now placed herself at the head of a coalition, as impolitic as it was unjust, by which the greater part of the Austrian dominions were to be partitioned between Bavaria, Saxony, Prussia, and Spain.

The parties to this league had not the same motives to justify or excuse their disregard of the rights and wishes of the inhabitants of the countries they adjudged to themselves as were plausibly alleged by the authors of the treaties for the partition of the dominions of the Spanish monarchy at the beginning of the same century. These treaties were made to preserve, this to disturb the balance of Europe. Frederic II, in his memoirs, takes but little pains to justify his claim to the Silesian duchies in point of right; but rests his attack upon Austria in 1740 upon those motives which military conquerors usually deem sufficient to warrant their successful acts of aggression.

In his Anti-Machiavel, Frederick had stated the grounds upon which a sovereign might justly engage in war, in a manner which does equal honour to his head and heart.

"It is the object of the war which renders it just or unjust. The passions and ambition of princes often dazzle their vision and paint in the most alluring colours the most violent actions. War is a resource in extremity, and is to be resorted to with caution and only in cases admitting of no other remedy. Princes ought therefore to search their hearts in order to determine whether they are moved by the suggestions of pride and ambition or by solid rea

son.

"Defensive wars are doubtless the most just.

There are wars of interest, which sovereigns are compelled to undertake in order to vindicate their just rights. In this case arms must decide the validity of the reasons alleged.

Anti-Machiavel of Frederick II.

curer à la France la garantie de l'empire du traité de Vienne." (Oeuvres posthumes de Frederic II, tom. i. Histoire de mon Temps, ch. 2.)

"There are wars of precaution, which princes act wisely in undertaking. These are certainly offensive wars, but they are not the less just on that account. Where the excessive aggrandizement of one power threatens to overwhelm all others, it is the part of wisdom to oppose barriers to its encroachments whilst there is yet time to stay the torrent. The clouds are seen to gather, the lightning announces a coming storm, and the sovereign, who is unable to contend against the tempest, will, if he is wise, unite himself with all those who are menaced by the same common danger. Had the kings of Egypt, Syria, and Macedonia confederated together against the Roman power, they would not have fallen under its oppressive yoke; an alliance prudently contested, and a war carried on with energy would have saved the ancient world from universal despotism.

"It is the part of prudence to prefer lesser evils to greater, and to choose a certain rather than an uncertain course of policy. A prince will therefore act more wisely to engage in an offensive war, while he has yet the option between the olive branch and the laurel, than to await an open declaration of war, which may leave him without the means of effectual resistance. It is a sure maxim that it is better to anticipate others, than to be ourselves anticipated; of which great men have constantly availed themselves by exerting their strength whilst it is yet entire, thus antici pating the designs of their enemies, before they have been carried into execution.

"Many princes have been involved in war by treaties of alliance, obliging them to furnish a certain proportion of auxiliary forces. As no sovereign in Europe is sufficiently powerful to dispense with the aid of others, these treaties of alliance are formed for the purpose of mutual support in case of need. The event decides which of the two allies derives the greatest advantage from the compact. A fortunate conjuncture favors one of the contracting parties at one time, a different state of circumstances is advantageous to

the other party, at another. Probity and worldly wisdom, both equally require that princes should religiously observe the faith of treaties, that they should scrupulously fulfil them, the more so as they thereby secure a more efficacious protection to their subjects.

"Every war, then, which has for its exclusive object to repel usurpation, to maintain legitimate rights, to guarantee the freedom of the universe, and to avert the design of ambition, is a just war. The sovereign who undertakes such a war, cannot reproach himself with the blood which may be shed in the contest. He acts from uncontrollable necessity, and under such circumstances, war is a less evil than peace.

"But war, in general, brings with it so many calamities, its issue is so uncertain, and its consequences are so ruinous to a country, that princes cannot sufficiently reflect before they resort to this extremity. The ravages committed by their troops in the enemy's country are nothing in comparison with the calamities war entails upon the state by which it is undertaken. It is therefore the more extraordinary that so many sovereigns engage rashly in this dreadful alternative.

"I am persuaded that if monarchs could present to themselves a true and faithful picture of the calamities inflicted upon a nation by a single declaration of war they would not be insensible to the impression. It is indeed hardly possible that they should form an adequate conception of evils from which their lot exempts them. How can they feel the weight of taxation, by which the people are oppressed? the loss of youthful population inflicted by the recruiting system? the contagious diseases by which whole armies are swept away? the horrors of battles and sieges. still more horrible? the desolation of the wounded, deprived of those limbs on which depend their means of subsistence? of the widows and orphans, who have lost, by the death of their husbands and fathers, their sole support? the

destruction of so many useful citizens, prematurely mowed down by the scythe of death in the flower of their age?

"Princes, who ought only to live to reign for the benefit of mankind, should reflect well before exposing them, for frivolous and vain causes, to the most dreadful sufferings of which human nature is capable.

"Sovereigns who regard their subjects as slaves may risk their existence without pity, and see them perish without regret; but princes who consider their fellow men as their equals, and the people as the body of which they are the soul, should be sparing of the blood of their subjects."b

These sentiments, worthy of a Fenelon in the benevolent spirit they breathe, and at the same time not too refined to be capable of practical application by the ruler of a state, did not prevent Frederick from reviving an antiquated claim of the house of Brandenburg to several duchies in Silesia which had been in the undisputed possession of Austria ever since the peace of Westphalia. In vain did Austria set up the guaranty of the pragmatic sanction by his father Frederick William 1. He alleged that the guaranty was conditional, and that the condition had never been performed. His real motives are avowed in his private correspondence, which discloses the love of glory, ambition, the desire of employing the army and treasure his father had bequeathed to him, in the aggrandizement of Prussia, as the secret springs by which he was moved. His ostensible

b Oeuvres de Frederic II, tom. ii p. 155. edit. Berlin, 1789.

It is well known that the Anti-Machiavel was revised and corrected by Voltaire, who published the first edition, in which he took the liberty of making several material alterations, which the author subsequently disavowed. On comparing the passage cited in the text from the edition of the works of Frederick "du vivant de l'auteur," with the 26th chapter of the edition of the Anti-Machiavel published in 1834 by my learned friend Dr. Friedlaender, from an original manuscript in the handwriting of Frederick, I do not find any material variation in the thoughts, though the style is much less pure and correct in this last mentioned edition.

Oeuvres posthumes, tom. viii. pp. 154, 155, 161-164, 210. Correspondance avec Jordan.

claim was to four duchies, and he seized the whole pro-
vince. Having secured his conquest, Frederick immedi-
ately abandoned his allies, upon pretexts which are equally
inconsistent with the sound principles laid down in the
above commentary upon Machiavel, of fidelity to an ally
even when the contract turns out exclusively to his advan-
tage. Silesia was ceded to Prussia, by the treaty of Bre-
slau, confirmed by that of Dresden, in 1745; and Frederick
left France and his other allies to fight it out with Austria.
But the elector of Bavaria, who had been chosen emperor
under the title of Charles VII, having died in the same.
year, his son and successor renounced his pretensions to
the imperial dignity, as well as to the hereditary states of
Austria, and a general peace was at last concluded at Aix
la Chapelle, in 1748, by which the former state of posses-
sion established by the treaties of Westphalia and Utrecht
was confirmed, except the cession of Silesia to Prussia,
and of the duchies of Parma and Guastalla to the Infant
Don Philip.
The pragmatic sanction of Charles VI, and
the succession of the house of Hanover to the British
throne, were also recognized by the peace of Aix la Cha-
pelle, which was based upon the Status quo ante bellum,
excepting the territorial cessions by Austria. It left Aus-
tria still a first rate power, whilst it raised Prussia, with
unequal forces to the same rank.

The peace of Aix la Chapelle planted the seeds of an other war between France and Great Britain, which broke out in 1756, upon a question of the disputed boundaries between their respective territories in North America. The British made reprisals upon the French commerce at sea, before the actual declaration of hostilities, upon the ground that the hostile movements of the French forces and their allies the Indians on their frontiers of Canada constituted a previous aggression.d George II formed,

§ 2. Seven years war.

In the celebrated report of the English civilians made in 1753, upon