A reward of "24" was listed for Castro himself. (Id., p. 3)1 While the Bounty proposal never got off the ground operationally, yet it is another indicia of the climate of the time.

As the MONGOOSE program advanced, the Special Group recognized that the Cuban program, considering what was being proposed, created a potentially volatile situation. The March 5, 1962 SGA Minutes acknowledged that:

Agents infiltrated into Cuba would be trained in paramilitary as well as intelligence skills and *** once the agents are within the country, they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S.

Nevertheless, under the program, agent teams were dispatched into Cuba. A Lansdale memorandum of March 13, 1962, to the Special Group Augmented advised that:

(1) Two teams of agents dispatched April 1 through 15, 1962; (2) Two teams of agents dispatched April 16 through 30, 1962; (3) Two teams dispatched to Cuba May 1 through 15, 1962; (4) Four teams of agents dispatched to Cuba May 16 through 31; (5) Ten to fifteen teams of agents dispatched to Cuba June 1 through 31, 1962.

In addition to the agent infiltrations, the MONGOOSE program also continued to include stepped up sabotage proposals. The unsuccessful attempt to blow up the Matahambre mine was approved on August 30, 1962, and an August 31, 1962 memorandum from Lansdale to the SGA selected sabotage targets as "the Matahambre Mine and various refineries, nickel plants * **" The same memorandum suggested: encouraging destruction of crops by fire, chemicals, and weeds, hampering of harvest by work slowdown, destruction of bags, cartons, and other shipping containers.

While the MONGOOSE program ended around the time of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, sabotage continued. For example, the Special Group minutes of June 19, 1963, show that the following proposed sabotage program was approved:

A meeting was held this morning with higher authority, on the above subject. Present were Mr. McNamara and General McKee; Mr. Harriman; Mr. McCone and Mr. Fitzgerald; and Mr. Bundy.

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*

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*

Mr. Fitzgerald then gave the outlines of the proposed program. It will be directed at four major segments of the Cuban economy: (a) electric power; (b) petroleum refineries and storage facilities; (c) railroad and highway transportation; and (d) production and manufacturing. (He pointed out that many targets in the last category could be put out of operation by successful sabotage of power facilities.) The first operation is planned for mid-July. Raids will be conducted from outside Cuba, using Cuban agents under CIA control. Missions will be staged from a U.S. key.

A question was asked as to whether the Cubans would retaliate in kind. The answer was that they would certainly have this capability but that they have not retaliated to date, in spite of a number of publicized exile raids.

I set out the above events as examples of the atmosphere and environment which I can easily see might lead one to conclude that an assassination effort, presumably approved by higher authority, fit within the realm of approved action against Castro and Cuba.

1 The reward for Castro was supposed to "denigrate * * * Castro in the eyes of the Cuban population." (Lansdale, 7/8/75, p. 26) The logic of the effort, however, escapes me.

VII. Whose Idea Was the Use of the Underworld in an Assassination Plot Against Castro

A final matter I would like to treat briefly is a question which the Committee Report does not specifically address, i.e., the origin of the Castro plots. I describe the testimony here not because it matters much where within the CIA the proposal originated, but because it sheds additional light on why it is so difficult to pin down responsibility for assassination.

The Inspector General's investigation did not focus on any one particular individual as the originator of the plots, noting that the "first seriously-pursued CIA plan to assassinate Castro had its inception in August 1960." Concerning the plots' origin, the Inspector General's Report stated:

Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, asked Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, if Edwards could establish contact with the U.S. gambling syndicate that was active in Cuba. The objective clearly was the assassination of Castro although Edwards claims that there was a studied avoidance of the term in his conversation with Bissell. Bissell recalls that the idea originated with J. C. King, then Chief of WH Division, although King now recalls having only limited knowledge of such a plan and at a much later date-mid 1962. (I.G. Report, p. 14)

However, when King was interviewed by the Committee, he denied that the Castro underworld plots originated with him. He said that he remembered nothing about the plots but could not dispute Bissell and Edwards. (King Interview, p. 1.)

Moreover, Bissell and Edwards each had differing recollections concerning who proposed the idea of utilizing the underworld in an assassination effort against Castro. Each testified that the other came to him with the idea. Edwards testified that:

Q. Now, did you in the fall of 1960 receive some instructions from Mr. Bissell in connection with Mr. Castro?

A. Yes.

Q. And did he tell you to find somebody who could accomplish the assassination of Mr. Castro?

A. No, he told me if I had access, to see if I had access to any source that I feel might accomplish that end, yes.

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Q. And this refreshes your recollection that you were approached in August 1960 by Mr. Bissell.

A. I was approached by Mr. Bissell. Now, I'm not sure that it shows here that it was approved, this possible project was approved by Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA, and by General Cabell, the Deputy Director. They are both dead.

I mean, I told him that Mr. Bissell, the Deputy for Plans, had asked me if I had any sources and Bissell was there as I recall. I'm pretty sure he was there. And it was a brief conversation, it was a sensitive conversation. (Edwards, 5/30/75, pp. 3, 5, 7)

On the other hand, Bissell described the origin as follows:

My own recollection was that Shef Edwards himself brought up the possibility of using this channel. *** I am sure that I did encourage Shef Edwards to see what could be done through this channel.

***I think he [Edwards] either said in as many words or strongly inferred that the plan would be put into effect unless at that time or subsequently he was told by Mr. Dulles that it should not be.

*

You have hit on an important point which is that this operation, the planning for this operation and the support of this operation was conducted in a manner completely different from that of any other operation I ever knew of in the Agency was conducted. The main difference was that an operation directed against a foreign government was handled through the Director of Security's chain of command by his people and with his contacts, and as you are aware, he did not report to me, he was not in my chain of command. This was done, as I made clear, with my foreknowledge, but operationally, this matter was in his hands.

*

I received reports quite infrequently from Shef Edwards. I felt a high confidence in his competence to pursue this matter and none in my own. * * * I knew a plan had been drawn up and I knew that Edwards had been authorized to pursue it, and I knew in a general way what the plan involved. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 22, 23, 32, 72)

I think the question it undoubtedly did raise in my mind at the time was whether the specific operation that had been initiated by Mr. Edwards with my knowledge and encouragement, whether the operation was threatened with being blown. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 59, emphasis added)

The testimony set out above demonstrates that none of the witnesses were rushing forward to take credit for initiating the Castro schemes. And, plots to use the underworld to attempt to assassinate Castro are events which should stick in one's memory. Nevertheless, this aspect of our investigation, as in many other areas of our inquiry on assassination, has not provided concise, clear evidence nor easy answers.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR BARRY

GOLDWATER

My signature appended to the Majority Report of this Committee indicates I am greatly appreciative of the dedicated work done by the Senate members of the Committee and the complete staff.

I am in disagreement with the general idea of an interim report. In fact, as I will indicate, I was opposed to getting into the subject of assassinations at all. Although my signature appears on the Majority Report, I have additional views concerning this whole subject which I am compelled to make part of this report.

A majority of the Select Committee voted in favor of an interim assassination report, because they believed it was necessary to lay the matter at rest so that the Committee could get on with other work. While I respect the decision of the Committee, I disagree for the following reasons:

(1) An interim report is tentative in nature. If the Select Committee is unable to pass on the subject matter of assassinations with finality, I submit it should wait until it can do so. Further, it is questionable that there is any public need requiring an interim report.

(2) A lengthy report with numerous names and replete with quotes can pose security and diplomatic problems in the absence of time to carefully scrutinize the document. Americans and our friends abroad may suffer embarrassment or notoriety.

(3) The interim report deals with such subjects as "plausible deniability", "command and control", and covert operation methods. The Select Committee is placing itself in the position of generalizing on these subjects based on four case studies presented to the full Committee. Although the document does contain disclaimers as to final conclusions on these matters, nevertheless conclusions in those areas are implied.

(4) It is possible that the Select Committee may uncover new material bearing on assassinations as it proceeds into other areas of investigation leading to the further possibility that its findings might have to be altered in the final report.

In view of the foregoing, I believe the reader of the interim report might want to ask himself these questions:

Does it serve any national interest?

Does it enhance the legislative process?

Does it raise more questions than it answers?

I, for one, oppose the interim assassination report because I feel the Committee should have all the evidence at hand before publishing a report. Problems raised by the conduct of covert operations have an important bearing on the work of the Select Committee. Important also are the lines of authority established by various administrations. However, the Committee has received scant information on covert operations and command and control as of this writing.