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Limitations of the rational and critical powers, 12-14: two

kinds of temperament, and of theological questions, 12–13.

Inalienable rights of the intellect, 13. Danger of one-sided

intellectualism, 13-14.

The Moral Nature and Revelation

Connexion of the moral nature with theology, 14-15.

Revelation and Ethics, 15-19 : (1) There might be authoritative

rules before the knowledge of higher motives, 15-16. (2)

There might be rules relating to a single motive, 17-18.

(3) Higher motives might be made known, 18-19.

But Christian Ethics not to be included in Dogmatics, 19-20.

3. The Religious Element

Questions relating to it, 20.

(a) The existence of the Religious Element, 20–32 : Proposition,

Sense in which Religion is used, 21; Definitions

to be avoided, 21-23. The evidence-1. Our consciousness,

23-24. 2. Universality, 24-31. Objections to the argument

(a) religion may be an invention, 25-26; (b) it may be due to

traditional beliefs, 26–27. Answers (1) that only can be

developed which exists in germ, 27 ; (2) our judgment of

religious motives, 27-28 ; (3) not probable that accidental

transmission could secure universality, 28-29 ;

(4) when

religion has been discarded, it has always revived, 29 ;

distinction from religious prejudices, 29–30. (c) Religious

knowledge may be derived from other knowledge, 30; but

religion includes emotion, 30-31. 3. Special phenomena

in the manifestation of religion, 31-32.

(b) The Religious Element points to an Object or Objects

answering to it, 32–37 : Nature of the inquiry, 32. Religious

feelings exist only in relation to an object, and tend to

create a belief in the existence of the object, 33. Objections :

emotions lead to delusions; but delusions are temporary,

34-35; the thing to be proved is assumed ; but there must

be an ultimate assumption, 35-36. The conclusion confirmed

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by the whole analogy of our nature, 36-37.

(c) Testimony of the Religious Element to doctrines, 37-45 :

Proposition stated, 37. The satisfaction of an inward want

an evidence of truth, 37–38 ; for (1) it follows from what

has been said about the Religious Element; and (2) the

proposition is supported by the facts of consciousness, 38-41.

Objections : (1) beliefs maintaining themselves in this way

may be mere prejudices, 41 ; but (a) they are more persistent,

(6) they tend to recur, (c) they are felt to have a divine claim

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upon us, (d) they are often opposed to our prejudices, 41-43; 41-81

(2) many such beliefs have been mere errors, 43 ; but these

errors may be partially true (instance, the idea of sacrifice),

43-44; (3) We have the same tendency to believe what

satisfies a prejudice; this undoubtedly shows liability to

error and need of care, 44-45.

(d) Nature of the Religious Element, 45-51: to be learned by

an examination of facts, 45-47. It includes feeling, knowing,

and doing, 47-49. Resulting classification of the kinds of

religion, 49-51.

(e) Catholic self-knowledge, 51-61: two modes of regarding

the capacity of the religious nature, 51-54 : recognition of

spiritual truth, 51-53; discovery and construction, 53-54.

Source of knowledge, our own consciousness, 54-55 ; difficulty

arising from this, 55-56; self-knowledge must be catholic,

56–57. Lines of tendency described, 57–61.

(f) Sources of error, 61–74: (1) incapacity for intellectual

formulation, 61-62; (2) failures in the religious consciousness,

(a) want of proper balance in its contents, 62-64 ; (b) absence

of some of its constituents, 64-65 ; (c) reliance on a prejudice

or idiosyncrasy, 65–66, nevertheless an idiosyncrasy may

anticipate the universal, 66-68. Hence spiritual discernment

has various degrees, and is susceptible of cultivation and

growth, 68–74. Examples : belief in the existence of God,

68-69 ; in his attributes, 69-70; knowledge of the human

soul 70–71; recognition of spiritual relations, 71-73. Two

resulting facts, 73–74.

(g) Confirmatory facts, 74-78 : (1) diversity of theological belief,

74-75 ; (2) man have a power of seeing the truth of a doctrine

which they could not have discovered, 75-76 ; (3) dependence

on authority, 76; (4) revolts against authority, 76–77; (5)

men cling to a creed after they have ceased to believe in it

literally, 77.

(h) Revelation, 78–81: (1) might be given of truths which the

human mind normally could not have discovered, 78-79;

(2) might be given of truths which the mind normally reaches

only by a tedious process, 79; (3) might be given of the

spirit which is the ground of doctrinal truth, 79-81.

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Traditional view, 82-89: Ca nolic dogma, 82-83; doctrine of

the Church of England, 83-84; doctrine of the Westminster

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DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY

119-162

General aspects of the subject; usually thought to be beyond

the range of our faculties, though recently said to be alone

satisfactory to reason, 119-121.

Starting-point of the doctrine, 121–122.

Statement of the dogma, 122-127.

Arguments in connexion with the dogma, 127-159.

1. The Biblical argument, 127-136 :-

(1) Passages where God, Christ, and the Spirit are mentioned

together, 127-129. (2) Passages where God and Christ

are mentioned together, 129–132. (3) General adverse

considerations, 132–136 : (a) The doctrine had no name

for one hundred and fifty years after the death of Christ,

133-134; (b) It is nowhere stated in the Bible, 134 ; (c) Its

characteristic propositions are nowhere laid down, 134-135 ;

(d) Several passages are apparently inconsistent with it, 135 ;

(e) Many scholars are satisfied that the doctrine is not in

the Bible, 135-136. Conclusion, 136.

II. Arguments based on history, 136–144:-

Two possible explanations of the slow formation of dogma :

(1) No pronouncement was required till the doctrine was

challenged, 136-137 ; (2) germs of thought may have un-

folded themselves as fresh problems arose, 137–138. Con-

siderations which favour the latter hypothesis, 138–142 :

Catholics admit the imperfection of early statements, 138 ;

there is an advance in the complexity of successive creeds,

138-139 ; particular testimonies of early writers, 139–142.

The evidence seems to show that the doctrine was no part

of primitive Christianity, but was gradually formed through

the exercise of thought, 142-144.

III. Philosophical Arguments, 144-156 :-

(1) It is said that those who deny the dogma represent God

as an abstract and solitary unit, 144-145. (2) God must

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