sent inconveniences. These, in their turn, will make us seek for reparation with a similar ardour. Doubtless this is the fate that will attend the deliberations of the Congress. We sigh after repose; in the system we have pursued, we imagine we have obtained it; but soon we shall feel that there are inconveniences; and then our regrets will arise accompanied by all the sentiments which our precarious situation will produce.

This is the idea of M. de Pradt, and this he endeavours to deduce by analysing the errors which the Congress have committed. Unfortunately they are many. With the exception of the union of Belgium with Holland, and Sweden with Norway, which our author considers, as it is in itself, a most prudent and desirable measure, the allied sovereigns at Vienna, seem to have forgotten the real interest of Europe, and the very object of their meeting. But as most of these errors arise from the same origin we must be satisfied with laying before our readers the reflexions which he makes.

"The acquisition that Russia has made in Poland has deranged every thing. It has rendered every wise combination impracticable. It has added to the views of aggrandisement that Austria may have formed. In fact, what in the Congress could have been opposed to Russia, after she had been permitted to make such rapid strides, and to menace the whole body of Europe? Therefore, Austria found herself at liberty to take possession of the major part of Italy: another great departure from the system that has for its object the safety of Europe. But Prussia could not remain a passive spectator of all these acquisitions; and, as not to increase in proportion to our neighbours, is in fact to decrease, it was necessary that she should, on her side, obtain compensation, and the means of an equilibrium. Hence, every where have we beheld the parties seeking for indemnities.

"By the increase of the territory of Russia in Poland, Prussia wholly lost the great proportion of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which had belonged to her.

By this arrangement she found herself exposed to the first attack of Russia: therefore she directed her attention towards Saxony. In this arrangement she beheld two circumstances. "First, An indemnity.

"Second, A means of resistance to Russia by the principles of adhesions that its occupation would give to the different parts of her monarchy.

"Whatever may be the amount of the personal interests contained in this system, it was not less European than Prussian. It corrected two great errors in the geographical situation of Prussia -the division of her states by the interposition of Saxony, and lier extension of dominion towards the Meuse. The latter is an arrangement that has been allowed contrary to all established principles, whether for Prussia France, the Low Countries, or Germany.

That

That which is inconvenient to the whole world can be good for

no one

"That Prussia should be re-established in the whole of her possessions in Germany and Poland, and Cleves, except at a very remote period, the natural key of Holland. This even was conformable to the principle of the Congress; that then if Prussia should have wished to make an attempt on her neighbours, they had put her in mind of the laws of good neighbourhood, all the world would have applauded the act; but, that she should remain despoiled of all her former benefit, and prevented deriving any new one, whilst her powerful neighbours and antient rivals gratified themselves with every object pointed out by their conveniences :was it, in good truth, to be supposed?

"In leaving Saxony in a state of division substituted for that of total destitution, with which it at first was menaced, the Congress did at one and the same time too much and too little, as we shall soon have occasion to demonstrate. In the despoiling of Saxony, it established the monument of a contradiction of that principle of legitimacy, which they had laboured to establish. Sovereigns should not be despoiled of their territories from mere motives of convenience; they could not be judged, as has been said with much reason, and with many marks of approbation, by the plenipotentiaries of France. But, is it not to despoil to take the half? Does not the violation of principle, which protects property, commence with the thus taken half? But is it not to be condemned, without being judged, to lose the half of one's property?

"This very principle has been equally violated with regard to the republic of Genoa. This country, with the difference in its situation from that of Venice, consisted merely in the fact, that it had made no part of an anterior treaty. It passed directly from its original state of independence, into that of a French province. It might, therefore, return into its ancient condition, without injuring any particular pre-existing interest: on the contrary, it might have been made the means of producing satisfaction. Instead of this, it has been given to the King of Sardinia, who has lost nothing; and who with this country is not rendered stronger; for it is not Genoa, small or great, that makes Sardinia a power, nor a defence for Italy." P.79,

It is, indeed, a melancholy fact, that by allowing Russia to cross the Vistula, and touch on Silesia and Moravia, the Congress has permitted the Czar to take the place of Napoleon. Until now, oppression came from the west; and for the future, it will proceed from the east. Let us consult the map.

Russia borders on East Prussia; and crosses all the line of the kingdom of Prussia. Koenisburg is more in Russia than in Prussia. By crossing the Vistula she has established herself in the very centre of Europe. She also touches on the frontiers of Austria, She possesses fifty millions of men bent by the discipline

8

discipline of the north to the obedience of the east. She has formed establishments of every nature, and in them as well as in her arsenals the chains of Europe are preparing. The creation of arts and commerce at Odessa, ought to inspire us with more fear than her armies in Germany. Never was there a prospect more threatening for Europe. It was for this reason that Napoleon had formed the plan of pushing Russia back into Asia. M. de Pradt, in approving the plan, condemns the means which Napoleon employed. He asserts that the aggrandising and strengthening of Prussia ought to have been employed as a barrier against Russia, and the means of expelling her from Europe. But whatever may be said of the means employed by Napoleon, it is unquestionable that his plan ought to have been, adopted by the Congress. But unfortunately Prussia, to secure Saxony, has paid no attention to the interests of Europe, nor to the real interests of its own monarchs. Toleave a shadow of liberty to Prussia and Europe, it was indispensable that Russia should not have crossed the Vistula. Here were her limits. Here Europe commenced. But as it is, the war of the independence of Europe against the despotism of Napoleon has terminated by its submission to Russia.

M. de Pradt considers this amazing aggrandisement of Russia as the effect of the friendship and gratitude of Prussia; he is. too able a man to be deceived by the holy alliance, or by the assumed magnanimity of Alexander; and yet, though he regrets that their connection has not taken a different direction, he is very tender on account of Prussia, more so than we should have expected.

For this reason, according to our author, France has increased the danger of Europe, in pleading for Saxony on the ground of right and legitimacy. In so doing, the French ministers had not so much at heart the preservation of that kingdom, as to prevent the aggrandisement of Prussia. They well knew that Prussia, already a neighbour to France, must, in a very short time,' become its enemy, even without any other reason than that of its being a neighbour. They thought it therefore highly prudent. to prevent Saxony from falling under the dominion of Prussia, in order to weaken the power of so dangerous a neighbour. But the doctrine of legitimacy and right which had engrossed the attention of the Congress during four months, was not in favour of Europe, but in favour of France. Hence the French ministers. did not make any thing like that resistance to the union of Austria and Italy, which they had made to that of Saxony and Prussia. Yet the misfortunes of Italy were much greater, and more affecting. But France having a wish to make use of Austria'

against

against Prussia on account of Saxony, was obliged to yield he opinion on the score of Italy.

"This system appeared alike contrary to the interests of France, of Saxony, and of Europe.

"First; To France it occasioned the loss of the most necessary of her allies, and indeed it changed her into an enemy. It brought near to her a power that ought ever to have been kept at a distance. It has embittered the minds of the Prussians, whose animosity, so active and fatal to France, has proceeded, in a great measure, from their resentment on the score of an opposition that frustrated the object of their most ardent desires. If France remained silent on the invasion of Italy by Austria, why did she make such a noise on that of Saxony, of importance to the liberties of Europe, while that of Italy cut it up by the roots?

"Second: The preservation of Saxony in its integrity being demonstrably impossible, but little service could be rendered to her by attaching so much importance to a question, the most fortunate result to which could not preserve her from being torn in pieces. Saxony should either have remained undivided under its own king, or that of Prussia. In fact, why was Saxony divided into two parts? Whom can the half of Saxony, by the side of Prussia, of Austria, and of Russia, serve or assist? In its state of consolidation it would have been lost amidst these three colossal powers. What situation will it occupy in its actual condition? Was it not a fine present to make to the King of Saxony, that of his dominions thus parcelled? Was it very consolatory to his subjects that some Saxons should remain to Saxony and its king, while they had to behold their separation from their fellow-citizens, and the division of their country? Was not the King of Saxony a very happy prince in the midst of the shreds of his states, and the wrecks of a family, in which he could only calculate on hearing sighs, and witnessing a flow of tears? Was royalty well defended, most honoured, by being left on the half of a throne? Let us be candid. It is not the title that makes the king, but the power. We can never conceive how they can reconcile the respect due to royalty, with the trifling consideration assigned to it in some countries. The throne should be raised so as to be seen from afar, and afford an imposing spectacle; in all countries it comes within the definition given of it by Napoleon: "Four bits of wood and a velvet carpet."

Third; The opposition made by France to the designs of Prussia in favour of Saxony; which, taking from the latter the means of defence against Russia, has deprived Europe of its principal defensive point. It has now become the great interest of Europe. The colossal power of Russia has changed all its relations: a circumstance of which we must never lose sight.

"From all this, what has resulted? That Prussia has been rendered hostile to France; that she is weakened in the principal part of her defensive system against Russia; and that Saxony has been

rendered

rendered useless either to its own sovereign, who no longer possesses power; or to Prussia, who can reckon, for no great length of time, on the good will of the Saxons. The Congress has taken too good care to catechise them on the subject of the union with Saxony, in order that the Saxons may, in a few years, become good Prussians, Of the probability of this alteration in character and feeling, we may judge by the circumstances that happened at Liege." P. 95.

We have entered into some details concerning this division of Saxony, to justify our ministers from the attacks which the Opposition made at that time. Perhaps the time will come when they themselves may wish that they had been silent. For if any attack on the proceedings of Congress had been necessary, they ought rather to have been so directed as to have prevented Russia from passing the Vistula, Austria from invading Italy, and Prussia from remaining unfortified. These and others ought to have been the objects of British policy.

Indeed, this appears to have been a general error with all the powers attending the Congress. For the sake of extending their own possessions, they have, in great measure, forgotten the real interests of Europe, the real safeguard of their own dominions. In considering the power of Russia, we may again ask how Austria could consent to Russia passing the Vistula? For, in crossing it, she touches on Moravia; that is to say, approaches the very gates of Vienna. Instead of raising her voice, as she did, against the incorporation of Saxony, Austria ought to have employed all the strength of her representations, all her opposition, all her means of alliance, to prevent an encroachment so near and so alarming. But Austria wanted Italy, and the other powers would never have consented to the sacrifice of the Italians, unless she herself had consented to give up to them some other objects of their ambition. If it is not possible, exclaims M. de Pradt, if it is not possible to deny that our interest is excited by the circumstance of a people being deprived of their sovereign and sovereignty, to whom is it more due than to the Italians? Ever since the beginning of the French Revolution they have been fighting most desperately. One campaign has often decided the fate of Prussia, Austria, and even of Russia, at Austerlitz, at Jena, at Tilsit, but seven long years were hardly sufficient to bend the Italians to the French yoke. Things however are now changed. The feelings of independence have made so rapid a progress in this country, that, in course of time, a general reunion of Italy must result from the restraint to which she has been compelled to submit. The time may come when the Italians may adopt a system that the whole of Europe will applaud, Such a system might Buonaparte have effected, but

he