It is, however, the right of the nation to initiate the problem, it is the task of the statesman to deliberate and decide upon the means of solving aright the desire of the people. In the actual management or arrangement of the affairs of a nation, there is usually so great a number of principles in operation, the poise and counterpoise of circumstance and event, the concur rence or counteraction of interests, and so great an intermixture of design and accident, that careful deliberation and the diligent scrutiny of the best minds are required to see that assumptions and realities are not confounded, and to provide, by the judicious investigation of actuality and the skilful interpretation of theory, the best political resource possible in each exigency of the state. The determination of the measures belongs to legislation, the determination of the men belongs to representation. 66 But is not the representation of opinion a most desirable requisite in a properly organized Parliament? Most assuredly it is. Representation is, in reality, the organization of opinion, and legislation is the art and science of making opinion effective towards the ends aimed at in government. Opinion is a very "sovereign mistress of effects," but though she merits the characterization of Shakspere, she is not quite what Byron calls her, an omnipotence." The field of opinion is indemonstrable thought. It covers a large portion of the sphere of practical statesmanship. It sadly requires organization. The press, it is said, not only diffuses but confuses it. Opinion is usually applied to the subject of belief, the matter or proposition to which the mind has given its assent. Over men's opinions it is well known that a man's inclinations exert great power. Interests, prejudices, associations, ideas, sectarian predispositions and party spirit have each a powerful influence over not only the formation, but the realization of opinion. However, an opinion ought to signify a distinct preference for some principle to which the mind has given mature consideration, although for that principle it has not been able to discover any infallible and indubitable proof, such as would amount to definite demonstration. Opinion implies debatability, every thing debatable requires and should receive due deliberation, and therefore the representation of opinions would imply that free, impartial, and unfettered debate, should be engaged in by those chosen to be the representatives of the several opinions entertained by those who elect the deliberative assembly of the notables, to whom the decision of such matters has been assigned. But opinions are discreet, while representation must be concrete: so that a balance of opinions would require to be made before a choice of a representative could be undertaken. This throws us back upon interest, party, or measures, or it throws us forward to a further form, the representation of intelligence. Intelligence ought to be the formative agency in regard to opinion, but we know for a fact that interest and education have a much larger share than anything else in the formation of the opinions of men in general. Besides, opinions are much less frequently now-a-days formed by than for men. The machinery for the manufacture and spread of opinion through the press is now very complete. Men can so easily buy their opinions ready made, that it is almost waste of time to be at the trouble of forming them. This is a growing evil; an evil which the press diligently fosters by its claim to be the fourth estate. For how many people is it really true that a few leading journalists supply opinions periodically, which are accepted and employed as their own, on the same principle as they use the milk they take in their tea or coffee, as an article ordered, bought, and paid for, therefore justly theirs. But to talk of the representation of opinions come to on these terms and in such a way, is to ask the selection or election of an oligarchy of political men of letters, and would end, in the ultimate, in a government by journalists. Opinions are really valuable when they are entertained and felt, not when they are only accepted and maintained; and they can only be properly felt the value of when they have been thought out after mature consideration of all the circumstances and conditions of each case. Opinion, as the result of thought, is valuable; but opinion accepted through faith in a journalist is, for representative purposes, quite worthless. Do we object, then, to the representation of intelligence? Nay! we heartily approve of it, provided it be the intelligence of the elector. Let political education be proceeded with to the utmost; but see that it is education-thought led out, not instructionopinion dictated. Intelligence is beneficial, whether interest, class, party, opinion, or person is to be the ground of representation. Intelligent choice is always better than unintelligent choice; but mere intelligence, as intelligence, has no special claim to representation which could not be equally properly asserted as the right of morality, industry, property, &c. Human beings are so intimately knit together in a community, that every quality and characteristic of those who are to have the choice of the members of the legislative assembly is important, and the higher these can be raised, so much the better, in general, for the class of representatives likely to be chosen. If intelligence alone were the characteristic required in Parliament, perhaps it might have a casting force in the settlement of who should be the electors of the representatives of the people. But the best possible Parliament is that in which the highest human characteristics are all fairly and proportionately found; for "Power hath no long being but in worth." But even the best possible Parliament would not fulfil the requirements of philosophical politics unless the modes, forces, numbers, and qualifications of the electors are wisely settled. J. A. Froude has very pertinently said on this subject : "No one seriously supposes that popular suffrage gives us a wiser Parliament than we used to have. Under the rotten borough system Parliament was notoriously a far better school of statesmanship than it is or ever can be where the merits of candidates have first to be recognised by constituencies. The rotten borough system fell, not because it was bad in itself, but because it was abused to maintain injustice-to enrich the aristocracy and the landowners at the expense of the people. We do not look for a higher morality in the classes whom we have admitted to power; we expect them only to be sharp enough to understand their own concerns. We insist that each interest shall be represented, and we anticipate from the equipoise the utmost attainable amount of justice."-Fraser's Magazine, Dec., 1870. It appears in all discussions regarding Parliamentary representation, not only that in that form of legislation we have found the crown and top of governmental perfection, but also that the representative system so embodied is the one only type of legislative superintendence Low possible. We venture to suggest that a proper consideration of the purpose aimed at in representative legislation may lead us to see some means of improving representation in itself, and also Parliamentary representation as its highest and ultimate form. And the object in view in the composition of this paper as a contribution to the philosophy of politics is to suggest a graded representation such as would, in our opinion, secure a higher and better form of legislature than the common form of Parliament admits. It has been seen by the reader that there are in all the proposals for regulating representation a proportion of truth as well as an alloy of error. We have expressed in as brief a form as we could the considerations advanced in favour of and against the various measures of representation proposed, and we now desire to gain the attention of our readers to a few observations on the philosophy of representation which shall lead us to indicate a possible advancement in legislative activity, which may combine a good many of the best suggestions made, and yet eliminate a good many of the objections taken to them individually. Should any one care to charge the writer with presumption in venturing to imagine that any proposal he can make could be such as might improve the time-honoured institutions of our ancestors, he shall not feel careful to answer in that matter. J. S. Mill has asserted that "to inquire into the best form of government in the abstract (as it is called) is not a chimerical, but a highly practical employment of scientific intellect; and to introduce into any country the best institutions which, in the existing state of that country, are capable of, in any tolerable degree, fulfilling the conditions, is one of the most rational objects to which practical effort can address itself." Fortified by such a statement, we may endeavour to suggest, even in the face of a protest against the writer's likelihood of success. Legislation is the organization of opinion; but opinion in its earliest form is only the suggestion of some mind which has been arrested by a thought, and has given it such consideration as a single mind is able. Thereafter agitation fans the intellect of others into reflection on it and discussion of it. When debate has tested the arguments for and against it, the suggestion has made good its right to the general consideration of those who are interested in the matter in regard to the best means of effecting what is desired. Men plead for it, advocate it, ask legislation on it, and ultimately attain what they require-in so far as it is practical. Parliament has hitherto been too much employed upon the preliminary stages of the initiation and the discussion of opinion-not fairly fitted by popular debate for legislative decision. Crotchets are persistently pressed upon the notice of the legislature and forced into debate, often interfering with the progress of public business, and damaging most seriously the general good of the community. On this account every session is overburdened with abortive schemes for accomplishing objects which, however good in themselves, have not been ripened by discussion for legislation that can be effective by being acceptable. This arises, we believe, from a misconception of both people and parliament of the conditions of representative government. Representative legislation gives the force of law to those opinions which have acquired an active power over the minds of men. It does not make, but it enacts laws. condition is, let that be law which the people wishes and wills. The senator who strives to run his own idea into a law by pressing it on the House of Commons, and forcing or quirking it through the House of Lords, may have his name associated with the bill, but will most probably only add to the number of still-born acts or effete measures; for "The laws live only where the law doth breed Its Force cannot bind a free people when opinion does not sanction the decree which the law-makers may issue. Legislation is public opinion legalized. If we consider this aright, then we shall see that the sifting, testing, agitation, debating, and consideration of opinions ought only, or at least mainly, to engage the attention of the national legislature when they have acquired such an ascendancy in the minds of the people as to be matters of national concern: have, in short, attained the legislatable state, Parliament ought to be the one ruling power and final depository of decision after due argumentation on such subjects as come before it, as having a prima facie claim to national consideration in consequence of the general acceptance of it as a conviction by those who are concerned in regard to it; in other words, Parliament ought to be an aristocracy of thinkers trained to consider all questions from a national point of view; proved to be possessed of energy of mind and excellence of cha racter, and empowered to decide as a final and ultimate tribunal on the matters proposed, suggested, advanced, or desired by the people, and to sanction in name and on behalf of the community whatever was found after due deliberation most likely to conduce to the general good. It is the duty of the country to fix, determine, and propose the ends of legislation; and it is the duty of the representative legislation to devise the means, arrange the mode, and put into a practical form the processes by which the required end may be most fully and effectively accomplished. If the doctrine is accepted that public opinion is the initiator and determiner of legislation, it should follow as a consequence that it is the interest of a community to encourage, develop, and maintain the greatest possible amount of activity, originality, reflectiveness, and intelligence on civilization and the means of bringing its blessings more closely homewards to the multitudes. This the diffusion of the press may secure for us: but we require, beside the freedom of the press, to provide the agitation of new suggestions, and to induce the proper discussion of them. Irresponsible debate, however, seldom results in considerate discussion; and hence it is desirable, for the proper sifting of opinion, that legal and proper means should be afforded for bringing every suggestion made under the distinct investigation of some body corporate, whose duty it should be to examine them; so that, having passed the ordeal of considerate discussion, it might take its place among those proposals on which legislation might be desirable. In addition, therefore, to a free press as the organ of suggestive, reflective, and aggressive thought, we suggest the legal incorporation and nationalization of the main interests in civic and social life. If a representative form were bestowed on chambers of commerce; sheriff's of counties and convenors of boroughs; agricultural associations; associations of science, literature, and art; educational boards; trades unions; road trustees; trustees on charities, &c., professional incorporations, as lawyers, physicians, clergymen, teachers, &c., whose duty it should be to filter and arrange opinion, and who should be charged with the oversight and regulation of all practical propositions regarding possible legislation, we should have a complete and economical system of testing and sifting opinions, and also a series of assemblies of first resort for all proposals affecting other interests than those which are purely national. As each number of each of these associative institutes for the considerate discussion of matters affecting specific interests in the nation would have a vote in regard to that interest which he had a proper right to represent, this would at once secure the representation of interests and opinions, but would also provide in reality an unobjectionable cumulative vote: for one person might be member of such a number of these legalized associations as he might have claims to regard in as being informed on and interested in the matters brought before them. In this way, too, we might provide for the representation of minorities; for we might empower the statutory and legal meetings of such associations to appoint-if the majority in favour of a matter did not exceed two-thirds of the entire number of voters present-three members in behalf of the majority and two on behalf of the minority |