"Ideas, and not in the order of the things them"felves." But except you fuppofe it previous in the order of Nature too (which is indeed included in the former fuppofition) it cannot ferve your purpofe, i. e. be with any tolerable propriety the real foundation, and a priori infer the Existence, of the Subftance and all its other Attributes: Which fuppofition you are indeed forced to make in the next Sentence.

"So that when we fuppofe this Neceffity to be the ground or foundation of the existence of the felf exiftent Being, we do indeed pre-fuppofe it (i. e. fuppofe it to he really and in order of nature previous, or this is not fenfe) to that existence, when in reality it is coeval." What other Confequence can be drawn from this, but that the Suppofition is a falfe and groundless one, and all the Arguments founded thereon, fallacious. The foregoing Paffages, I think, explain themselves.

..

"To fay that this Neceffity must be by way of Caufality, or we can fix no manner of Idea to the "Words is mere trifling, as if there cou'd be no

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ground or Reafon of existence in any Being un"lefs that Ground or Reafon were the actual pro"ducers of the Being, which is as abfurd as is pof "fible." There can be no kind of antecedent Reafon for an Existence when there is nothing that can actually caufe, produce or at all affect that Exiftence, (as in the prefent Cafe :) except you'll have an an antecedent reafon why it is uncaus'd, or why it needs no producer, which wou'd be trifling indeed.

"I afk why he cou'd not but always have exifted? The answer fhould be, that it is and always was a Contradiction. I afk therefore once more, why it is a Contradiction to fuppofe him not to exift?" The proper Question I think, here should

2

.

be, What is that Contradiction? (Which has been often anfwer'd) not why it is one? However he goes on to prove that there must be a reafon or ground for every contradiction. A caufe why the fame. thing cannot be and not be at the fame time (p. 100. 101.) Why 2 and 2 do not make 5: i. e. you must have a reason for the very first principles of all reafon, or a Cause why fome of your Ideas differ and others agree, or elfe he will tell you they might not have been fo. He that can fee the neceffity for this may I fuppofe apprehend the neceffity for a Cause. or Ground of all Caufes and Grounds whatsoever, and another for that, and will fee no reason to stop any where.

"I ask again why God is that greatest and . 1C4. "most fuperior Being which they fuppofe him? "What answer can they make to that? If they are "confiftent with themselves, they muit fay, that "he is the greatest Being because he exifted from "all Eternity. But then again why did he exist "from all Eternity?" I might as well ask why this Neceffity of yours is that moft wonderful thing which you fuppofe it to be, or why it is an-, tecedent to the first Being. We know him to be the greatest from his Eternity, why he is eternal we know not, (apriori) but this we know that if there. were any ground really and truly antecedent to his existence, he cou'd not be eternal; which is enough to overturn your Foundation. What this Author adds in pages 106, 107. about the Causes of the determination of the Divine Will has been confider'd in the latter part of Note 53. 2d Edit.

p. 110,

III.

The Tranflator's Demonftration examin'd.

To confider minutely what he has advanced on this Head wou'd be to repeat every thing which went before concerning an Infinite feries, Eternity of the World, Caufe and Effect coeval, Abfolute Infinity without any end, &c. He that has once thoro❜ly reflected on fuch principles will not require a 2d Confutation of them.

He labours to maintain the poffibility of an infinite feries of fucceffive Beings against all thofe arguments which fhew that either fome one part of it was not fucceffive to others, or that every part of it was, both which deftroy the fuppofition," and therefore, fays "he, they are nothing to the purpofe. For in a feries

'

of Beings exifting from Eternity down to this pre"fent Time, there could be no firft, nor could there "be a time when none of them did Exist, for then "these wou'd not have Existed from Eternity". But there is no one of them which was not once future, Ergo there must have been a time when none of them did exift, Ergo there was a firft, and consequently the fuppofition contradicts itself. He goes on "Let us then fuppofe a series of Beings to begin, "to exist now, and that they will exift to all Eter

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nity, would any perfon be fo abfurd as to suppose "that there must be fome one not previous to any "other, (I fuppofe he means fubfequent to all others,) "that is, that there must be a laft?" We may add, and would any person be so abfurd as to call fuch a perpetually growing feries pofitively or abfolutely infinite? or conceive it as any whole or entire thing really exifting? Tis an indefinite flux or aggregate of parts which are continually added, but never make up any thing at all, which is abfurd, fee Note 10 2d Ed. Below he attempts to bring this feries off by afferting that it is infinite one way, but fi

4

nite another; which feems to me the fame as affirm-
ing it to be partly infinite and partly finite: but
we examin'd this before.

6.6

119.

"That other Beings befides the self-exiftent Be- 118, ing might have been eternal has been before prov"ed, though they would not be in the fame man"ner as He, because they would equally be depen"dent as if they had not exifted from Eternity." i. e. they would depend on the self-exiftent Being for their original or derive their Beings from fomething pre-existent and yet be all eternal, which appears to me fomething like a Contradiction.

Here the Defender of Dr. Clarke feems to be in fome confufion. He begins 'There's no impoffibi

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66

lity in an endless feries of dependent Beings exift"ing from Eternity. For, as Dr. Clarke fays, "If we confider fuch an infinite Progreffion as one "entire endless feries of dependent Beings it is plain this whole feries can have no Cause from without, or from within &c." and fo produces the Dr's Demonstration directly against himself, and when he has done, fays this is a true, if not the only reafon--why it is impoffible, that there should have exifted from Eternity fuch an infinite independent feries;" tho' how he comes to allow this fame feries, whether it be dependent or independent, to be confider'd here by the Dr. as one entire thing or whole, which he had fo frequently complain'd of in others, or why this does not deftroy the fuppofition as much as a first and last, I cannot apprehend.

He endeavours to invalidate the old Maxim, p. 120. that a Caufe is prior to its Effect, by a distinction between priority in the order of our Ideas and priority in nature For as Dr. Clarke fays, Light "would eternally proceed from the Sun, or an im"preffion from an impofed Seal, were their Caufes "Eternal. In the fame manner created Beings might

p. 124.

C

"might eternally fpring from the workmanship of the Almighty, as Light from the Sun. " Anf. Whatever is neceffarily prior in the order of our Ideas, is for that reafon prior alfo in the order of Nature, if we have any knowledge at all of Nature: or can prove any thing from our Ideas concernirg it. Every mover must be previous to the moved as well in Nature as in Idea, tho it cou'd not be properly a mover till it produced fome motion. In like manner as the Sun could not be what we now ftile Sun till it emitted Light, but yet the matter of it as well as the motion excited in its pirts must be previous (except you will suppose it felf motive) both in Nature aud Time to the actual Emiffion of these parts which cause the Idea of Light, and which require fome time for every Motion: ie their Motion is not inftantaneous, and confequently Light, which is the effect thereof, cannot be strictly coetaneous with the Sun. Your Father was no Father indeed till he had a fon, but will you fay that his fon and he might poffibly have been coeval? The contrary is intuitively certain, and he that will demand a proof of it or a reafon why it is fo, does not know when he ought to be convinc'd.

What he brings in the following pages concerning Omnipotence and the Unity, has been confider'd in R. g. 2d Ed.

He concludes "What the Tranflator fays about "Neceffity of existence is mere trifling and ought not to be confider'd at all. As if uniformity ex"cluded attributes of different kinds."

Abfolute Neceffity in the fenfe it is fome Times. ufed would deftroy all variety or diverfity of every kind, as Dr. Clarke endeavours to prove in the 6th. prop. p. 72 2d Ed. And it may exclude all diverfity of perfections in the Divine Nature for the very fame reafon that it does exclude a difference

of