rather misapprehensions of the author, with regard to particular points. In treating of Spain, for example, we cannot help thinking that he has paid (p. 129.) too great a compliment to the national character, or at least to the rulers of our peninsular allies. National defects are generally attributable, it is true, to the existing form of government and religion: but, even with the benefit of all these allowances, a long interval must yet elapse before the Spaniards will be found to merit the flattering representation that is here given of them. With respect to Austria, likewise, we have no doubt that the writer mistakes (pp. 178. 206.) in supposing that she ever wavered in joining or in following up the cause of the allies in 1813 or 1814. He may, we believe, assutne it for certain that, from the day on which the extent of Bonaparte's disasters in Russia became known, she had no other plan than that of bringing forth her utmost extent of military means, and of re-conquering the valuable provinces of which she had been deprived by France. A regard to appearances required, on her part, a less decisive tone than Russia or Prussia might adopt; and she might have, at particular intervals, a diplomatic point to carry before she threw her full weight into the scale: but on no occasion will she be found to have retarded the progress of the operations, if we make due allowance for the caution necessary when acting against so formidable and vigilant an enemy.

These are partial and by no means important blemishes; while in the greater part of the volume the writer has our cordial and almost unqualified assent. We extract, as a specimen of his composition, the observations on the well-combined passage of the Elbe in October 1813:

Of all the commanders in this war, none had distinguished himself more, or perhaps in an equal degree, with General Blucher. In a former war he had acquired the character of a gallant and daring partizan, to which his talents seemed then limited; but his present conduct established him in the first rank of great commanders. He had shewn that union of daring enterprize with consummate prudence, which was called for by his difficult situation; he had obviated all its disadvantages, and had carried on offensive and defensive operations with equal success. But he surpassed, if possible, his former exploits, by the decision and alacrity with which he carried into execution a plan entirely congenial to his bold and enterprizing character. At a moment when the enemy least expected such a movement, he broke up from Bautzen, and, though carrying pontoons along with him, marched with such rapidity, that in three days he arrived at Elster, near the confluence of the river of that name with the Elbe. Here, disregarding all obstacles, he transported his whole army across

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the river, attacked and defeated the corps of Bertrand, which was stationed on the opposite side. The moment that the Crown Prince heard of this movement, he lost not a moment in carrying the whole force under his command to cross at Rosslau and Acken. On the 4th October, the two armies came into contact. They were now, to the amount of 125,000 men, completely established on the left bank of the Elbe. They did not however stop here; but, determined no longer to follow any but the most decisive measures, they marched onwards. They successively passed the Mulda, the Elster, and finally the Saale; and drew up in battle array with their left resting upon that river. At the same time, the Austrian forces, after debouching from Bohemia, advanced upon Chemnitz and Altenburg; and the Cossack advanced guards of the two armies met on the left bank of the Saale.

There is not perhaps in the annals of military history, an operation of a grander and bolder nature than that which the allied powers had now undertaken. In interposing between Buonaparte and France, they had left all their own provinces uncovered; they left behind them an army of 200,000 men, commanded by the most distinguished military character of the age; they left also a chain of the strongest fortresses, while they themselves had not a single fortified position to rest upon. This measure, so remote from all common military practice, was rendered safe by two circumstances. One was the disposition which prevailed throughout the whole extent of the country into which they had entered. It was for them, not a hostile, or even a neutral, but a friendly, and as it were a native country. Instead of being harassed or impeded by the inhabitants, every aid which the most enthusiastic zeal could afford, might be confidently expected. The next security lay in the decided superiority of force, which they now possessed. An interchange of positions, like that now made, menaces total destruction to the weaker army, but is attended with little danger to the stronger, which can always force its way through the ranks of its adversary,'

The advance of the opposing armies and the gigantic conflicts at Leipsic are next related. The evening of the 18th of October brought the united forces of the allied Powers into the vicinity of the walls of Leipsic, and shewed their obstinate opponent the necessity of immediate retreat:

Buonaparte felt at length, and too late, that no means remained to him of farther resistance. A great part of his army had perished in the preceding battles, and the preponderance of the enemy, already considerable, had been greatly augmented. Of those who remained in his ranks a great proportion were determined enemies, more formidable from not having yet openly declared themselves. All his outposts and fortified lines were gone; and no prospect remained, but that the victorious encircling armies would storm him in this last retreat, and all his troops be destroyed or captured. He no longer therefore delayed retiring by the avenue which still remained open. The evening had scarcely

closed,

closed, when the whole army began to defile by the road leading to Weissenfels. The passage, narrowed as it was at present, was attended with extreme difficulty. Five or six rivers here running parallel and close to one another, and requiring bridges over each, formed a long and narrow defile, through which an encumbered army could march only slowly and with difficulty. Day broke, and only part of the troops was on the other side. Buonaparte then caused the magistrates of Leipsic to send a deputation requesting that hostilities might be suspended for the purpose of arranging a capitulation. The object of this demand was evident; he merely wished to retreat unmolested, and extricate his army from their present embarrassment. It was determined that such a respite should by no means be granted. The Emperor Alexander received the messenger in person, and, in presence of the army, announced to him this resolution. The allied forces were then led on to the attack; after a short resistance, the city was carried; and about eleven o'clock, the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and the Crown Prince of Sweden arriving from different quarters, met in the great square of Leipsic, amid the triumphal acclamations of the army and people. Buonaparte had left the city about two hours before, leaving a large party of his army. To them the disaster was greatly increased, when the confederate forces on entering the city were joined by all the remaining Saxon and other German troops. The French, now attacked and fired upon on every side, no longer knew where to turn; the narrow bridge was soon choaked by crowds of fugitives trampling upon each other. The passage was stopped; prisoners were taken by thousands; and of the few who endeavoured to save themselves by swimming, most perished in the waters. The whole rear-guard of the French army, including some of its most distinguished commanders, fell into the hands of the confederates. Among the prisoners were Regnier, Brune, Vallery, Bertrand, and Lauriston. Macdonald with difficulty gained by swimming the opposite bank; but Prince Poniatowsky, in endeavouring to do the same, sunk, and was drowned. The wounded, to the number of 30,000, were likewise all taken. The King of Saxony, with all his court, ranked among the prisoners. It was far too late now for this monarch to obtain any merit by joining the cause of the allies; and as, contrary to his consent and authority, the whole of his troops already ranged under their standard, there was no service which he could render to them. It was judged proper to inflict some chastisement for that injury which, on a former occasion, the common cause had sustained from him; and he was sent, under a guard, to the castle of Eysenach.

Such was the termination of this great and dreadful succession of combats; to which the annals of Europe, ensanguined as they are, had never yet produced a parallel. Never had the work of destruction proceeded on so vast and terrible a scale; nor had any field been so deluged with the best blood of her sons. Famine and pestilence, which follow in the train of war, were there, and did their part in the work of death. In viewing this dreadful scene,

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the philanthropic mind could however console itself by reflecting, that thus only could the injured cause of mankind be avenged; and that, through this bloody portal, peace and freedom were to revisit the earth.'

The leading feature of this volume, as of its predecessor, is impartiality. Whether we follow the writer into an analysis of military operations, or revert to domestic topics, such as the reported changes in the Cabinet, the discussions on finance, or the case of the Princess of Wales, -we find an uniform desire to do justice to both sides of the question, and to promulgate no opinions that are not supported by calm and deliberate reflection. On some occasions, (as p. 35.) the style is not sufficiently familiar for the plain matters under consideration; and it often betrays little incuria: but we have no hesitation in recommending the book to the imitation of those numerous writers who thoughtlessly or unblushingly come before the world with a very slender stock of preparation, and not always with a disposition to exhibit an unbiassed outline of public affairs. This sketch will be particularly acccptable to such readers as wish to have a view of the leading events of the year in a condensed shape, and are desirous of finding an author who can think for them on political subjects with a degree of attention which it may not suit their respective avocations to bestow.

ART. IX. Proposals for an Economical and Secure Currency; with Observations on the Profits of the Bank of England, as they regard the Public and the Proprietors of Bank-Stock. By David Ricardo, Esq. Second Edition. 8vo. pp. 128. 4s. 6d. Murray.

1816.

66

ART. X. Reply to Mr. Ricardo's Proposals for an Economical and Secure Currency. By Thomas Smith, Author of an Essay on the Theory of Money." 8vo. pp. 44. Richardson. 1816. WE E had occasion, in our February Number, to report a small tract by Mr. Ricardo on the Corn-trade, and to remark how inferior his performance on that topic was when compared with his former essays on the Bullion-question. We have now the satisfaction of reviewing a pamphlet on a subject professionally familiar to him; and, though we by no means warrant the accuracy of all his views, we recognize in it that disposition to temperate and impartial discussion which excited a favourable impression in the perusal of his earliest essay. The chief defect in the production before us is a certain verboseness of diction, and a tendency to enlarge on dry questions of finance, as if they were equally interesting to the

general

general reader with politics or biography. This defect we shall endeavour to avoid, in our report, by giving our readers a rapid summary of the more important part of Mr. R.'s arguments; after which we shall proceed to notice with brevity those of his opponent, Mr. Smith.

Advantages of Paper-Currency.-Nothing, says Mr. R., is more desirable in a circulating medium than steadiness, and, if possible, uniformity in its value. The use of paper, as a substitute in all the larger and many of the smaller payments, so far from operating to make a difference between the value of bullion and the established coin of the country, may be made directly conducive to the maintenance of the desired level. A rise of coin above bullion takes place in consequence of a particular increase in the demand: but this increase may be very easily met by an augmentation of the stock of paper; the latter, however, being always understood to be "payable in cash on demand." The advantage of this condition is particularly felt in the case of any alarm, or diminution of public and private credit. Merchants become then averse to receive in payment each other's bills or acceptances; a greater quantity of currency is consequently required to perform the same business; and to make this augmentation in coin is evidently a matter of much more expence and difficulty than to make it in paper. Reasoning from these and other considerations, Mr. R. (though, as we shall see presently, by no means an advocate of the Bank of England,) is desirous that bank-notes should continue in circulation, even for the smaller payments; not indeed on the plan of compulsion, as of late years, but in consequence of being made directly and easily convertible into gold or silver. He would impose on the Bank the responsibility of giving bullion for their notes; and he suggests (pp. 26, 27.) certain regulations, with the view of securing that establishment against unnecessary demands. Bullion seems to him a fitter exchange for a large sum than coin, because it would simplify the transaction, and might have the effect of rendering bank-notes of still more general currency than they possessed before 1797. Together with this, complete liberty should be given to every individual to export our bullion and coin of every description: while country-bankers would be pledged to discharge their notes in gold and silver, or in notes of the Bank of England. Nothing, it is well known, conduces so much to steadiness of value as an open and unrestrained exchange of commodities, and the plan now proposed seems calculated to prevent any run either on the Bank or on country-bankers; except on the occurrence of a national panic, when in course every one would be desirous of exchang

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