choofes

envious.

IX. Neither is that Affertion lefs falfe which at- God altributes it to Envy that he will not. For he that ways always wills the beft, and the leaft of many Evils, the leaft of is abfolutely Good and the fartheft from Envy: Evils, and we have fhewn that this is the Cafe with re- and therefpect to God. If a Perfon had his Choice either to fore is not abolish or not to abolish Evil, he would be malicious if he did not abolish it. But when the choice is between this and a greater Evil, he that chooses the lefs is far from being malicious. The Divine Goodness therefore reduces God to this Difficulty, that he must choose to make either no Creature at all, or an imperfect one; either no fuch thing as Matter and Motion, or tolerate Contrariety and Corruption in things; either no free Agent, or admit a Power of finning. He muft neceffarily have chosen one of thefe, and 'tis eafy to fay whether of them was more directly oppofite to Envy: God X. To fpeak my Thoughts, I dare confidently, could neibut with Reverence, pronounce that God would conceiv'd neither have been infinitely powerful nor good, if to be inhe could not have made any thing which we call finitely Evil. For there are fome things poffible which powerful, are not confiftent with each other, nay are repugnant and mutually destructive, i. e. are Evils to each other: If God were unable to produce any

NOTES.

if he were

not able to create imperfect Beings, i. e. Creatures, or things that are

"vidus eft, idcirco enim non tollit quia fapientiam (ficut contrary " edocui) fimul tribuit, & plus eft boni ac jucunditatis in fa- to each o

66

pientia, quam in malis moleftiæ; fapientia enim facit ut ther; i. e. "etiam Deum cognofcamus & per eam cognitionem, immor- Evils: nor "talitatem affequamur, quod eft fummum Bonum. Itaque infinitely "nifi prius malum agnoverimus, nec poterimus agnofcere Good.ifhe "Bonum: fed hoc non videt Epicurus, nec alius quifquam, fi had been "tollantur mala tolli pariter Sapientiam, nec ulla in homine contented remanere virtutis veftigia, cujus ratis in fuftinenda & fuper- in himself, ❝anda malorum a cerbitate confiftit. Itaque propter exiguum and deny'd compendium fublatorum malorum, maximo & vero & pro- Existence prio nobis bono careremus.

་

to every

thing else.

is deceiv'd who endeavours to attri.

bute im

potence

of thefe, how would he be infinitely powerful, fince he could not do all that is poffible? Nor would it be less injurious to his Goodness to be unwilling, for by this means his Power must lie idle and never effect any thing at all; fince nothing can be fimply Good and exempt from all manner of Evil, but God himself. If therefore the Divine Goodness had deny'd Existence to created Beings on account of the concomitant Evils, he might really have been efteem'd Envious, fince he had allow'd none to exift befide himself, and while he refused to admit any kind of Evil, he would have rejected all the Good. Thus vanishes this Herculean Argument which induced the Epicureans to discard the good Deity, and the Manicheans to fubftitute an Evil one.

Epicurus XI. Epicurus then is both a Deceiver and detherefore ceived himself, when from the prefent Evils he concludes against the Omnipotence and Goodness of the Deity. Whereas on the contrary God would neither have been powerful nor good if he had not tolerated Evils. From a competition or and Envy (if we may be allow'd the Expreffion) a Conflict of to the Dei- two Infinites, i. e. Omnipotence and Goodness, Ety, when vils neceffarily arise. These Attributes amicably confpire together, and yet restrain and limit each other. There is a kind of Struggle and Oppofition between them, whereof the Evils in Nature the higheft Power bear the Shadow and Refemblance. Here then, and Good- and no where elfe, may we find the primary and most certain Rife and Origin of Evils; and here only must we look for that celebrated Principle of

he ought

to have inferr'd

nefs.

the Antients.

Νείκος ἐλόμενον καὶ δῆρις αιματόεσσαν

The Peftilential Strife and Bloody Fight.

Empedocles.

APPENDIX:

Concerning the Divine Laws.

SECT. I.

Why God made Laws when he knew that they would not be obferved.

'T

natural

HE Divine Laws are either those which The DiGod has implanted in the Nature of every vine Laws Being, or those which he has published are either to Mankind in a particular manner, by certain or pofitive. Messengers chofen and fent for this Purpose. For fince a Law is the Will of a Superior fufficiently promulg'd to an Inferior, and attended with the Hope or Fear of Reward or Punishment: 'tis plain that God

may
be conceiv'd to have made this Declaration of
his Will to his Creatures two Ways: First, by gi-
ving them fuch a Nature as requires that fome
things be done, and others avoided, in order to
its Preservation: thofe things which are made
known to us in this manner, are commanded or
forbidden, we fay, by the Law of Nature and
that Law which thus discovers itself to our Under-
ftanding we look upon as the Will of God pro-

mulg'd

Particular Laws ought to give place

to more

general

all kind

mulg'd to his Creatures: For we are very certain that God, according to his Goodness, wills the Good and Prefervation of all things which he himfelf has made, as far as poffible: and confequently hates any thing that is hurtful to the Creature.

II. Now it must be obferv'd that these natural Laws are either Univerfal or Particular; and 'tis fit the particular ones fhould give way to the more Univerfal, and those of lefs Moment to the more important. For inftance, 'tis of the Nature ones, fince of Body that it be capable of Motion, that it be of Repug- ftopp'd and broken in Pieces by meeting with onancy thers in Motion, and this is the Univerfal Law of could not Bodies. But it is of the Nature of an Animal to be avoided preferve itself, and ufe its utmost Endeavour that the Parts of its Body be not feparated or diffolv'd, and this is the particular Law of Animals.

The fame m.ft be faid of

thofe

Now fince these Laws are fometimes inconfiftent, it is reasonable that the latter, as being a particular one and of lefs Confequence, fhould yield to the former: and this is evidently the Will of God. If it be afk'd, Why did God make Laws which in some respect interfere with one another? I anfwer, as before, That this could not be avoided without a greater Evil: Since therefore of two Evils the less is to be chofen, God will'd that particular Laws, and those of lefs confequence, fhould give place to the more Univerfal and those of greater Importance, rather than remove that Inconfiftency, for there arifes lefs Inconvenience to Nature from thence.

III. The fame must be faid of thofe Laws which relate to Morality. 'Tis the Univerfal Law of Free Agents, that they fhall please themselves by Election, but there are fome things eligible which which re- may be prejudicial to fome particular Beings. Now late to the it is better, as was faid before, that Particulars be

Laws

moral

World.

injur'd,

injur'd, than that the Univerfal Law of Free Agents be violated. We must fuppofe then that God willed this as the lefs Evil of the two. Men are permitted therefore to abuse their Free Will, and 'tis neceffary that God should tolerate either this Inconvenience or a greater. But it is not at all neceffary that Man fhould make an Evil Choice; therefore he alone is faulty; for it proceeds from his Act that God is reduced to a neceffity of choofing the leaft among many Evils.

with Sin

done.

IV. From hence it appears that all the Laws of Why God Nature are always obferv'd according to the Will is faid to and Intent of God. For he will'd that the Particular be angry fhould give place to the General ones, and that ners, fince Man fhould fin rather than be driven from Sin by his Will force. You'll fay, why then is he angry at Sin- is always ners, fince nothing is done against his Will? I anfwer: When Anger is attributed to God, 'tis after the manner of Ment; whereas it is ordered and effected by the very Nature and Conftitution of things, that whoever does any thing in oppofition to any Law of Nature, tho' it be a particular one, fhall bring fome Inconvenience upon himself. By which contrivance God has taken care that the very leaft Law fhould not be violated rafhly and without Neceffity. When an Offender therefore, who willingly breaks a particular Law, brings certain Mifery upon himself, God who wifely coupled thefe together, is faid to be angry: Because a Man in Anger would not take any other or more effectual Revenge on the Perfon that provok'd him; and the Evil which naturally attends a bad Election is to be esteem'd a Punishment inflicted as it were by an angry God.

See Chap. 1. 4. 3. par. 10. and Note C.

V. As