BAKER, JR. Altogether, I think the Committee's report represents a remarkably good treatment of the large volume of testimony and documentation which was received by us and a fair reconciliation of the conflicts that developed. While it is clear from the record that assassination planning and efforts did in fact occur during the late 1950's to the mid-1960's, it is not equally clear from the record that they were fully authorized by the respective Presidents serving during that time. I entirely agree with and subscribe to the Committee's central finding that: the system of Executive command and control was so inherently ambiguous that it is difficult to be certain at what level assassination activity was known and authorized. This creates the disturbing prospect that assassination activity might have been undertaken by officials of the United States Government without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the President of the United States. At the same time, this ambiguity and imprecision leaves open the possibility that there was a successful "plausible denial" and that a Presidential authorization was issued but is now obscured. (Committee Report, Findings and Conclusions p. 261) Or put another way, in the Inspector General's report on this subject in 1967: This reconstruction of agency involvement in plans to assassinate Fidel Castro is at best an imperfect history. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the operation being discussed or attempted, as a matter of principle no official records were kept of planning, of approvals, or implementation. The few written records that do exist are either largely tangential to the main events or put on paper from memory years afterwards . . . For the most part . we have had to rely on information given to us orally by people whose memories are fogged by time. (I. G. Report, p. 1) However, it is my personal view that on balance the likelihood that Presidents knew of the assassination plots is greater than the likelihood that they did not. This impression stems from the record of course, but as well from observing and hearing the witnesses testify and by applying the usual courtroom tests for determining the worth and value of the witnesses' testimony: the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying; the completeness or the incompleteness of their statements; whether the testimony has the ring of truth; prior consistent or inconsistent statements; inconsistencies in the course of their testimony before the Committee; the probability or improbability of their testimony; their means of knowledge; their interest in the subject. All of these things are best judged by observing the testimony of the witnesses. It is because of this, that I had hoped for public hearings on this subject, carefully sanitized to avoid the disclosure of properly classified information and the identification of "sources and methods". It seems to me that without a record clearly supporting a conclusion of Presidential responsibility, or the absence of it, that a public examination of the witnesses was more important than would otherwise be the case. The Committee determined not to hold public hearings and I abide by that decision. Accompanying these views is an Appendix of record evidence and documentation which relate to these conclusions and impressions. While the Appendix in large part deals with the Castro situation, I believe it is fairly representative of the problems we have encountered. HOWARD H. BAKER. FOR ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. Page I. The Testimony and Evidence Regarding Authority From Those In- 307 308 Pre-Bay of Pigs__. 308 Post-Bay of Pigs. 310 III. The Testimony and Evidence Regarding How Authority Would Have 313 318 318 B. The August 10 Meeting_. 319 1. The Testimony: Who Raised the Suggestion of the C. Conversations With President Kennedy About the Use of 324 1. President Kennedy's Meeting With Tad Szulc on No- 324 2. Conversation Between President Kennedy and Senator 325 D. President Eisenhower's Discussion at the August 18, 1960, 326 V. Did the Investigation of Giancana and Rosselli Reveal Their Involvement in the Assassination Plots to the FBI, Department of Justice, Attorney General, or the President?_ B. President Kennedy's Meeting With the Cuban Exile Leader__ 330 333 VI. The MONGOOSE Program-The Environment in Which the Assassination Plots Arose__. 333 VII. Whose Idea Was the Use of the Underworld in an Assassination Plot 338 |