nise this resolution by a bye-law. To this overture, the Proprietors replied in the negative; and the Synod, at the last meeting, ultimately contented themselves with reiterating their wishes, but in a much milder form.

At this meeting of the Synod, a proposal was made, for a rule to render subscription to the Westminster Confession of Faith, imperative. The motion was opposed in an admirable manner, by Mr. Carlile of Dublin, who, though, we believe, he maintains the doctrines of Calvinism himself, seems to understand the genuine principles of Christian freedom. Among many other excellent observations, Mr. C. remarked, that "such enforcements serve but to pervert the mind, to make men hypocrites or knaves. They resemble the putting of words into the mouth of a witness; and such enforcements, and pains and penalties, have been, and ever will be, the means of quenching the genuine spirit of Christianity-of raising feuds and contentions, and thereby drawing our attention from the important concerns that should engage us—and of causing divisions among us, from century to century." There were assembled at the Synod, 50 Elders, and more than 120 Ministers; but the farther consideration of subscription to the Confession of Faith, was postponed to the next year.-"Can ye not discern the signs of the times?"

MANY of our readers already know, but others will be gratified in learning, that there are four periodical works published in London, which advocate freedom of inquiry, and the Unity of the Supreme Being; the Monthly Repository, the Christian Reformer, the Christian Moderator, and the Christian Reflector: the last, printed in Liverpool. Twenty volumes of the first have been already published, containing many invaluable papers, on sacred literature. Of the second, eleven volumes have been printed. The Christian Moderator commenced in May last; and the seventh volume of the Christian Reflector is now in course of publication.

THE Friends of Truth will be gratified in seeing, that our increasing sale, calls for this Second Edition.

MARCH 15, 1827.

CHRISTIAN PIONEER.

No. 3.

NOVEMBER, 1826. Vol. I.

What Evidence can prove the Trinity?

It will readily be acknowledged, that in all inquiries which depend on moral evidence, the correctness of our conclusions will be very much affected, by the standard of proof by which we try them. If this standard is either too high or too low, if we require either too much or too little evidence, we may disbelieve where we ought to be convinced, or be convinced where we ought to disbelieve. The sceptic, who demands a kind and degree of proof inconsistent with our moral nature, our state of probation, and the analogy of the divine government, is led to throw away the inestimable aids, and motives, and consolations, and hopes of Christianity. The believer in transubstantiation, on the other hand, who is satisfied with evidence insufficient both in its measure and its nature, is led to embrace a faith, which makes the gospel itself incredible, by making it responsible for a doctrine contradictory to nature, to reason, and to other parts of the Scriptures themselves. It is evidently very important, therefore, that we should guard against the danger of requiring too much, or of being contented with too little proof of our religious opinions. For this reason, it seems to be proper, that one who has never critically examined the proofs of the doctrine of the Trinity, should inquire, by what sort of evidence we may justly expect such a doctrine would be accompanied. Mr. Yates, in his "Vindication of Unitarianism," has touched on this subject; but its importance may be thought to justify a more ample consideration.

A doctrine may, a priori, or previously to a minute inquiry into its proofs, have a presumption either in its favour or against it. A proposition which is at once perceived to be consonant to reason and the general tenor of the Scriptures, will have a previous presumption in its favour, and may be believed to be a true doctrine of Christianity, with little hesitation. On the contrary, a proposition, which is apparently both irrational and un

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scriptural, will have a previous presumption against it, and requires a more scrupulous examination, and a fuller and more unequivocal evidence, before it can be embraced. There is a previous probability, for example, that the doctrine of a providence will be found in the New Testament, and a previous improbability, that the doctrine of transubstantiation will be found there.

In applying this general principle, we may safely say, that there is a strong presumption that the Scriptures will not be found to contain any doctrine apparently inconsistent with the unity of God. There is no truth of greater clearness or higher authority, than that there is but One God. Both philosophy and revelation unite in confirming it. The systematical unity and harmony of design conspicuous throughout the universe, extending to the moral as well as the physical world,* lead us to the conclusion, that the cause of all is One. All the arguments, which demonstrate the existence of God, lead us to the same conclusion. They all result in this, that the non-existence of an infinite, original, eternal mind, implies an absurdity, a contradiction, an impossibility. But this reasoning can hold of only one such mind. For, since one such mind is adequate to every effect, if it could be maintained, that more than one could exist, it might be said of each of them, separately, that its non-existence is possible; and necessary existence, therefore, could be proved of neither of them. That, therefore, which is the essence of every argument for the being of a God, would lose all its force, and Atheism would be established on the ruins of all religion. But, indeed, the existence of one infinite mind, excludes, by the very definition of infinity, the possibility that there should be more than one. If we attempt to form the supposition of a second infinite Being, we at once see, that it must, in every particular, be entirely coincident with the first; that is to say, as to all our ideas, it will necessarily be one and the same. "For," to adopt the language of Hartley, in his Essay on Man, "if we suppose more than one, it is plain, since the attributes of infinite power, knowledge, and goodness, include all possible perfection, that they must be entirely alike to each other, without the least possible variation. They will, therefore, entirely coalesce in our idea, i. e. be one to us.

Stewart's Philosophy of the Mind, vol. II.

Since they fill all time and space, and are all independent, omnipotent, omniscient, and infinitely benevolent, their ideas cannot be separated, but will have a numerical as well as a generical identity. When we suppose other beings generically the same, and yet numerically different, we do, at the same time, suppose, that they exist in different portions of time and space; which circumstances cannot have place in respect of the supposed plurality of infinite beings. We conclude, therefore, that there is but one infinite being, or God."

To this great truth, that there is but one God, both the Jewish and Christian revelations lend all the weight of their divine authority. Nothing can be more full and express, than their testimony to this point. It was the great object of Judaism, to preserve this truth amidst the polytheism of the ancient world. So sacred was it esteemed by the Jews, that it was a custom of theirs, even till modern times, to repeat, every morning and evening, the passage of Deuteronomy; HEAR, O ISRAEL, JEHOVAH OUR GOD, JEHOVAH IS ONE. It is needless, however, to multiply proofs of this point, since it is one of those primary principles, quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum. All Christians, of every name, with whatever inconsistency it may sometimes be done, are compelled, by the force of Scripture testimony, to acknowledge, that there is one God, and that there is none other but He. We are authorised by this universal concession, to take this doctrine as an axiom in all our reasonings on this subject, and to say, that whatever else may be false, this must be true.

As, therefore, the Unity of God stands on the highest possible evidence, we are sure, that all other truths of religion will be really consistent with it; and, of course, there is a high probability that they will all be apparently consistent with it. We ought to view every proposition, which seems to contradict it, with doubt and suspicion; for we are certain, that such a proposition must either be false, or else, that we do not understand it. We are justified, therefore, in saying, that there is, a priori, a strong presumption against any proposition which apparently interferes with the doctrine of the Unity of God. We do not say, that this presumption is so strong that no evidence can remove it. But we must all admit, that, till the compatibility of such a doctrine with this primary

truth, is rendered manifest, every thing must be presumed against it, and nothing in its favour.

Now, there is scarcely any one who will deny, that the doctrine of the Trinity is apparently inconsistent with the Unity of God. There is a strong apparent discordance, we must all own, between the two propositions, that God is One, and that God is Three. It is not till after many subtile and metaphysical distinctions are made, that any one will pretend that the harmony and consistency between them become visible. This is true of all the technical statements of this doctrine which have ever been given. They have undergone many changes since the doctrine of the Trinity was finally completed, towards the close of the fourth century; but the same essential difficulty still adheres to them all. It must always be affirmed, under some form or other, by every believer in a Trinity in Unity, that Three, in some sense or other, are One, and One is Three. It is true, that while any term of the proposition is declared to be mysterious, ineffable, and indefinable, it is impossible to demonstrate that it affirms a contradiction. We only say of it, that it is apparently inconsistent with the doctrine of the Unity of God, in the natural and plain meaning of words. We say only, that, if it mean any thing like what such words would mean in any other proposition, it means something, between which, and the assertion that three Gods are one God, it is difficult to discern a difference.

The apparent inconsistency of the doctrine of the Trinity with the Unity of God, becomes much stronger, when we examine the practical statements that are given of it. In speaking of its theory, its advocates secure themselves from attack, by declining to say what they mean, and calling that a mystery, which might otherwise seem to be a contradiction. "Unless we have some notion of the thing itself," Dr. Wardlaw exultingly asks, on what principle can we possibly make out its contrariety to reason.' But the case is different in the practical statements of the doctrine of the Trinity. When the proposition is entire, and the contradiction would appear manifest, if words were allowed to bear any distinct meaning, its friends protest, that they use the word "Person" only "for want of a better word," and declare, that we have no definite conception in what sense it is to be understood. But when they speak of the "Persons" sepa