to enter into a contract with defendant, a public utility corporation, fixing its rates beyond State control. In the absence of clear and express delegated power from the State, it has been held that contracts of the nature claimed here are permissive only and not such as are contemplated by constitutional limitations. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467 (31 Sup. Ct. 265, 34 L. R. A. [N. S.] 671).

At the time this ordinance was passed in 1898, defendant had the right to use public places, streets, and highways in the conduct of its business without any franchise granting permission (section 6691, 2 Comp. Laws; 3 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 7214), and the authority of the city under section 3186, 1 Comp. Laws (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 5708), was limited to the police power of imposing and enforcing reasonable rules and regulations controlling the erection and maintenance of poles, wires, etc., to preserve its streets reasonably safe and convenient for public travel and other proper use. Michigan Telephone Co. v. City of Benton Harbor, 121 Mich. 512 (80 N. W. 386, 47 L. R. A. 104); Village of Jonesville v. Telephone Co., 155 Mich. 86 (118 N. W. 736, 130 Am. St. Rep. 562, 16 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 439); Union Telephone Co. v. Ingersoll, 178 Mich. 187 (144 N. W. 560, 52 L. R. A. [N. S.] 713).

In this case, however, it appears that an ordinance was enacted by the city fixing rates, and accepted. If this ordinance granted to defendant any valuable right "clearly outside any rights which it could claim under the authority of the general law," when accepted it would be a contract binding on defendant, under the ruling in Mahan v. Telephone Co., 132 Mich. 242 (93 N. W. 629).

Inasmuch as defendant demurred to complainant's bill, of which the ordinance in question is made a part, thus admitting all facts therein stated as true,

no testimony was taken, and we are relegated to the bill for information as to the situation. An examination of the ordinance shows that the only right or privilege granted defendant's assignor is "permission and authority to construct, operate and maintain lines of telephone and electric wires with the necessary posts, poles, equipments and appurtenances, and to make business, house and building connections, and from time to time repair, replace, enlarge and extend the same upon, along and in the streets, alleys and public places in the city of Owosso, to carry on the business of telephoning and of renting electric telephones and of operating the telephones in the city of Owosso." The remainder of the ordinance is devoted to duties, obligations, and restrictions imposed on the company, including the limit of rates heretofore stated, with a closing paragraph fixing the life of the ordinance at 30 years, "provided that said company or its assigns shall continuously operate its said telephone line in said city of Owosso and shall observe the conditions hereinbefore mentioned."

Although the bill states that defendant "during its entire existence and down until a short time previous" to commencement of this suit had followed and obeyed the "provisions of said franchise," it gives no information as to when defendant was incorporated or how long it had existed, but simply states that, as assignee of the company named in the ordinance, it "is operated under and by virtue of the terms of said franchise and ordinance." The bill contains no allegation that there is or ever was or ever will be any delinquent subscriber who has been or could be injured in purse or person by this objectionable form of account promulgated by defendant on or about October 1, 1913. Until complainant or some of those in whose behalf it alleges this bill is filed become delinquent subscribers and an attempt is made to exact the extra 50

cents from them, it is difficult to discover what injury has been or can be done by that of which this bill complains.

It is true that complainant's bill charges defendant sent statements of account to its subscribers which, as made out, imposed a rate plainly in excess of that fixed by ordinance and previously charged, which, but for the explanatory note appended, would raise a more serious question. Read, however, with the explanation appended, they became innocuous and the extra charge disappeared as to all except delinquents, and we are not advised that there were any such. Defendant's counsel assert that the extra charge of 50 cents was intended for and amounted to notice of a rule imposing a penalty on those in default, and was no intimation of a purpose to depart, otherwise, from the regular rates previously charged. Clearly such is the meaning of the communication taken as a whole. Just why defendant, in giving notice of the rule, resorted to this roundabout and apparently irritating form of notice which declared an extra charge against all on the indicated assumption that all would be delinquent, with an implied generous proposal to rebate to the regular price if by chance they paid their bills when due, may possibly be accounted for on the theory of psychological myopia, but is unimportant here, for injury to feelings cannot be recognized as a ground of equitable relief by injunction.

This bill discloses no primary injury, no threatened irreparable injury, and no person of the class who might be affected by the proposed extra charge. Courts of equity may not lend aid by injunction in the abstract, and unconnected with any injury or damage to the person or persons asking relief.

On the face of this bill the questions raised are in their nature academic, and, irrespective of other reasons urged, we are constrained to sustain defendant's

contention that the bill should be dismissed for want of disclosed equities.

The order overruling defendant's demurrer is therefore reversed, with costs.

BROOKE, C. J., and STONE and MOORE, JJ., concurred with STEERE, J.

OSTRANDER, J. I concur in the result on the last ground discussed.

MCALVAY, KUHN, and BIRD, JJ., concurred with OSTRANDER, J.

OAKMAN v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF WAYNE COUNTY.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COUNTIES

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

CITIES ANNEXATION OF TERRITORY-LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS. Under the provisions of Act No. 279, Pub. Acts 1909 (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 5442 et seq.), it is required in voting upon the question of annexing territory to a city that a majority of the electors residing in the district to be annexed and in the city to be affected should consent to the proposed change, and although the act fails to grant to the board of supervisors any discretion to refuse to enter an order to submit to the voters the question of annexation, but requires the petition to be submitted to a vote, the act is not invalid and means provided are not in violation of the State Constitution.

2. SAME DELEGATION OF POWER-REFERENDUM. There is no valid ground of objection to delegating to a board of supervisors the authority to submit such question to the voters, and under the Constitution the method of referendum being recognized as proper and valid, the act was not void for that reason.

3. SAME-REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTS.

Considering the powers conferred by the statute in the light of constitutional provisions in relation to representative districts and apportionment (Art. V, §§ 3, 4, of the Constitution), the statute should be held to require that, in submitting the question to the electorate, the integrity of the representative district be maintained by including in the order submitting the question to a vote, a proviso that the territory may be annexed for all purposes except electing representatives to the State legislature.

4. SAME.

Having conferred upon the board of supervisors the authority to annex territory subject to a referendum, the statute carries with it the implied authority to make such incidental order as may become necessary to effect the purpose of the legislation.

MCALVAY and OSTRANDER, JJ., dissenting.

Certiorari to Wayne; Hosmer, J. Submitted January 5, 1915. (Calendar No. 26,562.) Decided April 6, 1915.

Mandamus by Robert Oakman against the board of supervisors of the county of Wayne to require the respondent to submit to a vote of the electorate the question of annexation of certain territory to the city of Detroit. An order denying the writ is reviewed by relator on certiorari. Reversed.

L. C. Stanley and George G. Scott, for appellant. Allan H. Frazer, Prosecuting Attorney, and Paul W. Voorhies, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.