Now, have not the Unitarians given some grounds for this prejudice? I think they have. Some of their early writers, and XPriestley especially, certainly la boured to bring down the character of Jesus as nearly as they could to that of a common prophet or holy man of God. In doing this, I suppose they were incited by the notion of opposing the extravagant idea by which others attempted to elevate his person by the doctrine of his proper deity. But why should we not on this subject, first investigate the intellectual and moral character of Jesus, as what is most level to our means of knowledge and comprehension? In that way a Unitarian may have as sublime an idea of his character as the orthodox can derive from the metaphysical speculation of his creed, and more so-far more just and impressive at any rate.

I am glad to observe that this view of the matter is beginning to extend itself among Unitarian writers. Channing led the way, and others have followed. There is an excellent article in your number for July written in this spirit, in which moral miracles are claimed for Christianity, as well as, and in preference to, physical miracles. The character of Christ (his manifestations of truth and goodness), is a real and most sublime miracle, having this advantage in it, that we can contemplate it as perfectly as the first Christians could do, and, perhaps, even more perfectly.

If Unitarians would dwell more on this topic, they might prove to the world that in their knowledge of, and reverence for Christ, they excelled the orthodox. And as the name of the Lord is a strong tower, they might have the benefit of it. The orthodox have hitherto assumed this vantage-ground under false colours. Let the matter be put in its true colours, and it could not fail to produce a popular impression. Let this be done, particularly in opening any new field of missionary labour. Let it be seen that we are not inviting to, nor challenging a critical or metaphysical controversy, for which most people have little taste, or even qualification-let it be seen that our subject is moral and practical, and having an important bearing on human character and affairs. What signifies any doctrine 2 x when

about the modes of the Divine existence and operation, without reference to the actual character and authority of Christ? It is only as he is involved in it, that his disciples (Christians) are concerned. Thus far, therefore, let us investigate it, and call attention to it; but beyond that, leave it to the wrangling of metaphysical theologues. Now, the actual character and authority of Christ are to be learned from the details of his personal history, and not deduced from any theory concerning his person, and in their moral aspect, his history and teaching have a most important bearing on human affairs, both individual and social.

CHRISTOPHILUS.

ESSAI SUR L'EXISTENCE DE DIEU, ET SUR L'EXISTENCE DE L'AME.

Par L'Abbé CONSTANTIN DE PIETRI.

[WE have received, from a respected friend in Paris, the following translation of passages in this work, and cheerfully comply with his request for their insertion.— EDITOR.

OF THE NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

After having proved the existence of God, by proving the existence of an eternal, all-powerful, and intelligent cause, that produces and reproduces continually, and which manifests itself in the material world by physical laws, and in the moral and intellectual world by the laws of justice and of reason,-which speaks to mankind under the veil of the universe, and which we all adore in nature and in our conscience, it remains for me to speak of the very essence of God, and of His boundless and indescribable perfections.

But if the existence of God be known, his nature is not. It is even in some measure incomprehensible, and it is impossible to fathom its mysterious depths, without losing one'-self in its indefinite immensity. For if man is permitted to soar on the wings of thought beyond the reach of worlds, and to contemplate the author

of every thing that exists, he is not, however, able to comprehend that which, by its nature, is incomprehensible, nor to attain that which is inaccessible to his feeble faculties.

Nevertheless, as Nature, according to Pascal, bears the mark of its Maker upon every thing; or, to quote Bossuet, since order, that species of life spread throughout every part of the universe, appears to be the soul and life of the material world, which bears the stamp of the life and wisdom of God, it is in considering the universe, and in examining Nature, that we may form the least imperfect notions of an infinitely perfect being. For, says Clarke, who is cited by Voltaire, He who has produced every thing, must possess all the perfections he has concentrated in the things he has made, otherwise the effect would be more perfect than the cause; or, to speak in other words, there would be in the effect a perfection that had been produced by nothing, which is evidently absurd. Therefore, God, who shews himself to us in his works under the eternal attributes of his power, of his wisdom, and his love, must be, and is effectively eternal, unchangeable, infinite, immaterial, sole creator, free, just, and good.

God is eternal, 1st, Because the Being that exists of itself before every thing, and independent of all ages cannot be otherwise. 2d, Because the created beings, whatever they may be, who people the universe, do not absolutely exist in virtue of their own nature, but are evidently connected with an eternally active and absolute cause. 3d, Because there can be no creation without a creator, nor any duration without eternity.

God is unchangeable in his essence, and in his decrees; in his essence, because he is eternal, always the same by his nature, and without any quality subject to change; in his decrees, because he embraces in a single view all that is ever to happen, and knowing that the possibility of it is in his power, and the execution of it dependent on his will, he can never lose or acquire any thing, nor change in any manner.

But because every thing is regulated beforehand, and that no change can possibly happen, it does not follow that good and bad actions are of no importance,

or are equally the same; for the deeds which take place to-day, says Leibnitz, were already before God, when he formed the resolution of regulating events.

God is infinite, for his infinity (the idea of which is inseparable from the perfection of a Being who derives his existence from himself), is reflected through the immensity of space that is filled by worlds; for he is not confined to the different beings, nor to the globes that he animates, since he is the immediate cause of every thing that exists, and which nothing can limit; for perfection cannot exist, or even be conceived, without an infinite and unlimited power, which is the reason, and the necessary foundation thereof.

God is an immaterial being, not only because he is infinite, but still farther, because there exist feeling and thinking beings, who can only have been formed by a being supremely intelligent; again, because the ap pearance of unity, of wisdom, and of power that is displayed in every direction, in a blade of grass, as well as in the revolution of the stars, not being the inherent and essential qualities of matter, cannot be assigned or belong to a principle that is purely physical. Lastly, because it would be absurd to admit the universal effect that is produced, without admitting a universal and immaterial cause incapable of being operated on. This destroys the foundation of every system of materialism.

God is one, 1st, Because the reasons which compel us to admit a God, do not exist for a second, who would be useless if we were to suppose him perfectly equal to the first, and who would not be God if he was inferior to him; 2d, Because we see every particular thing in the universe tend towards a special end, and the whole towards a general one; for this reason we are led to believe that the whole is directed by the same spirit, in the same intention, and for the same harmonious results; lastly, because harmony, which is a species of life spread throughout nature, supposes unity, and consequently the existence of a single and combining intelligence. The system of two principles equally eternal, the one good, the other evil, is therefore not only

contrary to our reason, but to the laws of harmony that govern the world.

God is essentially a Creator, since he manifests himself in nature, and reveals himself to man, under the attribute of a creating power; it would be impossible to deprive him of this eminent characteristic, without annihilating his existence; in fine, God is essentially a Creator, because the universe is an assemblage of animated productions, of phenomena, and of a power, which naturally indicate a supreme cause, that is, an eternal Creator, as intelligent as he is powerful.

God is entirely free or independent in his existence, and in his actions; in his existence, because he exists eternally and independent of every thing but himself; in his actions, because he does whatever he pleases, and is at the same time the active and intelligent principle of every other existence. Besides, it requires a being wholly free, to create a free being such as man, when he acts according to the light of his reason.

In fine the idea of liberty or free will is so completely inherent to that of the Almighty, that it is impossible to deprive God of this attribute, without changing him into a sort of mechanical power unworthy of our adoration. It is this principle of divine liberty or free will that destroys the doctrine of fatalism.

God is supremely just; just because a sovereign, intelligent, powerful, and eternal being, cannot form a wish contrary to the order which he has, in his wisdom, established, or to the laws that result from the nature of things; just, because the virtue which inspires man, when he is not blinded by interest or passion, to render to every one that which belongs to him, and which shines forth in so eminent a degree, can only be a spark of that virtue which belongs to the Eternal Being, who is the source of every perfection and of every thing that exists. Just in fine, because the nations and the individuals between whom he has established relations on the fundamental basis of right and justice, find even in this life their perfection and their happiness in the accomplishment of their duty, and in its violation their degeneration and misfortune.

It would be erroneous, however, to conclude, that