All thefe

things

otherwise

be look'd upon as Mad, but only he that acts abfurdly from fome injury done to the understanding Faculty itself, or an Impediment to the Use of Reafon; he that could have follow'd the dictate of Reason, and yet knowingly violated it, muft not be reckon'd mad, but wicked, unless we will impofe upon ourselves by changing the customary Names of things.

XXI. If it be granted that we have this fuperior cannot be Faculty, 'tis plain enough that all these things may explained come to pafs. For he that is endow'd with it, will than by be able to please himself in the Profecution of his admitting Elections, even to the detriment of both Body and a Princi- Mind; to the prejudice of Senfes, Appetites and ple inus of Reason; which we often fee done to our Amazement; but unlefs we have this Faculty imparted As much to us, it does not feem poffible for us to create goodarifes Good to ourselves by Election, and to prefer what from this is thus created to all natural Good whatsoever. Principle,

this kind.

fo it is at- XXII. These things, I confefs, ought not to tended be done; but if nothing could be done which with this ought not, there would be no fuch thing as a Fault. Evil, viz. As therefore much Good arifes from this Principle, of finning. fo there is this Evil alfo, that by it Crimes and

a Power

Follies are committed: And it has this InconveThis mif- nience, that it can do what it ought not.

take, that the Will

the Under

XXIII. From thefe and other Arguments which follows might be brought, I think it is evident that God the Judg- has given us a Principle of this kind, and that our ment of Will is only determin'd by itself. They are miftastanding,aken therefore who affirm that either the Appetites, rofe from Paffions, or Underftanding, determine Elections. hence,viz. What probably gave occafion to the Mistake was, that it is that other things pleafe or difpleafe us, viz. fuch imprudent in us to as are agreeable to the Appetites or Senfes, beact with fide those which we choofe: Now it being obferv'd that we have regard to thele in Elections,

out con

fulting the Underftanding

and

and do not choose any thing repugnant to them, but upon neceffity, and that all Men are of Opinion, that the Judgment of the Understanding ought to be made ufe of in choofing, and being accustom❜d to this kind of Choice, we become at laft perfuaded that it is abfolutely neceffary, and that our Wills are always determin'd by fome Judgment of the Understanding at leaft, that it is a Condition requifite in the Object, that the Mind judge the thing chofen to be good and agreeable to the Appetites. Whereas the contrary to all this is generally true, viz. that the Mind judges things to be good because we have willed them, because we have formed an Appetite in ourselves by fome antecedent Election, and those things which we embrace by this fictitious Appetite, as we may call it, give us equal Pleasure with that which we defire by the Neceffity of Nature.

der to

be the

any

reason

XXIV. Nay we choose Objects which are con- We can trary to all the Appetites, contrary to Reafon, and act in ordeftitute of all Appearance of Good, perhaps for fhew our this only Reason, that we may affert our Liberty Liberty, of Election. 'Tis certain that every one can do which is this, and he that does it, proves by an Experi- prov'd to ment that he is free, and has a Power of pleafing fame as himself in Election. Nor can he be faid to be de- acting termin'd by the Judgment of the Understanding; without for this reason is made by the Mind itfelf, and may ferve equally for every Election, fince it is drawn from the Indifference of the Will itfelf: and he who does any thing upon a reafon which is made by himfelf, and is indifferent to either Side, muft be esteem'd to act in the fame manner as if he had done it without any reafon at all. 'Tis evident therefore that we have this Power, and make use of the Appetites and Senfes only as Spies and Informers; of Reafon as a Counsellor; but that the

Will

at all.

Will is Mafter of itself, and creates pleasure for itfelf in Objects by Election. (59.)

NOTES.

SECT.

(59.) Upon the whole it appears that the true defcription of Free will muft include thus much. A Power of choosing or not choofing, or of choofing either Side in any given Cafe ;. naturally independent of any mediate or immediate, external or internal force, compulfion, influence or neceffity; phyfically indetermin'd by either bodily Senfations, Appetites, &r: or mental Perceptions, Reafon, Judgment. "Tis an Ability of determining either among equal and indifferent Objects, or of preferring the pursuit of fome before others that are entirely different from or contrary to them: or laftly, of preferring the very confideration of fome unknown Objects to all the reft; of deliberating upon, or attending to fome particular Ideas, and refolving to overlook others, tho' equally prefented to the Mind, and fuppos'd to be of equal Importance.

All this is contain'd in the very Notion of a Self-moving Power; (tho' none perhaps have given fo full and distinct an Explication of it as our Author) for that which in ftrictness moves itself, is properly and phyfically independent of, and indifferent to all external Movers, as long as it continues to do fo; what is determin'd in certain circumftances by or according to particular Senfations, Motives, &c. and cannot poffibly be determin'd either without or against them, is fo far, and in fuch circumftances, only moved, acted upon, and purely paffive. If then there be any fuch thing, properly speaking, as an active Principle, it must be endow'd with fuch an absolute Indifference as our Author fuppofes: and when we speak of the strongest Motives, we don't mean fuch as have the greatest phyfical Influence or Weight in turning the ballance of the Will (fince we fuppofe none of them to have any at all) but only fuch as the Mind most commonly determines itself upon in fact; and to argue from fuch determinations that these Motives must have fuch an Influence both abfolutely and comparatively, i. e. whether taken by themselves, or in oppofition to each other; is manifeftly to beg the Queftion, and still to fuppofe that it cannot move or direct itself, notwithstanding our most evident perception and experience of the contrary. And that we have fuch experience, a little reflection on our felves will convince us. I think (fays S. C.) I may appeal to any confidering Man, whether he be not in all ordinary Cafes fenfible of an ability of darting his thoughts upon any

66

66

particu

SECT. II.

Where it is fhewn that Happiness confifts in
Elections.

FRO

I. ROM what has been faid above, it appears The more free that a Being endow'd with a Power of any choofing is more excellent and perfect than one the lefs he that is expos'd

66

Being is,

to Moti

ons from without, and meets with lefs inconvenience.

NOTES.

particular Object, even antecedently to any deliberation, and "then, whether after deliberation about particular Objects he

cannot resume his deliberation, and fometimes vary his Judg66 ment and whether, after the clearest Judgment, and most "deliberate Choice of particular things or actions, he be not "ftill conscious of a power of fufpending his practice, of re"fuming the confideration of the Objects whenever he plea❝fes, or of immediately choofing or practifing the contrary, "without being determin'd by impreffions from without, or "impediments from within. But we have no clearer proof of our own Existence than Consciousness: and I conceive we "need not expect greater Evidence of any thing than we have "of our Existence [p.]".

66

If then our Mind has fuch a power of felecting fome particular Ideas out of many perceived by the Understanding, and attending to them alone without any previous apprehenfion of their nature and tendency, without any special Reason, Motive or Inducement whatsoever to fuch particular Choice; if the Mind, I fay, does in fome Cafes exert fuch a power as this, then it is in these Cafes abfolutely free. It cannot here be di

rected

[p] Impartial Enquiry, &c. p. 42, 43. See also an Essay or Consciousness, p. 205, &.

3

that is without it: For that which neither acts nor is acted upon, is the fartheft from Perfection, fince

NOTES.

rected by the Judgment, fince it is fuppos'd to act independently of it: nay it may be properly faid fometimes to influence and direct, or rather to obftruct and fubvert the Judgment itfelf, for as much as it confines that to fome particular Objects only, and of confequence renders it partial, and precipitates it in the Choice of these, and withdraws others from it, which were abfolutely neceffary to a compleat View of the Subject, and an exact determination about it. Hence the fpring of all Errors, at least all criminal ones, hence vitious, abfurd Elections, and a Labyrinth of Woe. From the fame Power alfo duely apply'd proceeds the happy confciqufnefs of Defert, and in it is entirely founded all the reafon of Reward. Its ufefulnefs then, and neceffity, appear both for the establishment of Morality, the ground of all rational Happiness; and also, that we might always have wherein to please ourselves, which (as our Author has fhewn in the latter end of Subfect, 4.) otherwife we very often could not. Hence it appears I think fuffi ciently, that this Power is one of our greatest Perfections, tho' (like all other Perfections that come fhort of Infinity) it be liable to the greatest abufe, and fo capable of being turn'd into the worst of Imperfections.

It remains to be enquired with our Author, whether all the Happiness arifing from it counterballances the Mifery, and con. fequently, whether we and all other rational Creatures might not have been as well or better without it. But for this fee §. 2. and 5.

We fhall here only add a Word or two in vindication of this Principle against the three principal Oppofers of Liberty above mentioned. In the first place then, we don't affert that by this Power the Mind can choofe Evil as Evil, or refufe Good as Good, i. e. that the former, as fuch, is or can be a Motive for Choice, or the latter for Refufal: But we fay that it can choose the one and refufe the other without any particular Motive at all; (i. e. e. any drawn from the particular nature of the Object cho fen,) nay, in oppofition to the ftrongest Motive (viz. that Motive which prefents the greateft Happinefs, and which it ufually does, and always ought to follow) purely by the force of its free, active or felf-moving Power [9]

You'll

[9] See Jackfon's Vindication of human Liberty, p. 49, &e. of the beginning of E. Strutt's Defence of Dr. Clarke's Notion, &c