knowledge is also exhibited in the critical animadverfions which occur in many parts of the work.

It is not our intention, nor would it, indeed, be compati ble with the plan of our work, to follow the author through his relation of events, which must be fresh in the recollection of all our readers. We fhall only notice particular parts of his hiftory; and make fuch extracts as contain either remarkable facts, or important obfervations. It is proper to state, however, that he expreffes himself, with becoming indignation, on the atrocious conduct of the French in facrificing every principle of honour and juftice, to the promotion of their intereft; and in giving a loose to that spirit of profaneness, licentiousness, and rapacity, which has rendered them the icourge of every country of which their arms or their arts have pro-, cured a permanent or even temporary poffeffion. Their grofs exaggerations in the account of the refpective loffes of themfelves and their enemies, are likewife fully expofed; and their impudent falfhoods confuted by correct and faithful efti

mates.

The fudden departure of the Archduke Charles from Switzerland, in the Autumn of 1799, immediately after the arrival of the Ruffian army under General Korfakow, and the fatal confequences that enfued, which blafted all the fruits of one of the most brilliant campaigns, of which modern hiftory affords, an example, are fully defcribed by the author, who feems to think, that the irruption which the French had made into the countries on the Mein and the Neckar juftified, in a confiderable degree, the conduct of that Prince; and who does not admit that the subsequent defeat of the Ruffians is to be solely, imputed to his removal from the Banks of the Limmat to those. of the Rhine; though he be decidedly of opinion that he, should have left a part of his force on the former of these, rivers.

"It is not however to that remote caufe that the misfortunes of the 25th and 26th of September, must be exclufively attributed. The delay which took place in the march of Marthal Suworow, the death of Gen. Hotze, and the bad conduct of Generals Petrarch and Korfakow, conftitute three other principal causes of these events.

When the delay, which took place in the march of Gen. Suworow, is fpoken of, it is not referred to the three days longer, which he remained in Italy in order to fecure the fall of Tortona. The great intereft which the French had in preventing it, and the demonftrations which Moreau made with this view, were motives which prudence could not reject. But what can never be excufed, and what must always be regretted is, the three or even four days which the negligence or bad faith of the Auftrian Generals caused Marthal Suworow to lofe in the

Italian

Italian Bailiwicks. It may be affirmed with perfect certainty, that it had been pofitively promifed him, that a fufficient number of beafts of burden for transporting the bread and baggage of his troops, fhould be collected and ready by the time at which he should arrive at Ta. verna. Those who fome way or other prevented the fulfilment of this promife, it must be allowed are extremely culpable, and indeed it is upon them that the refponfibility of all the reverfes which the allies experienced in Switzerland ought to fall. In fact, had Marshal Suworow been able to put his van-guard in motion on the 10th, instead of the 19th, and to have fet off himself on the 17th inftead of the zoth, he would have arrived at Altorf on the 22d or 23d,fthat is to fay, two or three days before the attack of Maffena. It would thus have been prevented; the forces of the allies would have remained entire. Hotze would have lived, and the invafion of the fmall Cantons would undoubtedly have been made by him with vigour, with concert, and moft probably with a fuccefs, which would have immediately feconded the operations of Marshal Suworow. Events very different from those regretted by Europe, it may be believed would have happened. It will be objected that if the Ruffian General had arrived fooner, Maffena would have alfo made his attack earlier; but this objection which naturally fuggefts itfelf, is deftroyed by the fact for Maffena was perfectly ignorant of the march of Marshal Suworow, and Lecourbe was on that point in fuch perfect fecurity, that when he put himself in movement at the fame time with the reft of the army, on the 24th, he found himself engaged in the valley of the Reufs, between the Ruf. fians and the column of Gen. Auffenburg. Since then, Marshal Suworow not arriving till the 26th, had concealed his march from the French, it appears evident that the cafe would have been more certainly the fame, if he had arrived three or four days fooner.

"It need not be repeated how fatal the death of Gen. Hotze was to the Allies. That able officer, fighting on and for his native country, would, perhaps, upon the 25th, have maintained his pofition against Gen. Soult, or at leaft his defence would have been more obftinate than that of his fucceffor. He certainly would not, like him, have fo precipitately evacuated the Toggenburg, the country of St. Gall, and the canton of Appenzell. He would have difputed the ground inch by inch, and would, perhaps, even have been able to do fomething in favour of his colleague Korfakow,. He would, it cannot be doubted, have juftified the confidence which Marshal Suworow had in him, and would have fupported him to the utmost of his power. It is proba ble that, in that cafe, the Marthal finding himself well fupported on his right, inftead of being obliged to retire into the Grifons, would have kept his poft in the fmall cantons, and that upon the return of the Archduke to the Rhine, the campaign might have been renewed with advantage,

"But the immediate caufes of the difafters of the 25th and 26th of September, were the faults of Generals Petrarch and Korfakow; thofe of the former have already been fufficiently pointed out; befides, to fay what Gen, Hotze would not have done, is to have faid what Gen.

Petrarch

Petrarch did do, and what he ought not to to have done. He fhewed himself on this occafion, as he had done fome months before, at Frauen-` feld, and, in 1796, at Kehl, and in the Black Foreft. To recal these Occurrences, is to fay enough against that General.

"It is a matter of regret, that the conduct of Gen. Korfakow cannot be more favourably fpoken of; his amiable qualities, his undoubted bravery, and the honourable ufe which he made of the favour he once enjoyed at the Court of Petersburg, would prevent any reflection was it not confidered that it is not on the man, but on the General, that a judgment is to be paffed. In the latter capacity he has been far from fulfiling the expectations, which were to be formed of a man who was selected to go, at the distance of 1,200 miles, to command an army destined to give the laft finishing to the fuccefs of the campaign. He had brought into Switzerland, or had formed very foon after he got there, prejudices against the Auftrians, which certainly were not juft to the length that he carried them; for if the military farce which they played off on the 27th of Auguft, and to affift at which they made him come up by forced marches, was not calculated to give him much confidence in their offenfive intentions, it ought not, however, to have made him believe that they were dif posed to betray and facrifice him. If information may be depended upon, fcarcely was he arrived, when, according to the order of his Sovereign, he required that an attack fhould be made, and did it fo keenly, that the Auftrians, though perhaps with no great fincerity, confented to it, and in confequence a plan of attack was formed. The part which was affigned to Gen. Korfakow, he thought too hazardous, and from that conceived that they wished to have him defeated. He refused to execute it, alledging that his troops were not accustomed to a war among mountains, which every reader will ob. ferve, was certainly the fame thing as to renounce it altogether in Switzerland."

The fubfequent conduct of General Korfakow, after he had affumed the chief command in Switzerland, and at the critical moment when his lines were attacked by the French, as well as during the retreat of his army, are clearly proved to have been molt injudicious, unfkilful, and improper. This General, and three others who served under him were difmiffed the fervice by their Sovereign. The conduct of Maffena is also feverely cenfured by our author, who fhews that he neglected the most favourable opportunities for attacking his enemies, and that, in the victory which he ultimately obtained, he was Indebted partly to chance," and derived from it only a small part of the advantages, which it ought to have produced. Of Suworow he speaks in very different terms,

"It is confoling to have to pafs from cenfure to admiration, and fuch is the cafe now, that the conduct of Marshal Suworow and his brave army be spoken of, When it is remembered that it was after

having

having come from the interior of Ruffia, and after a most active and bloody campaign of five months duration, that this army, reduced almost to the half of its original number, penetrated into the middle of the Alps, there to open a new campaign, to fight new battles, and to engage in a kind of warfare to which it was entirely unaccustomed, one is ftruck with admiration of thefe intrepid foldiers of their worthy commander, and of the Emperor Paul, who fubjected his troops to fuch labours for the benefit of the civilized world!

"The march of Marshal Suworow across the Alps, shall not here be celebrated, for the French and Auftrians had preceded him; but what must appear much more worthy of praise are the obftinate battles which he fought in the valley of Mutten, and in the canton of Glarus, the conftancy with which he and his army fupported every kind of privation, and the fatigues of a march which was a continued engagement. Generals Prince Bagration and Rofenburg, already fo diftinguished in Italy, acquired new glory in Switzerland. Marthal Suworow confirmed that with which he was already loaded, and gave fresh proofs of his refolution and heroifm. It has been faid, that he received, with much impatience, the accounts of the disasters experienced by Generals Petrarch and Korfakow, and certainly confidering how many projects were difappointed by them, and all the mifchief they did to the affairs of the Allies, it would have been astonishing if he had received them otherwife. He has likewife been reproached with afterwards lofing time in the canton of Schweitz, and perhaps with a certain degree of justice; but it is a noble fault to be flow in retiring before an enemy, and he did better than fly before his, for he ftopt and beat them.

Before finishing this chapter, fomething must be faid with regard to the lofs of men on both fides in Switzerland, from the 25th of September to the 9th of October. It would only be lofs of time to. refute the extravagant reports made by the French Generals in the in toxication of victory. The final eftimate fent by Maffena on the 9th of October, in which he ftated the total lofs of the Allies, at 30,000 nen, fhall only be attended to, and it may, without hefitation, be affirmed from various researches made on the fubject, that this statement was at least exaggerated by one half. The Auftrians loft few men on the 25th, and had no prifoners taken from them, and it would probably be going beyond the truth, when their numbers of killed and wounded is ftated at 1,000. The lofs of General Korfakow's army, which has been fo variously reported, was certainly not above 8,000 men in killed, wounded, and prifoners, Marshal Suworow in these three ways loft about 2,000 men. He likewife left fome fick and wounded at Glaris, as did Korfakow at Zurich; but their number could not amount to 2,000. In the three actions of the 9th of October, the Allies loft about 2,000 more, fo that on the whole, the void occafioned in their ranks in the courfe of three weeks, was about 15,000 men. There is reafon to believe that the lofs of the French in the fame period, did not exceed 9,000. They fuffered very little in their en

gagements

gagements with Generals Petrarch and Korfakow, and their principal lofs was in their combats with General Lincken, Bagration, and Rofenberg. Those who have seen service, and who know how much Gazettes, and even official reports, exaggerate the deftruction of men which is always too great in a human point of view, will not be furprifed to find here reduced fo much the loffes, which on both fides have been fwelled fo high. There never is a campaign in which the number of men in the Belligerent armies is not two or three times deftroyed by exaggeration or credulity. It is the duty of the hiftorian to avoid the one, and, if poffible, to fet right the other."

The following is a juft remark on the mode of carrying on war, and more particularly applicable to the prefent than to any former war :—

"War is a forced ftate of things to which every confideration foreign to it, and every fubaltern intereft must bend it is a game at which we tofe, as foon as we ceafe to gain: either we must not play it at all, or we must be determined to profit boldly by all its chances, and never to forget, that if that be not done, the enemy is there to punish the omiflion. It is a game in which, with parity of stake and of skill, he who only afpires to gain a little, muft end by becoming the victim of him who afpires to gain much. The Auftrians have perfonated the first of thefe gamblers, during almost the whole courfe of this war.**

There is another point to be taken into confideration in dif cuffing the events of the prefent war; if two hoftile powers. have equal military means and resources, and an equal extent of population; and one of them fpurning with contempt all principles of juftice and all restraints of law, whether national or general, facrifices every settled rule of action between rival States, and every focial tie which binds the people of the fame country to each other, and to those who govern them, to the gratification of its intereft, and the attainment of its ends;while the other power regulates its conduct to its enemy by the known and received principles of the law of nations, and to its fubjects by the maxims of juftice and the laws of the land; the former must have a decided advantage over the latter. This advantage the French have had in the prefent contest; and to this caufe may the greater part of their fucceffes be traced. The whole lofs of the Allies in Germany and Switzerland, during the campaigns of 1799, are estimated at 25,000, killed or dead of their wounds; that of the French at 30,000. The author adds: "It may be fuppofed, that at least one half of that number was rendered unfit for fervice, and therefore that the total waste of men able to bear arms, "was on the part

of