included in one sentence; and what renders this deviation from truth more inexcufable, is, that the very document which the author produces in fupport of his affertion, will alone fuffice to demonftrate its inaccuracy.

In adverting to the revolutionary fymptoms, which appeared in Holland, in 1787, and to the vigorous measures which the Stadtholder, in the first inftance, adopted for the purpose of checking, in its infancy, the rifing spirit of rebellion; the author obferves, "This event was the fignal of a civil war, which was equally defired by the English, who could not bear that the Republic fhould enjoy a ftate of tranquillity and happiness, under the PROTECTION of France; and the ardent patriots, who, concealing their views beneath the pretence of a fimple defence of their rights, only aimed, in fact, at the abolition of the office of Stadtholder." The fact is, that the ardent patriots aimed at no more than the French themselves, by whom, even accord> ing to the author's own account, they were ftimulated, encouraged, and affifted; and there is very little doubt, that the object of the French Cabinet, at the time, was to complete the plan which Louis XIV. had conceived, and which the French Regicides have fince executed, of fubjecting the provinces of Holland, either by arms or by intrigue, to the yoke of France. One paffage from the book before us, will, we conceive, fuffice to prove the truth of our affertion. It relates to a propofition made by one of the principle demagogues, and approved by France, to'depofe the Stadtholder.

"The Dutch patriots, in order to prevent the threatened explofion, proposed a laft mean of conciliation; and, at a conference bolden at the French Ambassador's, Giflaer, the moft eloquent, the most skilful, and the most infinuating, inan of his party, after having juftified the conduct of the ftates, in the prefence of Thulemeyer, and proved that it had been dictated by prudence, and regulated by wifdom, brought forward in a perfpicuous manner, all the facts which had deprived the Stadtholder not only of the confidence, but even of the efteem, of the nation, and demonftrated the impoffibility of any reconciliation with him; but, at the fame time, he gave the Ambaffador to understand, that an accommodation might be promoted with the Princess of Orange and her children, and the offices and the authority which the Prince had irrecoverably loft, be restored to them. This infinuation was approved by France."

The partial and falfe account which the author gives of these commotions in Holland, he profeffes to have taken, from a "Memorial on the Dutch Revolution, by Citizen Caillard, former Chargé d'Affaires at Petersburgh, the Hague and Berlin." But not content with having given us an abstract of the citizen's memorial, he next gives us the memorial, at L12 full

full length, which occupies confiderably more than one-half of the volume. In one point of view, indeed, the memorial itfelf is useful, fince it enables us to detect, more readily, the infidelity and inaccuracy of the author.

The Citizen-memorialift feems to entertain a strange idea of the law of nations; and to have very little knowledge of the different treaties which the states of Europe had been accuftomed to conclude between each other, frequently conftituting claufes, fpecifically pledging each of the contracting parties, to guarantee the conftitutions of each other's country, and their refpective territories. Alluding to the treaty between England and Holland, in 1787, which contained, on the part of the former, a fimilar claufe, the memorialist makes the following curious remarks.

"It is difficult to comprehend the fignification of a guarantee of their conftitution to a people; unless fuch guarantee has for its object to preserve that people from the efforts of every foreign power to fubvert their conftitution, against their will. But if it is to be understood, that the conftitution is fo to be controuled by the guarantee, that the people themselves lofe the right of changing it whenever they may think proper, nothing is more abfurd nor more contrary to the principles of the law of nations; it is repugnant to the very nature of things, that, when a nation has chofen for itself any form of Government whatever, and time and experience have demonftrated its abufes and its vices, the cannot change it at her pleasure, and fo be deprived of the most unalienable of her rights. This is the fecond example given to Europe of fuch a monftrous guarantee; the firft was, on the firft partition of Poland."

The Citizen it feems knows as little of hiftory as the author, or he would have known, that the French conftitution and territory were guaranteed to France by Great Britain, in the treaty of 1783; and that fimilar guarantees were in use before, and were not only juftified by cuftom, but were founded on the most obvious maxims of public juftice. As to the imaginary right of a people to change the conftitution of their country, at their pleasure, it would be a waste of time to confute the ridiculous pretenfion by ferious argument.

The memorialift concludes his account, with an obfervation perfectly explanatory of his whole defign, and, at the fame time, fully demonftrative of the real views of the French Cabinet, of the truth of our own remarks, and of the falfhood of the affertions of M. de Segur.

66

France, fince fhe has been free, has repaired the errors of Monarchical France. The liberty, which the Dutch laboured to establish in 1787, was a very imperfect liberty which ftill retained the germ of its own destruction, fince it preferved the Stadthold

erate,

erate. Now, founded on the facred and imprefciptible rights of man and of the citizen, it refts on an immoveable bafis. The new Batavian Republic, enlightened by experience, now knows how to diftinguish her friends," (i. e. the French) "from her natural ene-` mies" (i. e. the English.) "The English were not lefs her enemies in preferving the Stadtholder in 1787, than they are at this time in invading their territory, in order to ftifle liberty in her cradle. She has every reafons to acknowledge the identity of her interefts with thofe of the French Republic, and this conviction will no doubt render their union as durable as the existence of the two nations !!!"

The members of the French Cabinet, vexed at the defeat of their plans, endeavoured to recover the influence which they had loft, by forming a quadruple alliance, between France, Ruffia, Auftria, and Spain.

"Hitherto France had been feen, allied to Auftria and Spain, forcing England to conclude an humiliating peace, and honourably occupying the first rank among the great powers; it was difficult to believe that fhe would fuffer berfelf to be humbled, in her turn, without a ftruggle, by the enemy whom he had recently vanquished; and patiently allow the Elector of Brandenburgh to defeat her policy, overturn her work, rob her of her allies, and brave her power."

M. de Segur contends that the French Ministry should have declared war against England and Pruffia, without pretend-, ing to fhew the juftice or equity of fuch a proceeding, merely because it was their intereft fo to do, and becaufe by fo doing, they might have given a different direction to the domeftic troubles which had then begun to difturb the tranquillity of the kingdom. But fuch was the infidious, crooked, underhand policy, unhappily adopted by the statesmen of that country, that even the attempt to form the quadruple alliance was not by a fair, direct, and open propofition to the principal powers, but by hints, inuendoes, and infinuations.

"The French Minifter at Petersburgh (the author himself) received orders to act in concert with Cobentzel, the Imperial Ambaflader, and to make, fecretly, indirectly, and without committing the King, certain infinuations, for the purpofe of afcertaining the intentions of the Ruffian Court, and of learning whether the would not confent to unite with France, Auftria, and Spain, in order to oppose the threatning ambition of the English and Pruffians. The French minifter who was not in the fecret of his Cabinet, fulfilled the orders he had received with circumfpection, but with full fuccefs. Catherine, notwithstanding what the Englishman Eton has faid in his "Picture of the Ottoman Empire," was very much provoked by the intrigues of the King of Pruffia, and the Cabinet of

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London;

London; and knew pofitively that the Turks, in declaring war against her, had acted by their advice." (How this knowledge of a fact, which, notwithstanding what the Frenchman Ségur has faid in his "Political Picture of Europe," never had existence, was acquired, the author has not condefcended to explain. And certainly, nothing fo important can be taken on the bare credit of a writer who, in the three volumes before us, has deviated from the truth in a hundred inftances.) "She knew that these two powers excited Poland and Sweden against her; and this Princess, anxious to avail herself of the proffered opportunity for revenge, confidered the infinuations of the minifter of France, as a formal propofal for an alliance, told him that it was also the object of her wishes, that he would haften to conclude it, that it was only neceffary to obferve a profound fecrecy; that the fufpicions of the English might not be rouzed; and, that, in cafe the alliance should be formed, the gave it to be understood, that, as foon as the mercbantmen which England fends every year to Cronstadt in great numbers, fhould have arrived, he would lay an embargo on them which would make the English Minifter repent his hoftile conduct towards her." (If this be not a calumny of the author's, of which it is no want of charity to fufpect him, it is evident that Catherine has tranfmitted one, at leaft, of her maxims of political prudence and justice, to her fucceffor.) "She further engaged to make peace, on reasonable terms, with the Turks, through the mediation of France, and the required that the four allied Courts fhould guarantee the integrity of the Polish territory, in order to defeat the views, which fhe already forefaw, of the King of Pruffia, upon Thorn and Dantzick. It is manifeft, whatever political fyftem a man may support in other times, that, at this epoch, the quadruple alliance would have been attended with the happieft effects. It would have faved Poland, given peace and fecurity to Turkey, checked Sweden, and induced England and Pruffia to make such an arrangement in Holland, as would have conciliated all parties."

But all this difinterested project of the French Cabinet was, most unfortunately, fruftrated by the active vigilance of the British Minifter, at Petersburgh, MR. FRAZER, who difcovered the fecret, and immediately gave information of it to his Court.

In relating the tranfactions of the fhort war which enfued between the Ruffians and the Swedes, at this period, M. de Ségur attacks, with equal violence and injuftice, the character and defigns of the Swedish Monarch, and repeats fome fcandalous anecdotes which are evidently the unprincipled fabrications of party, and which there is good reafon to believe, were invented by the French and Ruffian politicians at Petersburgh, That the policy and diplomacy, adopted by the French, were repugnant to morality appears, alas! but too evident, in thefe pages. One inftance of perfidy is at once too grofs and

ɔo extraordinary, to pafs without particular notice; it almost eads one to believe, that every perfon employed by the `rench, in foreign countries, in whatfoever capacity, is a by, in the worft fenfe of the word. "The French engineer afiette, who had been fent two years before to the Porte, by be Cabinet of Verfailles, wrote word to the French Minister at Petersburgh, that Oczakow was not in a state to resist a regular fiege, more than three weeks." So, it appears, that M. de Ségur employed an officer who had been fent to proe an ally to give intelligence to the enemy of that ally, fo s to enable her to direct her attacks against fuch parts of his lominions as were least capable of defence. For it cannot for a noment be doubted, that, with the good understanding which, at that time, prevailed between the French Minister and the Court of Peterburgh, he would communicate to her all the information which he conceived might be of use to her. To the truth of the following remark, we readily fubfcribe, though that it should have efcaped the pen of M. de Ségur, at a moment when he was labouring to imprefs his readers with the idea, that all the defigns of France were alike pacific and difinterested, would have excited our furprize, had we not witneffed fuch numerous inftances of the imprudence of his confeffions, and the inconfiftency of his arguments. "If the French had been neighbours and enemies to the Ottoman empire, it would have long fince ceafed to exift." We firmly believe it; we believe alfo, that if France had been the neighbour of the Porte, fhe would have been her enemy; and we trust that this declaration will make a due impreffion on the Turkish Divan; and convince our countrymen of what we fhould have to expect from France, (if her ability were equal to her will), who are both her neighbour and her enemy.

(To be continued.)

ART. III. Mufcologia recentiorum feu Analyfis Hiftoria, et Defcriptio methodica omnium Mufcorum frondoforum hucufque cognitorum ad Normam Hedwigii, a Sam. El. Bridel. Tom.. PP. 179. Tom. II. PP. 222. Cum Tab. fex æneis. 1798, 1799. Gotha Ettinger, Price 2 rix dollars, 14 grofch.

in 4.

IN N the first chapter the author asks, Quid fit Mufcus? to which is replied Planta fructu calyptrato et OPERCULATO prædita. The latter, however, certainly is not applicable to the phafcum, where no proper operculum, but merely a rudimen

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tum