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CONTENTS.

PART I.

THE ART OF WAR.

CHAPTER I.

MILITARY MAXIMS AND WARLIKE OPERATIONS.

Introductory Remarks. § I. Principle of Strength in an Army. II. Plan of
Campaign-Definitions of Military Terms-Importance of Rapidity of Move-
ment-Operations of large Masses on a single Point. III. Adaptation of Means
to Circumstances-Genius of Napoleon. IV. Offensive Operations. V. Con-
centration of separate Forces. VI. Modifications of original Plans. VII. Of
supporting the Wings of an Army. VIII. Depots. IX. Various Lines of Ope-
rations. X. Configuration of the Theatre of War-Illustrations. XI. Of pass-
ive Defence. XII. Fortresses. XIII. Advances and Retreats. XIV. Attacks on
both Extremities. XV. Spies. XVI. Order of Battle. XVII. Angles of Of
fence and Defence, XVIII. Oblique Attack. XIX. Importance of constant
Preparation. XX. Difficulties of Commander-in-Chief. XXI. Efficacy of Va-
lour and Discipline. XXII. Operations when inferior in Force. XXIII. Of
acting in detached Lines-Brilliant Success of Napoleon. XXIV. Of Flank
Attacks. XXV. Importance of a single Line of Operations. XXVI. Of Dis-
tances between Marching Corps-Retreat of Moreau-Mountain Campaigns.
XXVII. Of disappointing an Enemy's Wishes. XXVIII. Of the Importance of
frequent Entrenchment-Success of the Duke of Berwick-Of Marshal Turenne.
XXIX. Of Courage and Decision when surprised by a superior Force-Marshal
Turenne and the Prince de Condé. XXX. Transition from Defensive to Offen-
sive-Napoleon's first Campaigns in Italy. XXXI. Of abandoning and chang-
ing Line of Operations-Examples of Frederick the Great and Marshal Turenne.
XXXII. Operations with heavy Trains of Artillery, &c. XXXIII. Encamping
in Position. XXXIV. Conduct when menaced with being surrounded. XXXV.

Proper Position of Cantonments. XXXVI. Dangers in crossing Bridges in

Rear. XXXVII. Of employing separate Corps against a central Force-Battle

of Hohenlinden. XXXVIII. Conduct when driven from first Position-Battle

of Genola-Of Milesimo. XXXIX. Movements of a retreating Army. XL.

Concentration of Forces on the Eve of Battle-Defeat of Jourdan. XLI. Duty

of Commander previous to Battle. XLII. Of avoiding a Flank March before an

Army in Position-Battle of Kolin-Of Rosbach. XLIII. Of Prudence in View

of Battle-Resumption of Offensive during Retreat-Defeat of the Austrians at

Marengo-At Torgau-Battle of Ulm-Of Jena-Of Waterloo. XLIV. Of the

Advanced Guard. XLV. Demosthenes and Phocion. XLVI. Disposition of

Artillery. XLVII. Conduct of Alexander the Great XLVIII. Of Intervals

between Corps-Defeat of the Prince of Lorraine by Frederick-Of throwing

Forces into the Intervals of an Enemy's Line. XLIX. Qualifications of a Gene-

ral. L. Of Operations in the neighbourhood of a River. LI. Of the Passage

of a River-Prince Eugene and the Duke of Savoy. LII. Of defending the Pas-

sage of a River. LIII. of Tetes du Pont. LIV. Of Encampments. LV. Of

Sieges. LVI. Citadels. LVII. Of surrendering a Fortress. LVIII. Of Capitu-

lations. LIX. Obedience of Soldiers. LX. Union of Infantry, Cavalry, and

Artillery. LXI. Mingling of Infantry and Cavalry. LXII. Charges of Cavalry.

LXIII. Duties of Cavalry. LXIV. Artillery. LXV. Batteries. LXVI. Treat-

ment of Prisoners. LXVII. Of Prisoners of War. LXVIII. Qualifications of

General-in-chief. LXIX. Of the Staff. LXX. Unanimity of Principle of great

Warriors. LXXI. Battle of Waterloo..
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THE

ARMY AND NAVY.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

MILITARY MAXIMS AND WARLIKE OPERATIONS.

WAR, in the hands of the tyrant, is the science of wholesale murder, plunder and desolation-the science of defence in the hands of the patriot. The one employs it against the people; the other, in their behalf. The one seeks it as a trade; the other adopts it as a dreadful necessity to avoid or arrest greater evils. The one gains for his reward the fears and curses of the people; the other, their heartfelt applause and esteem.

Aware that no man can read descriptions of battles, or other military movements, understandingly, without some previous knowledge of the fundamental principles and maxims of war, we shall endeavour to place a kind of information at the disposal of the reader, which many have hitherto been unable to obtain.

We have always considered ordinary histories defective, from a total neglect of a scientific and philosophical account of the governing principles of warlike operations. In reading such works, we might almost be led to suppose that a general had nothing to do but to "trust in Providence and keep his powder dry"-to march his army against the enemy with no other thoughts than how to fight. But let the general reader once get an insight into the mighty projects of the chief officer before and during his march, all based on profound scientific

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