than the Catholics do. He ascribes it wholly to man; rejecting decidedly the doctrine that sin is to be ascribed to God as its author in any other sense than that he permits it. To guard more surely against this doctrine, Calixtus holds further the view that sin is of a privative nature, he being unable to see how anything which has a positive existence can be ascribed to any other creator than God. The third section treats of the work of redemption. The chief points are: Salvation is wholly an act of God's mercy. The infinite justice of God demanded an infinite merit in the sacrifice. Christ's merit was both active and passive. In him the Son of God assumed a human nature; of either nature of the God-man may be predicated, but only to a certain extent, attributes of both natures. Justification is conditioned on faith, and consists in the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of Christ's merit. Predestination to salvation is conditioned on foreknowledge of the faith of the elect. As, however, faith is itself an act transcending the natural powers of man and comes through the word of God, it is to be assumed that the Spirit conditions his working of the faith on the attentive heed given to the word. Baptism should, in the case of adults, be preceded by instruction, in order that their faith may flow from the hearing of the word; but children should be baptized early, in order that they may receive forgiveness and regeneration. At the Lord's supper faith is strengthened by partaking of the true body of Christ. But against the Catholics it is argued that the bread and wine are also really present, and that there is no real sacrifice in the case, since the notion of a sacrifice involves that of the slaying of a living being. He rejects the doctrine of the power of the clergy to bind and to loose, also the Catholic doctrine of the uncertainty of the state of grace, as well as the Calvinistic doctrine of perseverance. The church is, even as a visible church, one, holy, catholic, and apostolic; its constitution is monarchical, Christ being King; its members are divided into teachers and learners; the apostles have no successors; all bishops

are equal; laymen are to support the church according to their means, especially should Christian magistrates exercise a guardianship over its outward concerns; synods are the best guardians of purity of doctrine; factious heretics may be punished, but should not be put to death.

In 1628 appeared Calixtus's Apparatus Theologicus, a work designed as an introduction to theological studies. It consists of three parts: first, an encyclopedia, which lays down the position which theology occupies as a science, in which Calixtus insists on the importance of philology and philosophy, as the two wings without whose aid no great height in theological science can be attained; second, a history of the science, in which is given a summary of the theology of all the different denominations and periods of Christianity; third, methodology, directing how to study each dogma. This work, though incomplete and lacking in symmetry, is a monument of Calixtus's vast learning and rare power of analysis.

A year later he published an edition of Augustine de Doctrina Christiana, and of the Commonitorium of Vincent of of Lerinum, prefixing a long introduction in which he sets forth his views respecting the weight to be attached to the opinions of the church Fathers in the establishment of creeds. This was the occasion of much opposition and misrepresentation. For he here sets himself against the tendency of the Lutherans of his time to consider the symbols, not as being designed to select from the many doctrines found in the Bible the few which are most fundamental, but to consider rather all doctrines as alike essential, and the symbols as superadded to the Bible, and equally binding. The testimony of the patristic theologians he regards not as strictly authoritative, but as having a peculiar weight. By the stress which he laid on this point, he exposed himself to the charge of depreciating the importance of the Reformation, and so of favoring Catholicism; whereas in so far as he differed from his fellow Protestants he was rather hyper-protestant than otherwise, since he wished to dimin

ish the number of dogmas and rites that should be held to be absolutely indispensable to Christianity, condemning the virtually papal tendency of the Protestants of his time to make their creeds as binding on their churches as the pope's decrees on the Roman Catholics.

Perhaps Calixtus's most important work is the Theologia Moralis, issued in 1634. This was, indeed, not the first treatise on this subject produced by a Lutheran; yet after Melanchthon, and his immediate pupils Chyträus, Hemming, and Von Eitzen, it had been so thoroughly neglected that many of Calixtus's contemporaries, narrowly confining themselves to purely dogmatic theology, regarded his work as a dangerous innovation. Calixtus does not carry out the distinction, begun by some of his predecessors, between dogmatics and ethics in general, but rather brings the two nearer together by making a sharp distinction between philosophical and theological ethics, the former being held as indeed separate not only from dogmatics, but from theology in general; the latter, however, which his work alone. handles, being closely connected with the system of Christian doctrine. He treats it as a science concerned with the progress of sanctification in the believer. The work is divided into two parts; one treating of the regenerate man, the other, of the laws to which he is subject. The Christian, again, is considered both according to his internal and his external condition. As to the former (the one principally treated), there is recognized as characterizing every converted man a constant strife between the flesh and the spirit, only, as not in the unregenerate state, no sin can be committed with relish and approbation. The work of sanctification, carried on by the Spirit of God, must be considered in relation to the three faculties of the soul, the intellect, the will, and the desires. To the first belongs the conscience. That the conscience errs, is therefore to be attributed to the fact that the intellect is itself darkened by the fall; but no man errs in such a way as not to admit that the good ought to be done and the bad to be avoided. On the will Calixtus says little; on the desires, almost nothing.

In treating of the moral law, he oversteps the limits set to his task, and enters the field of general ethics. The law, as the specially revealed will of God, is essentially the same as that given in the hearts of men, but is superadded to the latter by an act of grace, and serves to correct the errors into which men fall in deducing inferences from their immediate cognitions. The moral law, contained in the decalogue, is one from which God himself cannot absolve us. When we are unable to deduce the necessity of certain commands from first principles, these commands are called positive laws, of which, though man does not know the ground, yet God does. The question, what the highest moral principle is, Calixtus does not distinctly answer; he seems to treat as such simply the divine will. After discussing the positive commands of God, he considers human laws, insisting that their fitness to promote the general good should always be clear. Ecclesiastical and civil laws are then distinguished; the former are praised for their simplicity; in treating of the latter, the author loses himsef in a consideration of the history of Roman law, occupying with this theme a fourth part of the whole work, if we consider as not exactly belonging to it the already mentioned digression directed against Neuhaus. It is easy to see that this work is too devoid of symmetry, and that the plan of it is itself too imperfectly carried out, to allow it to rank as a standard work. But it is exceedingly valuable, as containing the germ of much that has since been produced in the same department.

Calixtus wrote several treatises on eschatology. In one, de Supremo Judicis, published in 1635, he discusses at length the signs of Christ's second advent, the resurrection, the judgment, the new heaven and new earth, etc.; he holds in general to a strict interpretation of prophecy, yet is freer than most of his contemporaries. He rejects all chiliastic theories, though admitting some to be not heretical. Kindred to this work is that de Bono Perfecte Summo, published in 1643, in which the highest good is, with Aristotle, found in the Dewpia; the more perfect the object of knowledge, the higher is the knowledge; to see God is the summit of

blessedness. The damned will know God only as an avenger, having no love for him; the risen bodies of the saved will retain, perhaps, the same faculties as they now have, but will be free from all disturbance; the bodies of the lost will be literally burned, and the punishment will be eternal. These two works may be considered as complementing an earlier one, published in 1627, de Immortalitate Animae, a work which he himself esteemed as the most complete and thorough of his monographs.

The last of Calixtus's larger treatises was the one de Factis quae Deus cum Hominibus iniit. It was issued in 1654. Here he discloses some similarity to the views of the Calvinists and Arminians; but the covenants, of which he makes two, the Adamic and the Christian, are considered less as eternally made between the Father and the Son, than as consisting of an established relation between God and man. Here, as in his other works, Calixtus undertakes a comprehensive historical discussion of his theme, including a history of the Jews and a thorough investigation of the significance of the ceremonial law. But he himself felt that the subject was not exhaustively handled.

We must omit even to name the many other treatises which Calixtus produced. Besides his numerous controversial writings, he wrote on almost all branches of theology, especially historical theology. His style is sometimes heavy; his works often lack clearness of plan; he attempts too much, and, finding the work growing on his hands, is often obliged to break off abruptly. But his learning, his industry, and the breadth of mind were remarkable. He was the Schleiermacher of his age. Not entirely free from prevailing prejudices and errors, yet he was vastly elevated above the most of his contemporaries—too far above them to be appreciated by them. The constant abuse to which he was subjected from his bigoted enemies, for no other crime than that of advocating charity and peace, and the singleness with which, in spite of this abuse, he constantly pursued his object, are an abiding evidence of his catholicity of mind and his purity of heart.