pected, instead of being swayed by the fair names of piety or generosity, calmly to calculate the danger to which she would expose herself by the effort which would be necessary for the deliverance of a weak unprofitable island. On the other hand Athens had sufficiently shown by many examples, that she would not be deterred or diverted from her purpose by threats, or by any attack made upon her in another quarter.

"The envoys withdrew, that the Melians might deliberate on their final answer; and when they were called in again, they were informed that the Melians would not so despair of their fortune, or distrust their natural allies, as all at once to renounce an independence of seven centuries: but they repeated their offer of neutrality, and a fair compromise. The Athenians, as they withdrew, expressed their surprise at the singular infatuation which was hurrying the Melians to inevitable ruin. The siege of the town was immediately begun, and the bulk of the armament did not withdraw until it was closely blockaded both by sea and land.

"The threats of the Athenians were accomplished; the hopes of the Melians proved baseless. It does not appear that so much as a thought was entertained at Sparta of stirring for their relief. The Spartans were too much occupied by the incursions with which about this time the Athenian garrison at Pylus was infesting their territory; and even these they only resented by permitting individuals to make reprisals on Athenian property. They neither aided Corinth, when on some private quarrel it renewed hostilities with Athens, nor seconded the efforts of the Argive exiles; the sacrifices, it was alleged, did not permit them to cross the border. The Melians, left to their own resources, made a gallant resistance. Twice. they succeeded in surprising a part of the Athenian lines, and introduced some supplies into the town. But toward the end of 416 a reinforcement was sent from Athens to the camp of the besiegers. As the place was pressed more closely, and the miseries of the siege began to be more generally

felt, symptoms of disaffection appeared within the walls, and the dread of treachery hastened the fall of the town, which surrendered at discretion.

"And now the Athenians crowned their unjust aggression with an act of deliberate cruelty. They put to death all the adult citizens, and enslaved the women and children. It would seem from the threats which Thucydides puts into the mouth of the Athenian speaker in the conference, that the same decree which ordered the expedition had also fixed the punishment to be inflicted on the Melians, if they resisted; as had been done in the case of Scione. In either case the guilt of proposing, or at least of supporting the inhuman decree, is laid to the charge of Alcibiades, whom we thus find sanctioning and even out doing the most hateful acts of Cleon's atrocities. For the case of Melos differed widely from those of Scione and Mitylene. The Athenians themselves were conscious that they had not the shadow of a right to the island; and even if the conquest had been really necessary for the security of their empire, the utmost straining of the tyrant's plea could not palliate the extermination of the inhabitants. Indeed it seems probable that they, and especially Alcibiades, were instigated to this deed rather by their hatred of Sparta, than by any abstract principle, or by resentment against the Melians themselves.

"The language of the Athenians in the conference at Melos has been often thought to indicate an extraordinary degree of moral obliquity, and has been attributed to the pernicious influence of the sophists; and perhaps it is true that their doctrines lie at the bottom of the whole argument. But on the other hand it may be observed that the Athenian speaker only rejects the obligations of justice as a rule in political transactions, and that the expediency to which he professes to sacrifice it is the good of the state. Further than this the question did not lead him; and this conclusion, though quite untenable in theory, seems to flow from the idea which generally prevailed among the ancients, as

to the paramount claims of the public interest over every other consideration. The conduct of the Athenians in the conquest of Melos is far less extraordinary than the openness with which they avow their principles. But, unjust as it was, it will not to a discerning eye, appear the more revolting, because it wanted that varnish of sanctity, by which acts of much fouler iniquity have been covered in ages which have professed to revere a higher moral law. Their treatment of the vanquished whatever may have been its motive-was unworthy of a civilized nation. Yet some allowance may fairly be claimed for the general rigour of the ancient usages of war. The milder spirit of modern manners would not have punished men who had been guilty of no offence but the assertion of their rightful independence, more severely than by tearing them from their families, and locking them up in a fortress, or transporting them to the wilds of Scythia. But our exultation at the progress of humanity may be consistent with a charitable indulgence for the imperfections of a lower stage of civilization."¶

A learned modern writer has enumerated the following points as constituting the rude outlines of the public law observed among the Grecian states. 1. The rights of sepulture were not to be denied to those slain in battle. 2. After a victory no durable trophy was to be erected. 3. When a city was taken, those who took refuge in the. temples could not lawfully be put to death." 4. Those guilty of sacrilege were denied the rights of sepulture. All the Greeks were allowed, in time of war as well as peace, to consult the oracles, to resort to the public games and temples, and to sacrifice there without molestation.s

5.

These limitations of the extreme rights of war were en

Thirlwall's Hist. of Greece, Vol. iii. pp, 358, 362.

Yet the Orchomenians who had taken refuge in a temple after the capture of their city by Cassander were all massacred, παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ Ελλήνων voupa, says Diodorus, l. xix. 63.

Saint-Croix, anciens Gouvernemens fédératifs, p. 51.

forced by the council of the Amphyctions, which however was a religious rather than political institution, and as such took cognizance of international offences against the laws and customs sanctioned by the national superstition.t

The exclusively religious character of the Amphyctionic confederacy is also asserted by the same able historian. above quoted. "The original objects," says he, "or rather the essential character of the institution, seem to be faithfully expressed in the terms of the oath, preserved by Eschines, which bound the members of the league to refrain from utterly destroying any Amphyctionic city, and from cutting off its supply of water, even in war, and to defend the sanctuary and the treasures of the Delphic god from sacrilege. In this ancient and half-symbolical form we perceive two main functions assigned to the council; to guard the temple, and to restrain the violence of hostility among Amphyctionic states. There is no intimation of any confederacy against foreign enemies, except for the protection of the temple; nor of any right of interposing between members of the league, unless where one threatens the existence of another. It is true, that this right, though expressly limited to certain extreme cases, might have afforded a pretext for very extensive interference, if there had been any power capable of using it; but so far was the obligation of the oath from being strained beyond its natural import, that no period is known when it was enforced even in its simplest sense. The object of mitigating the cruelty of warfare among the Amphyctionic tribes was either never attained, or speedily forgotten. In the historical period, the remembrance of the oath seems never to have withheld any of the confederates from inflicting the worst evils of war upon their brethren; much less could it introduce a more humane spirit into the nation."u

Saint-Croix, anciens Gouvernemens fédératifs, p. 51. "Thirlwall's Hist. of Greece, vol. i. pp. 380, 381.

Theory of It has been questioned whether the ancient nations had power among any idea of a systematic arrangement, such as has been

the balance of

the ancient

nations.

established in modern times, for securing to different states within the same sphere of political action, the undisturbed possession of their independence and existing territories. Hume has attempted to show that the system of the balance of power, if not reduced to a formal theory, was at least practically adopted by the ancient states of Greece and the neighboring nations. In support of this idea, he states that Thucydides represents the league formed against Athens, previous to the Peloponnesian war, as an application of this principle. After the decline of Athens, and when the supremacy over Greece was contested between the Lacedemonians and Thebans, we find, says he, that the Athenians endeavored to preserve the balance by throwing themselves into the lighter scale. They supported Thebes against Sparta, until the victory of Epaminondas at Leuctra gave the ascendancy to the former; after which they immediately went over to the conquered, from generosity, as they pretended, but, in reality, from their jealousy of the conquerors.w

Demosthenes, in his oration for the Megapolitans, lays down the maxim that the interest of Athens required that both Sparta and Thebes should be weak. But the situation of Thebes at this juncture was very critical, and it was apprehended that she might sink in the contest she was then prosecuting with her rival. On the other hand, if Sparta succeeded against Megapolis, she would find it less difficult to reduce Messene; and this addition to her strength when that of Thebes was impaired, would destroy the balance between the two leading states which it must be the interest of Athens to preserve. On these grounds

▾ Hume's Essays, vii. on the balance of power.

w Xenoph. Hist. Greece, l. vi. vii.