could be a matter of indifference to the British parliament, or, he should hope, to the British public. Constitutional states he considered to be the natural allies of this country; and whoever might be in office conducting the affairs of Great Britain, he was persuaded that no English ministry would perform its duty if it were inattentive to the interests of such states. But it was one thing to admit the importance of the question, and the deep interest the country ought to take in it, and another to argue that the government should adopt any particular course of proceeding which an honourable member might advise; and the noble lord was not prepared to accede to the proposal with which the honourable gentleman had concluded his address, because he did not think that the state of affairs in Europe, and the complexion assumed by the transactions to which the motion referred, were such as to call, at present, for those steps which the honourable gentleman recommended. He entirely agreed in the honourable gentleman's view of the objects for which the Germanic confederation was formed by the treaty of Vienna. The principal object for which that confederation was formed, was not only the internal and external safety of the states which composed it, but also the maintenance inviolate of their separate and individual independence. It, therefore, could not be denied, that any thing which threatened to destroy or violate that independence, would be inconsistent with the principles on which the confederation was established; and would, so far, be a departure from the treaty of Vienna, to which all the great powers of Europe were contracting parties. But what was the state of these transactions as far as they had gone? He was not standing there to express his approbation to those resolutions of the diet, upon which the honourable gentleman had founded his motion: perhaps a British minister was not called on to pronounce a judgment, one way or the other, on the acts of independent governments, who must be considered, prima facie, the most competent judges of what suited their wants and existing situation.

Whether these resolutions, therefore, did, or did not, outstep the necessity of the case, he was, perhaps, as one of the ministry, not called on to say; but, in his own private opinion, he could not help entertaining an apprehension, that the governments who had entered in these resolutions, had over-estimated the dangers against which they were endeavouring to guard, and had not framed with the greatest possible degree of discretion that measure which they proposed to apply as a remedy for the danger. But though he could go thus far with the honourable gentleman, prudence and discretion required that they should rather look dispassionately at what had occurred, than come to a hasty conclusion as to what might yet take place. Uncertain facts and doubtful surmises ought not to be the basis of any important proceedings. But all that they knew at present was, that a certain number of independent sovereigns, united in a confederation, which is sanctioned by all the great powers of Europe, had unanimously adopted certain resolutions applicable only to their own states, and not involving any point whatever which concerned their foreign relations with other independent sovereigns. It, therefore, appeared to him that other states could not found any just ground for interference with these governments on the resolutions which they themselves had voluntarily adopted. In respect to British relations with foreign states, they could only consider the acts of the governments of those states; because looking externally at the states themselves, it was by the acts of their governments alone that foreign governments were able to judge of their intentions. The honourable gentleman seemed to apprehend that these resolutions, if carried into effect to their fullest extent, might, in the first place, create differences between the sovereigns and their subjects, and subsequently give rise to serious misunderstandings among the members of the confederation themselves. But, in looking at these resolutions, they must not shut their eyes entirely to the facts which had gradually led to the adoption of those resolutions; and it was

unquestionable that there were many appearances in Germany of a disposition to disturb the internal tranquility of the confederation on grounds which would not justify that disturbance. He alluded to several public meetings, and more particularly to the meeting which took place at Hambach, with all the symptoms of excitement which were there exhibited. He would not deny that if the resolutions of the diet were acted on to their fullest extent, steps might be taken which would so trench on individual rights, and which would cause such serious differences among the Germanic body as might render it impossible to hope that the peace of Europe could be preserved; and if the peace should be broken on such grounds as these, it would perhaps give rise to a war, not merely between the states of Germany, but a war of opinion which would spread its influence beyond the country where it had its source; in which case Great Britain would not only be entitled, but called on to take such steps, as circumstances might require, to preserve Europe against the consequences of such' an injurious and extensive principle of warfare. But when the honourable gentleman called on the house to address his majesty to use his influence with the Germanic confederation, it might in the first place be asked in what capacity he wished the sovereign to interfere; whether he wished him to interfere as king of Hanover or as king of England? Because, if it was as king of Hanover, he should think that the honourable gentleman would, on reflection, see that the British house of commons had no claim to make

such a request. But if the honourable gentleman proposed this address to the king, as sovereign of Great Britain, and as party to the treaty of Vienna, which established and secured the independence of these states of Germany, he should then say that the ground on which he resisted the motion was the ground of discretion. Not that he denied that the king of England had a right to express his opinion on this matter, (for he agreed with the honourable gentleman that such a right must undoubtedly have existed,) but

because he thought that nothing had yet occurred which called for such an interposition on the part of his majesty, or on the part of that house, for such a premonition as was implied in the motion. At the same time he could assure the honourable gentleman that the government was not inattentive to those important events to which he had so ably drawn the attention of the house. He could also assure him, that even without such an address as he had proposed, the advisers of his majesty would deem it their duty to keep their attention fixed on those circumstances which were then taking place on the continent of Europe, never, he trusted, undervaluing their deep importance with reference to England; because let persons recommend as they would the propriety of England withdrawing herself from all political connection with the rest of the world, his opinion was, that so long as her commerce was of importance to her, so long as continental armies were in existence, so long as it was possible that a power in one quarter might become dangerous to a power in another; so long must that country look with interest to the transactions on the continent, and so long was it proper for her, in the maintenance of her own independence, not to shut her eyes to any thing that threatened the independence of Germany. But he could not bring himself to believe that the alarm of the honourable gentleman was really well-founded; he could not believe. that any one administering the affairs of a great country could take so erroneous a view of its own interests, or of the interests of society, as to wish to deprive independent states of those constitutional rights, which were such a blessing to themselves, and certainly were no injury to their neighbours. He could not believe that such a wish existed, where there was power to carry that wish into effect; or even if such a wish did exist, he could not believe that those who had the desire deemed it possible for them, in the present state of the world, to carry that wish into execution. He could not believe that they could think it practicable by mere military force, to deprive millions of men

§ 14. Affairs of Italy.

of those constitutional privileges which had been formally conceded to them; because that would be to impute to them a want of knowledge and judgment, under which it was impossible to suppose persons to labour, whose extensive experience must have led them to a far different conclusion. He was, therefore, convinced that the intention of these resolutions, (however calculated they might be to excite alarm,) was merely to guard against those local dangers, the existence of which it was impossible to deny, though he thought their magnitude and importance had been greatly exaggerated. Under these circumstances he could not but believe that these governments, on whose decision might depend not only the fate of Germany, but the peace of Europe, would, so soon as the contemplated purpose of guarding against those local dangers was accomplished, have sufficient wisdom to abstain from pursuing the matter to further extremities, and would foresee those perils which their moderation and forbearance might prevent. He could not but believe that while, on the one hand, the violent party, which was but small, would abstain from exciting further alarm, so, on the other hand, the governments would see that there could be no advantage in trenching on the rights of the constitutional states, but that their own interests, as well as the interests of all Europe, would be most promoted by the preservation of peace. Under these circumstances, he felt it to be his duty to give a negative to the motion.

The motion was accordingly negatived by the house,¶ By a secret article of the treaty of Toeplitz of the 9th September, 1813, between the four allied powers, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, the reconstruction of Austria, upon a scale proportioned to that of 1805, had been stipulated. In order to accomplish this engagement,

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, vol. xiv. pp. 1020