agree to any thing tending to change the character of the Federal system, offered a proposition in these words: "That the legislative acts of the United States, made by virtue and in pursuance of the articles of Union, and all treaties, made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective States, as far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said States, or their citizens and inhabitants; and that the Judiciaries of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding."

This proposition expressly restricted the authority of the United States, in all cases within the sphere of its delegated powers. It refused to confer upon the General Government the power or the right to judge of infractions upon the Articles of Union on the part of the States. It was a limitation against any construction by implication to that effect, and simply declared a truth, as Hamilton said of it. It simply asserted what would have been the result under fair construction without it; but it was offered from abundant caution, and was unanimously agreed to, as appears from the Journal on the same page. It was subsequently put in the form in which it is now found in the Constitution, by the committee on style and revision. There was no change in substance. And that it did not answer the purpose of the Nationals, as now contended for by many, appears conclusively, not only from the opinion of Hamilton cited; but from the action of the Nationals themselves in the Convention afterwards. For, notwithstanding this clause was agreed to, as stated, on the 17th of July, yet we find that the very identical original proposition was again offered on the 23d day of August afterwards,

as appears on the Journal, page 260. It then met with no greater favor than it did at first. The Convention

refused to entertain it, and it was withdrawn. Moreover, I will here add, that no truth is better established than that the general view and understanding of the advocates of the adoption of the Constitution in that day, in reference to this clause, were in conformity with those given by Mr. Hamilton. That is, that no power was granted by the clause-that it simply declared a truth-that it was intended as a limitation of powers delegated, and only announced a principle that would have been recognized by the Courts, even if it had not been made, or in other words, that this clause did not in the least change the character of the former Government in this respect, and that the acts of the General Government, under the present Constitution, are no more binding on the States, or the citizens of the States, by virtue of it, than they were under the Confederation. This was the opinion of Mr. Madison. Here, in a number of the Federalist, written by him (No. 37), he shows that "treaties made by Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, had been declared by Congress, and recognized by most of the States, to be the supreme law of the land," without any such declaration to that effect in the Articles of the Union. And further, if further argument be necessary to show the prevailing opinion at that time, I refer you to a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, made in 1796. In this case, Ware, etc. vs. Hilton, etc., 3d Dallas, 199, Judge Chase says: "It seems to me that treaties made by Congress, according to the Confederation, were superior to the laws of the States, because the Confederation made them obligatory in all of the States. They were so declared by Congress, on the 13th of April, 1787, were so declared

by the Legislatures and Executives of most of the States, and were so decided by the judiciary of the General Government, and by the judiciaries of some of the State Governments." So it appears conclusively from the language of the clause, from the opinions of Mr. Hamil ton, and Mr. Madison, and Judge Chase of the Supreme Court of the United States, that the proposition offered by Mr. Martin, and incorporated substantially in the Constitution, conferred no more power under the new Constitution than existed without the declaration under the Confederation.

PROF. NORTON. Your position, then, is simply this: that this clause in the Constitution effected no radical or substantial change in the character of the General Government from what it was before. That if it was not vested with complete Sovereignty over the State authorities, and entitled to the allegiance of the citizens of the several States under the Confederation, that it did not become so vested by virtue of this clause of the Constitution.

MR. STEPHENS. Exactly so. That is my position, and I will add that Judge Chase, in the same opinion from which I have just read, and to which we may have occasion to refer again, held that under the Confederation the States severally were clothed with all the attributes of perfect sovereignty. And yet the Articles of Confederation were the Supreme law of the land as much as the Constitution now is. All compacts between sovereigns are the supreme law over their subjects or citizens so long as they continue. This is the doctrine of Vattel. General Pinckney, in the South Carolina Convention, when this clause of the Constitution was under discussion, after quoting Vattel to this effect, goes on: "Burlamaqui, another writer of great reputation on political

law, says, that treaties are obligatory on the subjects of the powers who enter into treaties; they are obligatory as conventions between the contracting powers; but they have the force of law with respect to their subjects.' These are his very words: Ils ont force de loi a l'egard des sujets, considèrès comme tels;' and it is very manifest, continues he, 'that two sovereigns, who enter into a treaty, impose, by such treaty, an obligation on their subjects to conform to it, and in no manner to contravene it." Every treaty existing, to-day, between the United States and every other Government or Governments is the Supreme law over the subjects of such Government or Governments, as well as over the citizens of the several States of this Union. That is, every such treaty is a law, Superior to all other local laws in both countries, over which it operates. Their Courts are bound to so hold, and do so hold. This no more affects the allegiance of the subjects of those Governments than it does the allegiance of the citizens of these States These treaties are Compacts between the Parties to them, and laws as to their subjects or citizens.

This clause in the Constitution, therefore, settles nothing on the question of allegiance. The Constitution may be a bare convention or compact between the States as Sovereigns, and yet be the supreme law while it continues over their citizens, without affecting their ultimate allegiance in the slightest degree. So we will proceed with our inquiry as to the nature of the present Government of the United States, and enter into an examination of the vexed question, where, under it, the ultimate Sovereign power resides. These are essential facts first to be ascertained and settled.

* Elliot's Debates, vol. iv, page 279.

COLLOQUY II.

INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF THE UNION—A BRIEF HISTORICAL SKETCHTHE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE-THE FIRST CONFEDERATION-A COMPACT BETWEEN SOVEREIGN STATES-JUDGE STORY REVIEWED.

MR. STEPHENS. The object of our immediate inquiry, is the nature of the Government of the United States, and where under it dwells or resides that Paramount authority which in the last resort can rightfully and peaceably make and unmake Constitutions, and to which allegiance is due. Is it in the whole mass of the people of the United States, territorially considered as one Nation, or in the People of the States, severally and separately, each for itself, untramelled by any obligations or restrictions incurred or imposed by any Articles of Union existing between them?

To understand and decide this question correctly, a brief historical review is necessary. From what has been said and assented to, it clearly appears that something exists in this country which by all sides is called "the Union." This must have parties of some sort.· It requires parties to make any thing bearing the designation of Union. Who are the parties to this Union? Are they the whole mass of the People, or are they States?

It also appears in the same way, that what is called the Constitution of the United States sets forth the terms of this Union, so admitted to exist on all sides. Now, to understand the force and meaning of the terms used in this written instrument called the Constitution,

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