clear, that in the language of our church, it is always used to denote the divine essence; that is, either the substance or nature of God, generally, or in a more restricted sense, the aggregate of all those attributes, which Natural Theology ascribes to God, whether derived from the abstract idea of supreme perfection, or, by induction, from the works of nature; such as eternity, self-existence, omnipotence, &c. The following is the definition of the term, given in the Augustan Confession. "There is one divine essence which is called God, and is God; eternal, incoporeal, indivisible, omnipotent, infinitely wise and good, the creator of all things visible, and invisible.”* It appears, then, that the first of the two formulas before recited, viz: that the Son of God is ouadios, or consubstantial with the Father, was intended by the church to signify, that the Father and the Son are partakers of one and the same infinite substance; and that the attributes by which the Father is distinguished from all finite things, as being an infinitely perfect spirit, the Creator and Preserver of the Universe, are numericaly identical with the attributes of the Son, (not merely similar or equal) and are common to both, without multiplication or division. But though the divine essence, common to the Father and the Son, is thus numerically identical and one, the church, notwithstanding, teaches, that there is between them a real intrinsic difference; to express which difference, this formula is used-The Father and the Son are two distinct persons. This word person (godwπov, UTodtadis) is, in itself, no less vague and ambiguous than oudios. Its meaning, however, may be readily discovered and precisely fixed, by referring to the object of the orthodox, in using the term * Una est esssentia divina, quæ appellatur et est Deus, æternus, incoporeus, impartibilis, immensa potentia, sapientia, bonitate, creator and conservator omnium rerum, visibilium et invisibilium. (Augustan Confession, Art. I.) at all. For it is very clear that the early Catholics, as well as the modern Trinitarians of other churches, have uniformly introduced this word into their professions of belief for the purpose of drawing a more marked distinction between orthodoxy and Sabellianism; and of more effectually guarding the true church from that and other kindred heresies. We are not, therefore, to understand the phrase in question in the same sense as when we say of men, that they are different persons; for that would destroy the numerical unity of God. Nor on the other hand, is the hypothesis admissible, that the difference is merely nominal or logical-in other words, that Father and Son are different names for the same thing, or at most, serve only to distinguish different parts and affections, exterior relations, or modes of thought and action, in the self-same substance-or to denote the difference between the substance itself, and its own attributes and operations.* This exposition of the formula, though expressed altogether in negative terms, is, in my opinion, a substantial one. Indeed, as the very nature of the subject precludes the possibility of a comparison with any thing which is the subject of our knowledge or experience, it follows, of course, that we cannot conceive, much less define, it otherwise than negatively. Besides all which, we have historical evidence of the inextricable difficulties, in which those theorists have been involved, who have attempted to define this personal distinction between the Father and the Son with mathematical precision. In all such attempts of the kind as I have seen, the definition is either less intelligible than the thing defined, or is such as to land * The Augustan confession thus defines the sense of the word person. "Nomine personæ utuntur ea significatione, qua usi sunt in hac causâ scriptores ecclesiastici, ut significet non partem aut qualitatem n alio, sed quod proprie subsistit." † See Storr über den Zweck der evangelischen geschichte, und der briefe Johannis. Tubing. 1786. p. 474, &c. us in Tritheism on the one hand, or on the other, in the very error, to preclude which the term was introduced.* As to the proposition added to this formula, by the ancient Fathers, the scholastic writers, and various theologians of our own church, with respect to the generation of the Son, and the ayevndia of the Father, I concur with many eininent divines, in thinking that it might be abrogated, or at least left in medio, without at all invalidating the estab lished doctrine respecting the divinity of Christ. It is clear, that this doctrine of the generation of the Son involves neither the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, nor the difference between them. There may be some, however, whose respect for the decisions of the Nicene Fathers, and the scriptural arguments by which they are supported, may induce them to retain the word generation. By such the formula before us may be still employed with the addition of that term. But let it be observed, that the word in question, when used by itself, can only serve as an arbitrary symbol of some unknown relation of the Son to the Father; so that they who employ it, even by so doing, acknowledge their inability to comprehend its meaning: and when the phrase is amplified so as to declare that the Son is generated ex rns 801αs 58 Targos, it denotes, after all, no more than this, that he was neither begotten out of any other essence, nor created out of nothing. But if they undertake to define this generation positively, let them be cautious to produce a definition neither inconsistent with itself, nor clashing with established principles respecting the nature of the Father and the Son. I conclude, then, that the doctrine, which I undertake to defend, may be summed up in these two propositions : I. Christ is not merely like the Father, or equal to him in nature and in dignity, but is of one and the * See note A, at the end of the article. same divine substance: or in other words, the attributes of Christ are numerically the same with those by which the Father is distinguished from all finite and created things, as being an infinitely perfect spirit, the Creator and Preserver of the Universe. II. There is between the Father and the Son, not a mere nominal or logical distinction, but a real difference. In attempting to defend the doctrine here propounded, I shall content myself with selecting from among the multitude of arguments which have been brought to bear upon the subject, those which I consider as most striking and conclusive, to the explanation and support of which, I shall limit my attention. And here I would observe what I take for granted in the very outset, that the foundation of all argument upon this subject must be exegetical, not merely philosophical. Indeed, the whole subject of the Trinity, and more especially that part of it immediately before us, (the divinity of Christ,) is so distantly removed from all analogy, and lies so far beyond the reach of sense and intellect, that a demonstration, strictly philosophical, of the truths which it involves, seems quite impossible. And this conclusion is strengthened by experience; for of all the writers, who, in the middle ages, or in later times, have attempted to build a demonstration of these truths upon abstract principles alone, not one has been able to prove any thing but the miserable weakness of the human mind. It may not be amiss to illustrate this assertion by two signal instances, drawn from the writings of two most ingenious men. The By a nominal or logical distinction, is meant a mere difference in name, in exterior relations, in the mode of conception, &c. See p. 6. + Leibnitz himself, admits that the questions which arise upon this subject, must be decided more by the authority of texts, than by mere abstract reasoning; and Lambert, in his letter to Urisperger, where he lays down the proper method of investigating this same subject, expresses a similar opinion. us in Tritheism on the one hand, or on the other, in the very error, to preclude which the term was introduced.* As to the proposition added to this formula, by the ancient Fathers, the scholastic writers, and various theologians of our own church, with respect to the generation of the Son, and the ayevndia of the Father, I concur with many emninent divines, in thinking that it might be abrogated, or at least left in medio, without at all invalidating the estab It is lished doctrine respecting the divinity of Christ. clear, that this doctrine of the generation of the Son involves neither the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, nor the difference between them. There may be some, however, whose respect for the decisions of the Nicene Fathers, and the scriptural arguments by which they are supported, may induce them to retain the word generation. By such the formula before us may be still employed with the addition of that term. But let it be observed, that the word in question, when used by itself, can only serve as an arbitrary symbol of some unknown relation of the Son to the Father; so that they who employ it, even by so doing, acknowledge their inability to comprehend its meaning: and when the phrase is amplified so as to declare that the Son is generated εx ans 801αs 58 Targos, it denotes, after all, no more than this, that he was neither begotten out of any other essence, nor created out of nothing. But if they undertake to define this generation positively, let them be cautious to produce a definition neither inconsistent with itself, nor clashing with established principles respecting the nature of the Father and the Son. I conclude, then, that the doctrine, which I undertake to defend, may be summed up in these two propositions : I. Christ is not merely like the Father, or equal to him in nature and in dignity, but is of one and the * See note A, at the end of the article. |