2. A revelation might enjoin some particular way of acting in conformity with any single motive already existing. It might, for instance, not only direct men to be charitable, but command them to found hospitals; not only to be just, but not to bear false witness. It might also prescribe the ceremonies by which our reverence towards God should be manifested, or by which our religious life should be cultivated. Without revelation men would adopt the ceremonies which taste or experience seemed to render desirable; with it, they would seek to express the same sentiment by careful attention to the ordained routine. The claim on behalf of revelation has been very generally directed to this special subject; and observances, which, from the natural point of view, are morally indifferent have been, through this claim, invested with the highest moral sanction. How, then, is the evidence of revelation in this matter affected by the testimony of our moral nature? Let us suppose an alleged revelation, which enforces the observance of a particular ritual, to be apparently well established. So long as the required ritual affords an easy and complete expression of our religious feeling, no difficulty will arise, and we shall be more disposed to admire than to doubt the wisdom of the regulations. But if the time arrive when our sentiments can no longer find satisfaction in these usages, if our observance become the cold submission or narrow dread of formalism, and our reverence imperiously demand some more natural method of expression, and if in consequence the authoritative retention of the old ritual begin to minister to superstition rather than to morals, a doubt will arise whether the revelation can be genuine, or at least whether that particular part of it can be of everlasting obligation. It is impossible to construct a scale by which to estimate the legitimate force of this doubt; but it presents a counter-evidence, which ought to be carefully weighed; and it may become so strong as to bear down all evidence that can be advanced on the other side. A

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noble and cultured reverence would not naturally express itself by sticking hooks under the arm-pits, and indulging in an agonizing swing; and any pretended revelation, whose principal object was to insist upon observances of this kind, would carry in itself a refutation of its claims. Perhaps it may fairly be added that the natural tendency to vary the expression of the religious motives according to national or individual temperament, and according to the degree of culture, ought to induce us to scan very narrowly the evidence of any supposed revelation which would tie men down to the performance of any particular set of ceremonies; for, independently of all other evidence, it seems more worthy of Divine wisdom to leave men at liberty in this respect, and it is difficult to believe that the genuine expression of love and reverence, however rude, is not more acceptable to God, as it is unquestionably of higher moral value, than the celebration of the most splendid ritual in simple obedience to authority. How far these considerations will apply in any special case it is not our present purpose to inquire. They are illustrated, however, by the transition from Judaism to Christianity, much in the Jewish ceremonial having become abhorrent to a more refined spirituality. Thus the theory arose that revelation might serve a partial and temporary purpose, and mark a particular stage in the religious education of mankind.

3. Higher motives than we have yet experienced, but of which we are capable, might be made known. They could not be made known by a verbal description, any more than music could be explained to one born deaf. But the exhibition of their working in human life has a tendency to awaken them in ourselves. We have a susceptibility for understanding in others phases of emotion which would not arise spontaneously within us, and through a wonderful sympathetic action the deeper life of some great soul may disclose itself in our hearts. Sometimes a whole new set of emotions starts into waking energy because we have seen the signs of their action in

more elevated minds than our own. A revelation made in this way would depend on the susceptibility of the minds to which it was presented. The new motive brought before us might be so much higher than anything we are yet capable of that for a long time we should only gaze at it in blank wonder, as a little child knows not why its parents bow their heads in prayer; or it might be so near us as in an instant to kindle our waiting hearts. Some, again, are naturally much more susceptible of this sympathetic influence than others. The same manifestations of high motives would accordingly be full of meaning to one, and hardly intelligible to another; and while one gazes with stolid indifference upon the grandest act in history, another will melt into tears of thankful joy for the new depths of life that have been broken open in his heart. The question of evidence does not appear to enter into this kind of revelation. It is the dawning of a new light in the consciousness, or it is nothing; and accordingly it claims no outward authority, and it appeals for its credentials to the awakened souls of men. Nevertheless, since it is essentially a taking away of a veil from the heart, it may, with far more propriety than the modes which we have previously considered, assume the name of revelation. Whether any revelation of this kind has been given at all more special than the daily revelations which are made through the relations of parent and child, teacher and taught, and others which arise in the constant interchange of mind with mind, is a subject for future inquiry.

These remarks might arouse an expectation that a scheme of duties should be presented as part of our system. Religious life involves not only a certain mode of thinking, but a certain mode of acting. Hence some writers would include Christian Ethics within the field of Dogmatics. But, though springing from the same stem, they are two distinct branches, and therefore lend themselves to separate treatment. Accordingly ethical considerations will come in only where they are

distinctly implicated with doctrines, and we shall not enter upon the manifold details of Christian duty.1

The Religious Element

We have now to inquire into the nature of the religious element in man. Most men who have reflected much upon theological subjects will admit that there is something which affects religious belief besides the mere logical evidence. This appears from the great diversity of belief, where the same evidence is open to all; from the different ways in which the same evidence affects us under different circumstances; and from the connexion which is often apparent between a man's natural tendencies and the line of thought which he adopts in his theology. There is some hidden power which gives us an affinity with certain kinds of evidence and with certain directions of thought, and which thereby is largely instrumental in determining our belief. What is this power? Does it constitute a portion of our finished human nature, or does it belong only to its weakness and perversion? If it be, like the intellect, an essential part of our nature, what are its laws? What are its defects, and its sources of error? By what method may it be made available for the discovery or the establishment of truth? These are the questions to which we have now to address ourselves, questions at once of high importance and of great difficulty.

(a) The Existence of the Religious Element

Proceeding to our task, we may lay down as the basis of our discussion the following proposition :-There is in man a primitive religious element. By this expression I do not, of course, mean that there is a particular and separable faculty of religion, but that there are certain manifestations

1 See the propriety of separating Dogmatics and Ethics ably defended by Dorner, A System of Christian Doctrine, translated by Professor Cave, vol. I. Introduction, § 4, pp. 24 sqq.

of human nature which we distinguish as religious, just as there are others which we distinguish as intellectual or moral.

It may be asked here, what is meant by religious? I must reply at present that the word is sufficiently understood for our immediate purpose, and that any attempt to define religion at this stage of the inquiry would prejudge many important questions. There are certain phenomena of which we are conscious in ourselves, such as devoutness; and there are things which we observe in society, such as the existence of churches and public assemblies for worship, which indicate the presence of similar conceptions or feelings in the minds of our fellow-men; and to these phenomena, from their possession of similar characteristics, we give the one name, religious. Every one who has had any religious. experience distinguishes in his consciousness the religious. element from others, such as the social or the intellectual.

From these remarks it is apparent that the word religion is here used to denote the inward quality of a religious man; and it is necessary to bear this in mind, because religion is an ambiguous term, and is constantly applied to the institutions, whether of ceremony or of dogma, through which the religious life of a people is expressed, as when we speak of the Jewish or the Mohammedan religion. When the term is understood as referring to an inward quality, to that which is often spoken of as 'the religious consciousness,' I may venture to point out that religion, as a natural object, cannot be defined in the sense in which we define a triangle or a square. The definitions of these figures contain implicitly the whole of their properties, which are discovered and made explicit by a rigorous deduction. But we can obtain a complete knowledge of any natural object only by a careful induction; and if we start with a philosophical or dogmatic definition of religion, we inevitably commit ourselves to a one-sided view, and to a probable misinterpretation of important facts. That this is so is