it was operating favourably to the manufacturing interest, they would stand by it when it came to operate favourably to us. I pass, also, without dwelling on the fact that it proposes to repeal the provision in the act of distribution, which provides that the act shall cease to operate if the duties should be raised above 20 per cent.-a provision, without which, neither that nor the Bankrupt Bill could have become a law, and which was inserted under circumstances that pledged the faith of the majority to abide by it. I dwell not on these double breaches of plighted faith, should this bill become a law: not because I regard them as slight objections; on the contrary, they are of a serious character, and likely to exercise a very pernicious influence over our future legislation, by preventing amicable adjustments of questions that may hereafter threaten the peace of the country; but because I have, on a former occasion, expressed my views fully in relation to them. I pass on to the objection that, if this bill should pass, it would against the clear light of experience. When that of 1828 passed, we had but little experience as to the effects of the protective policy.. It is true that the act of 1824 had been in operation a few

years, which may be regarded the first which avowed the policy that ever passed; but it had been in operation too short a time to shed much light on the subject. Since then, our experience has been greatly enlarged. We have had periods of considerable duration both of increase and reduction of duties, and their effects respectively on the industry and prosperity of the country, which enables us to compare, from authentic public documents, the result. It is most triumphantly in favour of reduction, though made under circumstances most adverse to it, and most favourable to increase. I have, on another occasion during this session, shown, from the commercial tables and other authentic sources, that, during the eight years of high duties, the increase of our foreign commerce, and of our tonnage, both coastwise and foreign, was almost entirely arrested; and that the exports of domestic manufactures actually fell off, although it was a period exempt from any general convulsion in trade or derangement of the currency. On the same occasion, I also showed that the eight years of the reduction of duties, which followed, were marked by an extraordinary impulse given to every branch of industry-agricultural, commercial, navigating, and manufacturing. Our exports of domestic productions, and our tonnage, increased fully a third, and our manufactures still more; and this, too, under the adverse circumstances of an inflated, unsteady currency, and the whole machinery of commerce deranged and broken. And yet, with this flood of light from authentic documents before us, what are we about to do? To pass this bill, and to restore the old, and, as was hoped, exploded system of restrictions and prohibitions, under the false guise of a revenue bill, as I shall next proceed to show. Yes, senators, we are told by the chairman of the Finance Committee, and others who advocate it, that this bill is intended for revenue, and that of 1828 was for protection; and it is on that assumption they attempt to discriminate between the two, and hope to reconcile the people to this measure. It is, indeed, true that the bill of 1828 was for protection. The treasury was then well replenished, and not an additional dollar was needed to meet the demands of the government; and, what made it worse, the public debt was then reduced to a small amount; and what remained was in a regular and rapid course of reduction, which would in a few years entirely extinguish the whole, when more than half of the revenue would have become surplus. It was under these circumstances that the bill of 1828, which so greatly increased the duties, was introduced, and became a law-an act of legislative folly and wickedness almost without example. Well has the community paid the penalty. Yes, much which it now suffers, and has suffered, and must suffer, are but its bitter fruit. It was that which so enormously increased the surplus revenue after the extinguishment of the debt in 1832; and it was that surplus which mainly led to the vast expansion of the currency that followed, and from which have succeeded so many disasters. It was that which wrecked the currency, overthrew the almost entire machinery of commerce, precipitated hundreds of thousands from affluence to want, and which has done so much to taint private and public morals.

But is this a revenue bill? I deny it. We have, indeed, the word of the chairman for it. He tells us it is necessary to meet the expenditures of the government; of which, however, he gave us but little proof, except his word. But I must inform him that he must go a step farther before he can satisfy me. He must not only show that it is necessary to meet the expenditures of the government, but also that those expenditures themselves are necessary. He must show that retrenchment and economy have done their full work; that all useless expenditures have been lopped off; that exact economy has been enforced in every branch, both in the collection and disbursement of the revenue; and, above all, that none of the resources of the government have been thrown away or surrendered. Has he done all that? Or has he showed that it has been even attempted? that either he or his party have made any systematic or se

rious effort to redeem the pledge, so often and solemnly given before the election, that the expenditures should be greatly reduced below what they then were, and be brought down to seventeen, sixteen, and even as low as thirteen millions of dollars annually? Has not their course been directly the reverse since they came into power? Have they not surrendered one of the two great sources of revenue-the public lands; raised the expenditure from twenty-one or two millions, to twenty-seven annually; and increased the public debt from five and a half to more than twenty millions? And has not all this been done under circumstances well calculated to excite suspicion that the real design was to create a necessity for duties, with the express view of 'affording protection to manufactures? Have they not, indeed, told us, again and again, through their great head and organ, that the two great and indispensable measures to relieve the country from existing embarrassments were a protective tariff and a National Bank? and is it, then, uncharitable to assert that the expenditures, so far from being necessary to the just and economical wants of the government, have been raised to what they are, with the design of passing this bill in the only way it could be passed-under the guise of revenue?

But. if it were admitted that the amount it proposes to raise is necessary to meet the expenditures of the government, and that the expenditures themselves were necessary, the chairman must still go one step farther, to make good his assertion that this is a bill for revenue, and not for protection. He must show that the duties it proposes are laid on revenue, and not on protective principles. No two things, senators, are more different than duties for revenue and protection. They are as opposite as light and darkness. The one is friendly, and the other hostile, to the importation of the article on which they may be imposed. Revenue seeks not to exclude or diminish the amount imported; on the contrary, if that should be the result, it neither designed nor desired it. While It is the reverse, it takes, it patronises; and patronises, that it may take more.

in every respect, with protection. It seeks, directly, exclusion or diminution. It is the desired result; and, if it fails in that, it fails in its object. But, although so hostile in character, they are intimately blended in practice. Every duty imposed on an article manufactured in the country, if it be not raised to the point of prohibition, will give some revenue; and every one laid for revenue, be it ever so low, must afford some protection, as it is called. But, notwithstanding they are so blended in practice, plain and intelligible rules may be laid down, by which the one may be so distinguished from the other as never to be confounded. To make a duty a revenue, and not a protective duty, it is indispensable, in the first place, that it should be necessary to meet the ex• penditures of the government; and, in the next, that the expenditures themselves should be necessary for the support of the government, without the deficit being caused intentionally, to raise the duty, either by a surrender of other sources of revenue, or by neglect or waste. In neither case, as has been stated, would the duty be for revenue. It must, in addition, never be so high as to prohibit the importation of the article: that would be utterly incompatible with the object of revenue. But there are other less obvious, though not less important rules, by which they may be discriminated with equal certainty.

On all articles on which duties can be imposed, there is a point in the rate of duties which may be called the maximum point of revenue—that is, a point at which the greatest amount of revenue would be raised. If it be elevated above that, the importation of the article would fall off more rapidly than the duty would be raised; and, if depressed below it, the reverse effect would follow: that is, the duty would decrease more rapidly than the importation would increase. If the duty be raised above that point, it is manifest that all the intermediate space between the maximum point and that to which it may be raised would be purely protective, and not at all for revenue. Another rule remains to be laid down, drawn from the facts just stated, still more important

than the preceding, as far as the point under consideration is involved. It results, from the facts stated, that any given amount of duty, other than the maximum, may be collected on any article, by two distinct rates of duty-the one above the maximum point, and the other below it. The lower is the revenue rate, and the higher the protective; and all the intermediate is purely protective, whatever it be called, and involves, to that extent, the principle of prohibition, as perfectly as if raised so high as to exclude importation totally. It follows that all duties not laid strictly for revenue are purely protective, whether called incidental or not; and hence the distinction taken by the senator from Arkansas immediately on my left (Mr. Sevier) between incidental and accidental protection is not less true and philosophical than striking. The latter is the only protection compatible with the principles on which duties for revenue are laid.

This bill, regarded as a revenue bill, cannot stand the test of any one of these rules. That it cannot as to the first two, has already been shown. That some of the duties amount to prohibition, has been admitted by the chairman. To those, he admits, a long list of others might be added. I have in my drawer an enumeration of many of them, furnished by an intelligent and experienced merchant; but I will not occupy the time of the Senate by reading the catalogue. That a large portion of the duties on the protected articles exceed the maximum point of revenue, will not be denied; and that there are few or none imposed on protected articles, on which an equal revenue might not be raised at a lower rate of duty, will be admitted. As, then, every feature of this bill is stamped with protection, it is as much a bill for protection as that of 1828. Wherein, then, does it differ? In this: that went openly, boldly, and manfully for protection; and this assumes the guise of revenue. That carried the drawn dagger in its hand; and this conceals it in its bosom. That imposed the burden of protection-a burden admitted to be unjust, unequal, and oppressive, but it was the only burden; but this superadds the weight of its false guise-a heavy debt, extravagant expenditures, the loss of public lands, and the prostration of public credit, with the intent of concealing its purpose. And this, too, may be added to the other objections, which makes it worse than its predecessor in abomination.

I am, senators, now brought to the important question, Why should such a bill pass? Who asks for it, and on what ground? It comes ostensibly from the manufacturing interest. I say ostensibly; for I shall show, in the sequel, that there are other and more powerful interests among its advocates and supporters. And on what grounds do they ask it? It is on that of protection. Protection against what? Against violence, oppression, or fraud? If so, government is bound to afford it, if it comes within the sphere of its powers, cost what it may. It is the object for which government is instituted; and if it fails in that, it fails in the highest point of duty. No: it is against neither violence, oppression, nor fraud. There is no complaint of being disturbed in property or pursuits, or of being defrauded out of the proceeds of industry. Against what, then, is protection asked? It is against low prices. The manufacturers complain that they cannot afford to carry on their pursuits at prices as low as at present; and that, unless they can get higher, they must give up manufacturing. The evil, then, is low prices; and what they ask of government is to give them higher. But how do they ask it to be done? Do they ask government to compel those who may want to purchase to give them higher? No: that would be a hard task, and not a little odious; difficult to be defended on the principles of equity, justice, or the Constitution, or to be enforced, if it could be. Do they ask that a tax should be laid on the rest of the community, and the proceeds divided among them, to make up for low prices? or, in other words, do they ask for a bounty? No: that would be rather too open, oppressive, and indefensible. How, then, do they ask it to be done? By put U UU

ting down competition, by the imposition of taxes on the products of others, so as to give them the exclusion of the market, or at least a decided advantage over others; and thereby enable them to sell at higher prices. Stripped of all disguise, this is their request; and this they call protection. Protection, indeed! Call it tribute, levy, exaction, monopoly, plunder; or, if these be too harsh, call it charity, assistance, aid-anything rather than protection, with which it has not a feature in common.

Considered in this milder light, where, senators, will you find the power to give the assistance asked? Or, if that can be found, how can you reconcile it to the principles of justice or equity to grant it? But suppose that to be overcome: I ask, Are you prepared to adopt as a principle that, whenever any branch of industry is suffering from depressed prices, it is your duty to call on all others to assist it? Such is the broad principle that lies at the bottom of what is asked; and what would it be, if carried out, but equalization of income? And what that, but agrarianism as to income? And in what would that differ, in effect, from the agrarianism of property, which you, on the opposite side of the chamber, profess so much to detest? But, if you are not ready to carry out the principle. in its full extent, are you prepared to restrict it to a single class the manufacturers? Will you give them the great and exclusive advantage of having the right of demanding assistance from the rest of the community whenever their profits are depressed below the point of remuneration by vicissitudes to which all others are exposed?

But suppose all these difficulties surmounted: there is one rule, where assistance is asked, which, on no principle of justice, equity, or reason, can be violated—and that is, to ascertain, from careful and cautious examination, whether, in fact, it be needed by the party asking; and, if it be, whether the one of whom it is asked can afford to give it or not. Now I ask whether any such examination has been made. Has the Finance Committee, which reported this bill, or the Committee on Manufactures, to which the numerous petitions have been referred, or any member of the majority who support this bill, made an impartial or careful examination, in order to ascertain whether they who ask aid can carry on their manufactures without higher prices? Or have they given themselves the least trouble to ascertain whether the other portions of the community could afford to give them higher? Will any one pretend that he has? I can say, as to the interest with which I am individually connected, I have heard of no such inquiry; and can add farther, from my own experience (and fearlessly appeal to every planter in the chamber to confirm my statement), that the great cotton-growing interest cannot afford to give higher prices for its supplies. As much as the manufacturing interest is embarrassed, it is not more so than the cotton-growing interest; and as moderate as may be the profit of the one, it cannot be more moderate than that of the other. I ask those who represent the other great agricultural staples-I ask the great provision interest of the West, the navigating, the commercial, and, finally, the great mechanical and handicraft interests-if they have been asked whether they can afford to give higher prices for their supplies? And, if so, what was their answer?

If, then, no such examination has been made, what has been done? Those who have asked for aid have been permitted to fix the amount according to their own cupidity; and this bill has fixed the assessment on the other interests of the community, without consulting them, with all the provisions necessary for extorting the amount in the promptest manner. Government is to descend from its high appointed duty, and become the agent of a portion of the community to extort, under the guise of protection, tribute from the rest of the community; and thus defeat the end of its institution, by perverting powers, intended for the protection of all, into the means of oppressing one portion for the benefit of another.