ries of wind, issuing in all directions from the vallies, that they cannot proceed without standing off to a considerable distance, in order to get the trade wind. But, even then, they find it extremely difficult to work into the road; because the wind to leeward of the island seldom blows for five minutes together in the same direction. In addition to those difficulties, an enemy's fleet would have to work in, in the face of a great number of guns; which would not fail to rake them; and after coming on the bank, perhaps within less than a mile of the shore, they might attempt to warp in, which would be wholly impracticable, on account of the constant and excessive fire from the batteries on shore. The nearer the ships approached, the greater would be the risk; particularly from the fire of the elevated batteries, which would penetrate the upper decks, and pass through the hull under water, and even into their magazines; so that there would be imminent danger of losing the ships, both by sinking and blowing up. "It must nevertheless be observed, that although such a wind as would enable vessels to come into the road by South-west Point, be very rare in this latitude, yet westerly winds have been known to prevail for a week together. These, however, seldom occur oftener than once in five or six months, and as their duration is often momentary and always precarious, it would be too great an uncertainty for an enemy, after a long voyage, to wait here in the expectation of so very precarious an event. "From those observations it will appear that there is no certainty of arriving at James's Town without coming round the northeast end of the island. And even then, if ships, after doubling Sugar-Loaf Point, where the trade wind generally leaves them, and the eddies commence, do not keep close under the shore all the way between that and the road, they run great risk of being blown entirely off the bank; or of being compelled to come to an anchor at po great distance from the batteries. "Ships thus obliged to hug the shore between Sugar-loaf Point and the road, gives the island a prodigious advantage over an enemy who might attempt this route; because he would be exposed to such a continued and multiplied fire from the batteries between Butter-milk Point, and James's Town, as scarcely any number of ships would be able to overcome. "Rupert's Bay, James's Town, and Lemon Valley, are the principal landing places on the leeward coast. All these are well fortified by fleur d'eau batteries, provided with furnaces for heating shot, and flanked by cannon placed upon the cliffs far above the reach of ships' guns. Mortars and howitzers for showering grape upon ships' decks, or upon boats attempting to land, are also provided. In short, it seems wholly impossible to force a descent at any of those points. Even admitting that the enemy's troops got on shore, and succeeded in carrying the fleur d'eau batteries, they would then be exposed to inevitable destruction, from the tremendpus fire from the heights, and, above all, from the immense quanti ties of grape (or even stones) that might be thrown (with very small: charges of powder) from howitzers and carronades of large calibre placed upon the heights, against which it would be wholly impossi ble to find shelter. "Besides the principal landing places above mentioned, there are several ravines, or vallies, interspersed throughout the coast, where an enemy might undoubtedly land, if he were not opposed: but, most of these are also protected by batteries; or are so easily defended by rolling stones from the heights, that no body of troops attempting to gain the interior by these ravines could have the smallest chance of success." P. lxxx. The General proceeds to state his plan of defence, which appears simple in the extreme, and therefore most effective. Muchalso of the security of the island is to the telegraphs, which are so well disposed, as to place its whole circle under the immediate. surveillance of the governor. The Tracts will be found peculiarly interesting to those who have a turn for agriculturists, and are desirous of tracing its progress even in the most desolate and distant climes. Gen. Beatson has written largely, but luminously, upon this important point, and his observations cannot fail to produce the most beneficial effect on the island itself. To these succeed a most interesting account of the cele-' brated mutiny in December, 1811, when Gen. Beatson had. the command. Though the detail is drawn up with great modesty, his conduct appears to have been highly meritorious; to his firmness indeed, and discretion, the safety of the island must be attributed. From this narrative we shall make the following extract. "About one in the morning of the 24th, as no firing had been heard in the direction of Long Wood, I began to entertain apprehensions for the safety of the Lieutenant-Governor; and about the same time two lights and a number of men were discerned, moving slowly along the side of a hill, two miles east from Plantation-house; which were supposed to be the mutineers advancing with cannon. Major Doveton, commandant of the volunteers, immediately dispatched two active men of his corps to gain intelligence. Messrs. John Bagley and Kennedy were selected for that purpose; but very soon after, a black messenger brought intelligence, that Colonel Broughton and his party were taken prisoners. "This information gave me at first some uneasiness, on account of the danger to which my friend and colleague would be exposed in the intended attack upon the mutinous troops: but there was no alternative; for however much I value the life of Colonel Broughton, I could not permit considerations of a private nature to interfere with my public duties; nor to deter me from carrying into execution the plans I had formed, which were imperiously necessary for restoring military subordination, and the peace and order of this settlement. "At the same time I considered it proper to make an attempt to rescue his person from the impending danger. I therefore wrote a pencil note to Captain Sampson, directing him to advance with 30 chosen men to form an ambuscade on the left flank of the mutinous column, and to commence the attack, by giving one fire in such a manner as to avoid Colonel Broughton, (who might b distinctly seen by the lights the mutineers had imprudently with them,) and immediately after to rush upon them with the bayonet Major Kinnaird was to support this attack. "I had just given these orders when Major Wright arrived, and informed me the mutineers had halted within 50 or 60 yards of Major Kinnaird's post; and had sent forward to offer the conditions on which they would surrender. The negociations were intentionally protracted until day-light on the 24th; which having terminated in the unconditional surrender of the whole party, the attempt to rescue Colonel Broughton became unnecessary. “The first proposal sent by the mutineers, were, that griev ances must be redressed, and a promise given, that the soldiers should have regular issues of spirits from the stores;' to which I sent word by Major Wright, that I would grant no terms; I could not treat with rebels; and if they did not instantly surrender, I would put every man to the sword.' "Major Wright soon after returned, and told me the mutineers hoped I would grant terms; and it was observed by some persons around me, that the life of Colonel Broughton would be in great danger if the attack were made. To this observation I replied that the mutineers having possession of the LieutenantGovernor would be no security to themselves; and a second message was returned, apprising them of this resolution; and that I would instantly order them to be fired upon, and the whole destroyed if they did not submit. Upon receiving this reply, they began to waver; and finally they proposed to Majors Wright and Hodson, that all they would now ask, was my promise of pardon; but this I positively refused; and, at the same time, informed them, if they did not yield unconditionally, that Major Kinnaird had received orders to put the whole of them to death. It was now day-light, and seeing a superior force opposed to them, they at length surrendered, saying they would trust to my mercy. "Of above two hundred men that sallied from James's Town, upon this mad and desperate enterprise, only 75 remained together in the morning; all the rest seem to have repented, and returned to their barracks. "The prisoners were put in close confinement at High Knoll, and the following General Orders were issued. * Head 7 "Head-Quarters, St. Helena, 24th Dececember, 1811. "GENERAL ORDERS. "The Governor had hoped that the communication of his sentiments in the orders of yesterday, would have had the effect of convincing the soldiers in garrison of his dispositions to render them the strictest justice on every occasion; and of his readiness to afford redress for any real grievances they may sustain. He could hardly have supposed that so numerous a body of the corps of infantry, exceeding 200 men, could have been so misled by a few discontented and factious persons, as to commit acts of mutiny and rebellion in the manner they have done, by the seizure of the Lieutenant-Governor, and by avowing an intention also of seizing the person of the Governor himself. From the conversations Lieute nant-Colonel Broughton had with these deluded men, it evidently appears there has been too much pains taken, by some villains in this island, to misrepresent, or to construe, every act of the Governor, as tyrannical and oppressive. On the contrary, he will venture to say, that no former Governor had ever been so attentive to the comforts, as well as to the improvement, of the moral character of the garrison. He has never ceased to do his utmost to augment the produce of the lands, by which alone can the necessaries of life be reduced in price, and thereby come within the reach of a soldier's pay. It is true, the issues of spirits have been discontinued; and this is by order of the Court of Directors. It is his duty to obey; and what the soldiers did demand, it is impossible to give. The garrison may recollect the shameful excesses that were committed lately, after the arrival of 12 casks of rum from the Cape, and the great increase of patients in the hospital, which immediately followed; notwithstanding the soldiers were limited to half-daily rations of spirits. It was for these reasons that the Governor did recommend to Mr. Pringle, at the Cape, not to send the remaining casks; but, at the same time, he requested him to send Cape wine, which is hourly expected; in order to give a trial and to ascertain if this substitute for spirits would be acceptable; if so, it would be provided in sufficient quantity to afford regular issues, at the rate of one pint per day to each man. It is also well known, when any soldier's term of service is expired, that the Governor has never, in any instance, refused his discharge. Wherefore, if any are dissatisfied with the changes that have taken place on this establishment, they have it always in their power to quit it, when their term of service shall have been expired. Nay, the Governor will even go further; for if there be any effective men here, who dislike their situations because they have not an opportunity of committing excessive intemperance, he will readily accommodate them, by entertaining them and making up the term of five years, for any of the India establishments, where they will have opportunities of satisfying their propensities. "It came to the knowledge of the Governor last night, that the infantry complain of some hardships in the nature and amount of stoppages. The circumstances that have been represented to the Lieutenant Governor, as well as some particulars in a written statement in his possession, are matters that will be immediately attended to. In short every soldier may rest assured, that if real grievances are properly represented, there never shall be cause to complain of want of redress-but at the same time the Governor must apprize the soldiers, that no menaces, no intimidating anonymous papers, like those that have been recently handed about, can ever produce a change in his conduct. He will do his duty; but he will never permit a stain on his reputation and character, by yielding to mutinous clamour and unreasonable demands.' ' P. 220. The danger was not yet past, nor the mutinous spirit repressed. Happily, however, by the firmness and resolution of the Governor, and by the cordial co-operation of the officers under his command, peace and order were at length restored. Gen. Beatson considers our European notions of the quantity of rats to be found at St. Helena, as perfectly erroneous. In his opinion, they are neither more numerous nor destructive than in the farms of England. It certainly appears, that the agriculture of the island is capable of a very high degree of improvement, and we trust, that under the circumstances in which it is at present placed, that the excellent observations of our author will not be neglected. They are the result of much thought and experience, and, if put into practice, will impart a comfort and an advantage to the inhabitants of St. Helena, with which they have never yet been acquainted. The population of the island is clearly in an increasing state; in 1769, there were 334 whites, and 721 blacks. In 1799, there were 388 whites, and 1957 blacks; and in 1812, there were 382 whites, and 1150 blacks. The importation of slaves having been interdicted in 1792, the decrease of the black population may easily be accounted for. Of fish, there are found seventy-six different sorts. Whales in great abundance appear in August, and remain there about three months. We are sorry that our limits will not permit us to make any further extracts from this excellent work. We trust, however, that it will be generally read, not as an idle and a superficial account, but as a thoughtful, clear, and judicious production of one who has expended much time and attention upon the state of that island, of which he was once the respected and successful governor. ART. |