as long as you will have me; and wish to leave here with a good reputation; and will stand by whatever the wishes of this board are, and will not stand for any legal proceedings, and wish to ascertain your wishes as soon as you are ready, and will abide by them."

Upon the trial both plaintiff and defendant moved for a peremptory instruction to the jury, agreeing that the question presented was one of law. The court was of opinion that there was no evidence tending to show the existence of any fraud, collusion, or bad faith on the part of any member of the board nor any bad faith or collusion on the part of the plaintiff; that the validity of the contract must depend upon whether the board had power to conclude a contract for plaintiff's services to extend beyond the official life of all the members of the board. Being of the opinion that the board had no such power, a verdict was directed accordingly and judgment was entered on the verdict.

The reasoning of the trial court is expressed in the following language:

"Except where the situation and circumstances carry an element of necessity, an element not present in this case, the trustees are without power to tie up the hands of the people in the important matter of the personnel of their superintendent and teachers beyond the time during which the affairs of the school are committed to them. Such a limitation of the power of the trustees may perhaps be inferable from our school statute; but, however that may be, many reasons exist why the contract would be contrary to public policy. It might be desirable on occasions to enter into a long-term contract with a superintendent; when in an effort to get a very desirable man, the board might find itself confronted with that very condition. But because on an exceptional occasion a board meets with such condition that is no reason for saying that the power does or even should exist. In school affairs, gentlemen, it is better to lose the services of an exceptionally good superintendent for

a term of three years than that the school should be shouldered with an incompetent and exceptionally poor superintendent for a year or a month or any length of time; the advantage of being able on an exceptional occasion to obtain the services of an exceptionally good man is more than offset by the disadvantage, which our common experience in school matters teach us would result from a long-term employment of an undesirable, not to say incompetent, man. Any public policy requires that the children be not put at disadvantage by a careless or culpable school board, at least beyond the time when the members of such board are charged with the school administration, without right in the parents of such children to act through their newly appointed agent to correct that condition. The court does not hold that the board of education is limited to contract for one year. A majority of the board having absolute control of the affairs of the school for a longer period might contract for the length of their official life, because during that period the people, through the election of new agents, would be powerless to disturb the statu quo. But the court does hold that it would not have the right to contract for a term of three years. If this contract had been for two years, instead of three, a different question would have been presented."

Defendant contends, broadly, that the contract is opposed to the policy of the constitution and laws of this State, and asserts that, whatever the opinion of the court may be respecting the general proposition, the particular contract was made under such circumstances that it is a fraud in law, and opposed to public policy on that ground.

OSTRANDER, J. (after stating the facts). The question is whether a correct rule was stated and applied by the trial court. It has been presented in other jurisdictions. In some, decision has turned upon some provision or the construction of a statute, in others the rule applied by the trial court is announced; while in still others a contrary rule is followed. Among the cases which have been examined are City of

Denver v. Hubbard, 17 Colo. App. 346 (68 Pac. 993); Reubelt v. School Town of Noblesville, 106 Ind. 478 (7 N. E. 206); Board of Commissioners of Jay County v. Taylor, 123 Ind. 148 (23 N. E. 752, 7 L. R. A. 160); Board of Commissioners of Pulaski County v. Shields, 130 Ind. 6 (29 N. E. 385); Wait v. Ray, 67 N. Y. 36; Moon v. School City of South Bend (Ind. App.), 98 N. E. 153; Smith v. School District No. 57, 1 Pennewill (Del.), 401 (42 Atl. 368); Fitch v. Smith, 57 N. J. Law, 526 (34 Atl. 1058); Wilson v. East Bridgeport School District, 36 Conn. 280; Burkhead v. Independent School District of Independence, 107 Iowa, 29 (77 N. W. 491); Stevenson v. School Directors of District No. 1, 87 Ill. 255; Davis v. School Directors, 92 Ill. 293; Millikin v. County of Edgar, 142 Ill. 528 (32 N. E. 493, 18 L. R. A. 447); Chittenden v. School District, 56 Vt. 551; Hemingway v. Joint School District, 118 Wis. 294 (95 N. W. 116); School District in Natick v. Morse, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 191; Sparta School Township v. Mendell, 138 Ind. 188 (37 N. E. 604). Not all of these cases relate to schools, or school districts or affairs; but, excepting the Colorado decision, they all involve the power of boards or officers representing municipal or quasi municipal corporations to make contracts for the services of others for periods beginning or extending beyond the official lives of such boards or officers, or of some of them.

The statute of Michigan, heretofore referred to, makes each city incorporated under it a school district and body corporate with the usual powers of corporations organized for public purposes, expressly giving the right to sue and be sued, to acquire, hold, and dispose of real and personal property. The board of education is made to consist of six trustees, each elected for a term of three years, at a regular annual election held on the second Monday in July in each year. At the first regular meeting after each annual election the board is required to organize by

electing from its members a president, and by electing a secretary who may or may not be a member of the board. This board has control and management of the property interests and affairs of the district, and is directed to establish such primary and graded schools as the public interests may require, and, if deemed expedient, to establish a high school. It is provided that:

"The board of education shall appoint and employ a superintendent, and the teachers and instructors for the public schools, and determine their salaries and define their duties. They shall prescribe the courses of study to be pursued, the books to be used, classify the pupils as may be expedient, and provide the necessary apparatus and facilities for instruction, * determine the length of time the schools shall be taught each year, adopt rules for the regulation and government of the schools, and do whatever may be required to advance the interests of education."

* *

These are some of the powers bestowed out of many, among which others is the power to designate and establish sites for schoolhouses, purchase and procure land therefor, and erect and maintain schoolhouses and buildings for use of the public schools, with proper furniture and appurtenances for buildings and grounds.

In some of the States, with respect to district schools, it is the right and duty of the taxpayers of the district, at the annual meeting, to determine how long school shall be taught during the current year, what studies shall be pursued, and whether a male or a female teacher shall be employed. This right so reserved to the taxpayers is in a number of the cases above referred to the ground upon which the court denies to trustees, or to a trustee, elected annually, the power to engage a teacher for the ensuing, or succeeding, year. In Wisconsin (Webster v. School District, 16 Wis. 316; Hemingway v. Joint School Dis

175 MIOH.-8.

trict, supra), the rule stated is that the power of the board to contract is general, in the absence of an inconsistent determination of the voters at the last annual meeting and subject to their power at the next (or of the new board) to determine with respect to the length of time a school shall be taught, whether by male or female teachers, or both, and the application of the school moneys. In Illinois (Stevenson v. School Directors of District No. 1, supra) it was held that in respect to district schools the power of directors to employ teachers is limited to the current year. Reasons for the conclusions were found in a construction of the statute which, as in Wisconsin, reserved to the taxpayers of the district the right to determine at the annual election what branches of learning should be taught in the schools. The court uses this language:

"There is, doubtless, no objection to contracts for the teaching of terms extending for a reasonable time beyond the current school year, when such contracts are entered into in good faith, and not for the purpose, merely, of forcing upon the district an unsatisfactory teacher or defeating the will of the voters at the annual election."

See, also, Davis v. School Directors, supra, and Millikin v. County of Edgar, supra. In the Millikin Case the doctrine of the earlier cases is applied in considering the validity of a contract made by a board of supervisors with a person engaged as keeper of a county poor farm for a term of three years. It is pointed out that the term of office of a supervisor is one year, the board is clothed with power to levy taxes to raise funds to support paupers, a power to be exercised annually, and, in view of these considerations, it would be an unreasonable construction of the statute to hold that the legislature, although it had imposed no limit upon the time for which a keeper of the poorhouse might be appointed, intended