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Webster's Dictionary. It is more fitting to be grateful than to be critical. Our opinion is, that his definitions have been frequently undervalued, and the objections against the encyclopaediac form of his work have been overstated. It is often, indeed, quite difficult to say how far a lexicographer should proceed in explaining terms, and where he should draw the line between a dictionary and an encyclopaedia. He may aim at precision, and fail in the requisite fulness, or he may aim at fulness and fail in the requisite precision. Webster's definitions, when not full, are unusually accurate, and when not precise, are unusually plain. Often, if he had been more exhaustive than he is, he would have merged his lexicon into an encyclopaedia, and if he had been less exact than he is, he would have become obscure and enigmatical. We had intended to notice at length some of his definitions illustrating this rather remarkable fact. We will content ourselves with a single illustration — that taken from the words Discover, Invent, Contrive. Webster's third definition of Discover, is: "To obtain, for the first time, sight or knowledge of; as of a thing existing already, but not perceived or known." Now, first, a man may be said to discover what he himself had not previously seen during a certain period, although it had often been seen by him before that period, as the voyager discovers the island which is his home, but from which he has been absent for weeks or months or years. Secondly, a man may be said to discover what he himself had never seen before, although it had often been seen by others; as an immigrant to America is the first on board the ship to discover the Western Continent. Thirdly, a man may be said to discover what no one of his class or nation had previously seen, although it had been seen by men of other classes or nations; as Columbus was the first Spaniard who discovered America, and the Northmen were the first Europeans who discovered it, but America had been seen and known by men of other tribes. Fourthly, a man may be said to discover what had never been seen or known before by any of his race. In one sense a planet is discovered by two or three astronomers, each of whom supposes that it was never previously seen; but when it is ascertained that one of these astronomers detected the planet a week, or a day, or an hour before it was detected by the other claimants, he is said to have discovered it; he gains the honor of being the discoverer. Still Webster's general definition remains good; to discover is "to obtain for the first time sight or knowledge, as of a thing existing already, but not perceived or known.”
He says further: "We invent by forming combinations which are either entirely new, or which attain their end by means unknown before." Now we do not hesitate to say that a man invents a machine, when he discover without the help of others, such a mode of combining means for an end as was entirely new to him, although the same kind of machine had been known and used by other men before he was born. Nothing is more VOL. XXII. No. 85.
common at the Patent Office, than to reject a real invention because the same invention had been patented many years before. A true inventor may hasten to have his invention recognized, lest other true inventors anticipate him. From the fact that means in their separate state have certain capabilities, a man, without any suggestion from others, infers the mode of attaining an end by certain combinations of these means: this man invents the method, although he may afterwards ascertain that the method was not entirely, and not at all, new to other men. Discover is the general term: Invent is one specific term, and denotes the discovery of a mode of attaining an end by certain combinations of means. Contrive is another specific term, and denotes the discovery of certain combinations of means for attaining an end. Contrive differs from Invent, as the former has prominent reference to the combinations, the latter to the mode of making the combinations; Contrive and Invent are distinguished from Discover, as the two former refer only to a change, something to be done, but the latter refers also to that which remains after the discovery just as it was before. Thus Herschel discovered a planet which continued just as it was; Galileo invented the telescope, which was something made by new combinations of means; Gauss contrived the means of communicating intelligence by the electric fluid. Still Webster's general definition of Invent remains good: "We invent by certain combinations of means, which are either entirely new [to the inventor or to the race], or which attain their end by means unknown before [by the inventor or by the race]."
We do not intend to assert, that the above-named definitions of Webster are as good as they might be, or that all his definitions are correct. Perfection cannot be expected in any work, least of all, perhaps, in an English dictionary. For example, we often speak of God as self-suficient; and we mean that he is not dependent for any excellence, or for any part of his bliss, on any other being or on any other thing. But Webster gives nothing more than the following definition to this adjective, which is so frequently used to express an attribute of God: "Having full confidence in one's own strength, or abilities, or endowments; hence, haughty, overbearing." And although theologians have long spoken of the self-sufficiency of God, yet we find in Webster only the following definition of the noun self-sufficiency: "An overweening opinion of one's own strength or worth; excessive confidence in our own competence or sufficiency." Dr. Ridgely say's (Vol. I. p. 127): “ As his [God's] self-sufficiency is that whereby he has enough in himself to denominate him completely blessed, as a God of infinite perfection; so his all-suficiency is that whereby he is able to communicate as much blessedness to his creatures as he is pleased to make them capable of receiving." This distinction is so well recognized, and has been so long current, that it certainly should be noticed in an English lexicon.
While we pay our debt of admiring gratitude to the Editor of this volume, and to his learned coadjutors, we must also express our thankful appreciation of the service which the Publishers of the volume have rendered our country. They have withheld no expense and no toil from the vigorous prosecution of this noble work, and we trust that their enterprise will be rewarded in some fair proportion to its merits. No English scholar can dispense with this work.
ANALOGY CONSIDERED AS A GUIDE TO TRUTH.'
The object of this full volume of 626 pages is to show that the principle of analogy may be applied more widely than is usually done both as a ground of belief and a help to faith in the evidences and doctrines of natural and revealed religion. It is written in a modest and excellent spirit, and includes a wide field of inquiry.
Archbishop King, and after him Dr. Copleston and Archbishop Whately, define analogy as a resemblance of relations or ratios,' so that there may be an analogy between things that have no direct resemblance at all. Between the seed and the plant, the egg and the bird, there is a resemblance of relations,' although no external likeness. "A sweet taste gratifies the palate," says Dr. Whately, "so does a sweet sound gratify the car, and hence the same word 'sweet' is applied to both, though no flavor can resemble a sound in itself." This limitation Dr. Buchanan thinks is too narrow. While it is true to a certain extent, it omits the use which we make of analogy in connection with concrete objects and substantive realities. It is liable also, he thinks, to the objection that it is founded on a comparatively small part of human knowledge, viz. the sciences of number and quantity. Without attempting a logical definition, the author of this volume seems to apply the term to all cases where a resemblance exists.
After showing how analogy differs from metaphor, the author proceeds to indicate its ground in nature and man, its influence on thought and language, its uses for illustration, for classification and arrangement, for suggestion and discovery, and for argument and proof, and then endeavors to point out the limits and peculiar claim of this mode of reasoning.
Part II of the volume is taken up with an exhibition of the sources of Analogy in Matters of Faith. The subjects here discussed are Analogy in respect to the Laws and Conditions of Thought; in respect to the Manifestation of Truth; in respect to the Extent and Limits of Knowledge; in respect to Thought and Language; in respect to Evidences between the volumes of Nature and Revelation; between the Interpretation of Nature and Scripture; between Human and Divine Testimony; between Secular
1 Analogy considered as a Guide to Truth, and applied as an Aid to Faith. By James Buchanan, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Systematic Theology, New College, Edinburgh.
and Religious Education; between a little Child and a Christian Disciple; between Natural and Revealed Laws; between Human and Divine Relations; between Scripture and Experience; between the Constituent Truths of Revelation; between Type and Antitype; and between the Old and New Testaments. The bare mention of these various topics shows something of the extent and order of the discussion.
The III and concluding part of the volume is devoted to Analogy applied to modern Religious Questions. These are: the Natural Proofs of Theism; the Point of view of Deism; the Claims of Rationalism; Spirituralism in Religion; Religious Liberalism; Belief in Mysteries; the Relation between Reason and Faith; the Question of Authority in Religion; the Rival Rules of Faith; the Correction of Socinian Errors.
We have thus particularly enumerated the contents of the book, in order that its scope and purpose may be understood. It is written with sufficient learning, with a high Christian purpose, and abounds in good thoughts. It is not remarkable for scientific precision and accuracy, nor is it one of those fresh and original productions whose vital force insures their permanency. Nevertheless, it will do good service in the cause of religion and learning.
THE SHEMITIC AND THE INDO-GERMANIC RACES IN THEIR RELATION TO RELIGION AND SCIENCE.1
This volume affords a good illustration of the intellectual activity which prevails in the German universities. Professor Hupfeld assigns the following among other reasons for the superior intellectual life of these institutions: First, each university is governed in the main by its professors. They form a close corporation, fill their own vacancies, and thus decide the character of the university. It is true that the government of the state has a veto upon the action of the Academical Senate, but the nominations of the professors are generally sanctioned by government, and the universities cannot easily be made the tame servitors of the civil power. In a good degree they have maintained an independence of the state in their scientific teachings. The professors have, of course, a personal interest in the appointment of such teachers as shall honor the university and make it attractive to students from foreign lands. Instances of favoritism and nepotism in the selection of teachers are comparatively rare. Secondly, the professors appoint to the chairs of instruction such men as have accomplished something in the literary or scientific world. In France a professor must be examined before he is allowed to enter the Board of Instruction;
1 Semiten und Indogermanen in ihrer Beziehung zu Religion und Wissenschaft. Eine Apologie des Christenthums vom Standpuncte der Völker psychologie. Von Rudolf Friedrich Grau, Lic. Theol., Repetent und Privat docent der Theologie zu Marburg. 8vo. pp. 244. Stuttgart: Verlag von S. G. Liesching 1864.
but in Germany he must publish a book, or otherwise give evidence of his power to originate as well as receive ideas. Thus the promising scholars who aspire to connect themselves with the Board of Instruction in a university are stimulated to intellectual effort. A large part of German books are written by young men who are candidates for office in a university. Thirdly, the professors receive a limited salary from the government, but also receive fees from their pupils, and are thus incited by their pecuniary, as well as other interests to make their lectures valuable as well as attractive. Fourthly, before a man is elected to a professorship he is employed as a private teacher or repetent in the university, and in this office he receives no salary from the government, but depends for his support entirely on the fees of his hearers. Here is a new stimulus to activity. As attendance upon the lectures in the university is optional, a private teacher or repetent may attract a larger number of auditors than are attracted by a regular professor. The professor is thus constantly spurred on to exertion, by the fear that the lectures of the young candidate will supersede his own. In this manner is he delivered from the temptations to indolence. He has the conviction that unless he remain wakeful and keep himself abreast of his age, his lecture-room will be empty, and his former hearers will be found sitting at the feet of the youthful repetent. The repetent is not entitled to vote in the senate of the professors, but in the lecture-room he may have as much authority and power as his character will give him, and may here surpass the most venerable of the professors.
This rivalry between the young and the old instructors, affecting as it does their pecuniary condition as well as their literary fame, gives an animation to the German universitylife, which is unknown in this country. Often the rivals are bosom friends, and scorn to perform any act which is not honorable and kindly. Often, of course, it is not so. The youthful teachers are tempted to originate new theories, and to attract attention by a dazzling literature, rather than by real wisdom. Still there is activity, even where sound judgment is sacrificed to a parade of learning. The evils are incident to a system which keeps up a vigilant spirit among the professors.
Fifthly, if the repetents prove themselves to be well qualified for the work of teaching, they are nominated by the professorial senate, first, to the office of Professor Extraordinarius, and if they are successful in this office, they are nominated to the station of Professor Ordinarius, each successive post bringing an increased emolument. The Rectorship of the university is still another prize held out before the Professor Ordinarius, whose entire life, indeed, is filled with incentives to fresh activity.
The author of the volume before us is one of those young men, who, within a few years, have entered on their career of authorship. Although he still remains a repetent at Marburg, he enjoys a high promise of distinction in this or some other university. The present volume will open