with Great Britain at Amiens in 1802; with Austria at Campo Formio in 1797; at Luneville in 1801; at Presburg in 1805; at Vienna in 1809; with Prussia and Russia at Tilsit in 1807. It is only necessary to examine the various manifestoes published by the allied powers on the rupture of each of these temporary suspensions of hostilities, to be convinced that it was not so much any immediate provocation on the part of France, as the indications furnished, by her general conduct and policy, of designs inconsistent with the maintenance of a just balance of power in Europe, which induced the allies again to take up arms. The danger of universal monarchy, once perhaps vainly apprehended from the ambitious designs of the houses of Austria and Bourbon, was at last realized from the genius of one man, who wielded with unexampled energy the vast natural resources of France, whose power of aggression had been fearfully augmented by revolution and conquest. This long protracted and violent struggle was too often marked in its course by the most flagrant violations of the positive law of nations, almost always accompanied, however, by a formal recognition of its general maxims, and excused or palliated on the ground of overruling necessity, or the example of others justifying a resort to retaliation. The mighty convulsion, in which all the moral elements of European society seemed to be mingled in confusion, at last subsided, leaving behind it fewer traces of its destructive progress than might have been expected, so far as regards a general respect for the rules of justice acknowledged by civilized communities in their mutual intercourse. It is true that the war of the French revolution was finally closed by the complete triumph of the principle of armed intervention asserted by the allied powers, but not until the conduct of France had justified their interference, (which at first might have appeared an unwarrantable aggression,) not merely in attempting to propagate her principles, but in seeking to extend her dominion by the sword. After having occupied the greater part of the continent by her

victorious army, she was at last stripped of all her conquests made since 1791, and reduced by the peace of Paris 1814-15 to her ancient limits and possessions, with the exception of the department of Vaucluse and other enclaves permanently united to France, and of certain fortresses on the northern frontier ceded by her to Prussia and to the kingdom of the Netherlands.

By the 7th article of the treaty of Paris, 1814, the sovereignty of the island of Malta, the dispute respecting which had been the ostensible cause of the rupture of the peace of Amiens, was confirmed to Great Britain.

By the 8th article, France ceded to Great Britain the islands of Tobago, Saint Lucia, and Mauritius with their dependencies; whilst she receded to Spain that part of St. Domingo which had been ceded to France by the treaty of Basle. Great Britain, at the same time restored to France all the colonies, factories, and establishments of every kind possessed by the latter power on the 1st of January, 1792, in the seas and upon the continents of America, Asia, and Africa.

By a separate convention signed at London on the 13th of August, 1814, between Great Britain and Holland, the latter power ceded to the former the cape of Good Hope, with the colonies of Demarara, Essequibo, and Berbice; whilst Great Britain restored to Holland the colonies, factories, and establishments of which the latter was in possession on the 1st of January, 1803, in the seas and upon the continents of America, Asia, and Africa. The effect of this stipulation was to leave Great Britain in possession of the island of Ceylon which had been ceded to her by Holland at the peace of Amiens.

By a convention signed at Paris on the 5th of November, 1815, between Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, it was stipulated that the seven Ionian islands should form a distinct free and independent state under the denomina

§ 11. Congress of Vienna.

tion of the United States of the Ionian Islands, and under the immediate protection of Great Britain.▾

The treaty of Paris, 1814, had laid down the general basis on which the final pacification of Europe was to be concluded, and had referred to a general congress, to be assembled at Vienna, the arrangements necessary to complete the dispositions of that treaty.

By the first of the secret articles of the treaty the four allied powers, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, reserved to themselves exclusively the disposition of the territories ceded by France in the third article of the patent treaty; and it was stipulated, that the relations, from which a system of permanent equilibrium was to result, should be regulated at the congress upon such bases as should be determined among the allies.

By the second secret article, the King of Sardinia was to receive the state of Genoa as an accession to his territories.

By the third secret article, the countries comprised between the sea, the new frontiers of France, and the Meuse, were to be perpetually annexed to Holland; and the freedom of navigation on the Scheldt to be reestablished, on the same principles, which regulated in the patent treaty

that of the Rhine.

By the fourth secret article, the countries of Germany on the left bank of the Rhine, which had been annexed to France since 1791, were to be appropriated to the aggrandizement of Holland, and to the indemnification of Prussia, and other states.

On the meeting of the congress, the four great allied powers, at first, asserted the pretension of disposing of the territories ceded by France, without consulting that power, or the other states represented in the congress. But this pretension was ultimately renounced, in point of form; and

a directing committee was constituted, consisting of the representatives of the eight powers, parties to the treaty of Paris, viz: Austria, Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Spain, Sweden, and Portugal. To this committee was referred the disposition of the vacant territories and the other general business of the congress.

This general committee named three other select committees, to the first of which was referred the organization of the federal compact of Germany, to the second the affairs of Switzerland, and to the third those of Italy.

In the discussion of the territorial arrangements consequent upon the peace, several important questions arose, which might seem to require an appeal to the strict principles of international law, but which were ultimately determined by considerations of policy, and that state necessity which has been too often substituted in the place of justice in the transactions of nations.

§ 12. Questions of Poland

The most important of these questions was that of Poland, which was also closely connected with that of Saxony. and Saxony. These joint questions were referred to a select committee consisting of the representatives of the five great powers. Russia had reconquered, and insisted upon retaining all that part of ancient Poland which had been erected by Napoleon into a new state, under the title of the Duchy of Warsaw, and of which the King of Saxony was the nominal sovereign. Prussia also claimed the entire kingdom of Saxony by right of conquest, and as an indemnity for the territories she had lost by the peace of Tilsit in 1807. These two powers mutually sustained each other's pretensions, which were opposed, wholly or partially, by Austria, France, and Great Britain.

In the discussion of these joint questions, the British plenipotentiary, Lord Castlereagh, declared that if the incorporation of all the Saxon states into the Prussian monarchy could be shown to be necessary for the reconstruction of that monarchy on a solid foundation, he would have no hesitation in assenting to such a measure on the part of

his government. But if this incorporation were intended to indemnify Prussia for the losses of territory allotted to her in the final partition of Poland, which territory was now to be annexed to Russia, thus placing the former power in a state of evident dependence upon the latter, Great Britain would never consent to such an arrangement. He also addressed several memoirs to the Emperor Alexander, in which he protested against the erection of a kingdom of Puland, which should be united to, and which should make part of the Russian empire, and expressed the desire of his court to see an independent power, more or less considerable in extent, established in Poland under a distinct dynasty, and forming an intermediate state between the three great monarchies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia.w

The Prussian plenipotentiary, Prince Hardenberg, in a memoir annexed to his note of the 20th December, 1814, treated the question of the proposed incorporation of Saxony under the three following points of view:

1. According to the principles of the law of nations. 2. According to the political interests of Germany. 3. According to the interest of Saxony herself.

Under the first head, which is all that is material to our present purpose, it was stated that the right of conquest gives a lawful title to acquire the sovereignty of a conquered country. The authority of the public jurists was

cited to this effect.

The qualification of the principle cited by the Prussian minister from Vattel, that the right acquired by conquest

w Klüber, Acten des Wiener Congresses, vii. B'd, 5, 6. Grotius, de J. B. ac P. lib. iii. cap. viii. § 1.

"Les immeubles, les villes, les provinces passent sous la denomination de l'ennemi, qui s'en empare, mais l'acquisition ne s'en consomme, la proprieté ne devient stable et parfaite que par le traité de paix, ou par l'entière soumission et extinction de l'état auquel ces provinces appartenaient.” (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 13, § 197.)